TW
Tripwire
Find contracts. Test them. Review real vulns.
Contract
0x4f40e2f1edf9999124b2fcf26b04821e6ca7196d checked chain 1
Dedaub
Queue = batch runner. Audit = immediate run. Audit + LLM forces codex.
Value & Balances
$0.00
last balance 3 months ago
ETH
0.0000
WETH
0.0000
USDC
0.00
USDT
0.00
Findings Signal
0
confirmed findings
crit 0 high 0 unconfirmed 9 total 9
validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others

Proxy & Workflow

linkage
Proxy status
non-proxy
Implementation address
Proxies pointing here
1
View top proxies
Workflow
checked
attempts 0
checked 1 week ago

Latest Findings

validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others
No confirmed findings yet.
Show unconfirmed findings
Severity Tool Title Validated Confirmed
critical detector Untrusted DELEGATECALL target reachable no no
high codex Unprotected governance token initialization lets attacker become minter and drain DAO ETH no
high detector Untrusted CALL target/value reachable no no
high detector ETH value transfer possible no no
medium detector CREATE/CREATE2 reachable no no
medium cast DELEGATECALL present no
low cast Contract creation opcode present no
info cast Heavy EXTCODE*/BALANCE usage no
info cast Heavy CALL-family usage no

Codex

latest run
complete findings
Found 1 concrete exploit path: the governance token proxy can be initialized by anyone before the deployer does, letting an attacker set themselves as minter and later drain the DAO’s ETH via mintShares + exit.
Top findings
  • high Unprotected governance token initialization lets attacker become minter and drain DAO ETH

Code Metadata

fingerprint
Created block
Code size
17093
Codehash
0xf728cb2d2a00462bb0304d41b79a9436c0d51fc1f1d0f9a9132f31924b37fde0
Priority score
0.000000
Latest run id

Recent Runs

last 20
Run ID Status Validated Total findings Created
ff7f23a9-503b-490f-a989-b437a8f79cd7 complete crit 0 high 0 9 3 months ago