TW
Tripwire
Find contracts. Test them. Review real vulns.
Contract
0xcad333e2f7ec4058aa5ba825a5de8af4139490c9 checked chain 1
Dedaub
Queue = batch runner. Audit = immediate run. Audit + LLM forces codex.
Value & Balances
$2.72
last balance 3 months ago
ETH
0.0009
WETH
0.0000
USDC
0.00
USDT
0.00
Findings Signal
2
confirmed findings
crit 0 high 2 unconfirmed 4 total 6
validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others

Proxy & Workflow

linkage
Proxy status
non-proxy
Implementation address
Proxies pointing here
0
Workflow
checked
attempts 1
checked 1 week ago

Latest Findings

validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others
Severity Tool Title Validated Confirmed
high detector Untrusted CALL target/value reachable yes yes
high detector ETH value transfer possible yes yes
Show unconfirmed findings
Severity Tool Title Validated Confirmed
high detector SELFDESTRUCT reachable no no
medium codex Oracle callback accepts any authorized sender response without validating a pending query id no
medium codex Public `update()` path can spend ETH from contract balance on oracle queries no
low codex Privileged kill switch can sweep balance via `SELFDESTRUCT` no

Codex

latest run
complete bytecode findings
Runtime bytecode matches an Oraclize/Provable-style oracle client with a public `update()` path, a `__callback(bytes32,string,bytes)` entrypoint, and a privileged `kill()` path. Based on runtime-only evidence, the main i...
Top findings
  • medium Oracle callback accepts any authorized sender response without validating a pending query id
  • medium Public `update()` path can spend ETH from contract balance on oracle queries
  • low Privileged kill switch can sweep balance via `SELFDESTRUCT`

Code Metadata

fingerprint
Created block
1469067
Code size
2204
Codehash
0xb1fc278728ff61b8338d41c1c1eba823f11bbb815560a5d95a88c6fa6cee18bf
Priority score
2.718852

Recent Runs

last 20
Run ID Status Validated Total findings Created
019b3836-3fab-72b2-b454-064ea28d2ebf complete crit 0 high 2 6 3 months ago