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Tripwire
Find contracts. Test them. Review real vulns.
Contract
0xc06053fcad0a0df7cc32289a135bbea9030c010f checked chain 1
Latest run: 019c0eab-909f-728c-9614-1375a52b5654 complete
Dedaub
Queue = batch runner. Audit = immediate run. Audit + LLM forces codex.
Value & Balances
$0.00
last balance 3 months ago
ETH
0.0000
WETH
0.0000
USDC
0.00
USDT
0.00
Findings Signal
0
confirmed findings
crit 0 high 0 unconfirmed 6 total 6
validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others

Proxy & Workflow

linkage
Workflow
checked
attempts 0
checked 2 months ago

Latest Findings

validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others
No confirmed findings yet.
Show unconfirmed findings
Severity Tool Title Validated Confirmed
high cast SELFDESTRUCT present no —
high detector Untrusted CALL target/value reachable no no
high detector ETH value transfer possible no no
high detector SELFDESTRUCT reachable no no
high slither SimpleERC20Escrow.pay(address,uint256) (contracts/Contract.sol#34-38) ignores return value by token.transfer(recipient,amount) (contracts/Contract.sol#37-38) no —
low codex Unchecked ERC20 transfer return value can mask failed payouts no —
From run 019c0eab-909f-728c-9614-1375a52b5654 suppressed 1 initializer finding view all

Codex

latest run
complete source findings
Two issues: proxy initialization can be hijacked to set an arbitrary market, and ERC20 transfers ignore return values which can mask failed payments.
Top findings
  • low Unchecked ERC20 transfer return value can mask failed payouts
View run

Code Metadata

fingerprint
Created block
—
Code size
920
Codehash
0x3f1b03344f575d1a57970cdc0466fd536bd253467e0a9cb65dfc766c69971fcd
Priority score
0.000000
Latest run id
—

Recent Runs

last 20
Run ID Status Validated Total findings Created
019c0eab-909f-728c-9614-1375a52b5654 complete crit 0 high 0 7 2 months ago