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Tripwire
Find contracts. Test them. Review real vulns.

Analysis Run

cb735c6e-3195-4e92-b44b-e34ec97fa506

failed
Chain ID
1
Address
0xb6307611c06c57257ee2ad83beed39cc6650163e
Block Number
—
Created
Sun, Jan 4, 2026 4:13 AM
Review Summary

What survived the funnel

Open this run to answer one question: is this real attacker-relevant behavior with real impact, or just normal contract plumbing?

back to vulns open contract
Confirmed
2
Validated
2
Source
Verified
Review Backing
Present
Best current signal
Untrusted CALL target/value reachable
crit 0 high 2 direct contract
Review Checklist
1. Read the findings table first. Ignore raw jobs until the result looks real.
2. Confirm attacker control, not just the existence of a sink.
3. Confirm money or privilege impact.
4. Keep it if the behavior is real. Kill it if this is normal proxy, admin, or upgrade plumbing.

Processing Jobs

Status & attempts
ID Type Status Attempts Heartbeat
31554 report.consolidate complete 1 / 1 3 months ago
77951 artifact.fetch complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
77952 tool.cast_disasm complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
77953 analysis.bundle complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
77954 capability.graph complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
77955 detector.run complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
77956 validation.fork complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
113568 tool.slither failed 2 / 2 1 week ago

Artifact

Runtime bytecode: available
Creation TX: —
Deployer: —
Proxy: no
Implementation:
—
Verified Source: yes

Slither

tool.slither
Status
failed solc version 0.1.6 is too old for supported toolchain
Attempts
2 / 2
Findings
0
Solc
—
View stderr 
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/worker.py", line 198, in main
    payload = dispatch_job(job_type, job_id, job_meta, run_data, config, laravel_client)
  File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/worker.py", line 114, in dispatch_job
    return slither_run.run(job_id, job_meta, run_data, config, log, laravel_client)
           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/jobs/slither_run.py", line 1056, in run
    solc_path, solc_meta = _prepare_solc(chosen_version, workspace)
                           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/jobs/slither_run.py", line 190, in _prepare_solc
    raise RuntimeError(f"solc version {default_version} is too old for supported toolchain")
RuntimeError: solc version 0.1.6 is too old for supported toolchain

Codex

report.consolidate
Job Status
complete
Attempts
1 / 1
Findings
1
No findings?
no
Summary
Found 1 concrete profit path: a publicly callable constructor-like function lets anyone mint arbitrary tokens (if compiled/deployed with Solidity >=0.4.22).
View stderr 
[codex:663] OpenAI Codex v0.77.0 (research preview)
[codex:663] --------
[codex:663] workdir: /tmp/codex-multi-d208nf5f
[codex:663] model: gpt-5.2-codex
[codex:663] provider: openai
[codex:663] approval: never
[codex:663] sandbox: read-only
[codex:663] reasoning effort: xhigh
[codex:663] reasoning summaries: auto
[codex:663] session id: 019b8734-bea8-78d2-86ff-f0a758acf844
[codex:663] --------
[codex:663] user
[codex:663] You are a profit-focused exploit hunter. Your ONLY goal is finding ways to extract value (ETH, tokens, NFTs) from this contract.
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] Read `AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt` completely before concluding. Treat `lib/` and `@openzeppelin/` as trusted unless misused.
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] ONLY REPORT if you find a CONCRETE, EXPLOITABLE path to profit. We do NOT care about:
[codex:663] - Gas inefficiency, code quality, naming, or best practices
[codex:663] - Theoretical vulnerabilities without a clear extraction path
[codex:663] - Centralization risks (admin can rug) - assume admin keys are secure
[codex:663] - Front-running unless it enables theft beyond MEV
[codex:663] - DoS, griefing, or issues that don't result in attacker profit
[codex:663] - Missing events, view function issues, or informational findings
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] HIGH-VALUE PATTERNS TO HUNT:
[codex:663] - Reentrancy: external calls before state updates that allow double-withdrawal
[codex:663] - Access control: missing/bypassable auth on withdraw, transfer, or mint functions
[codex:663] - Flash loan attacks: borrow -> manipulate -> profit in single tx
[codex:663] - Price oracle manipulation: TWAP with short window, spot price reads, stale prices
[codex:663] - Signature replay: missing nonce, chainId, or deadline in permit/meta-tx
[codex:663] - Proxy hijacking: unprotected initialize(), storage collision, UUPS without auth
[codex:663] - Accounting errors: rounding that favors attacker, share inflation, first depositor attacks
[codex:663] - Unchecked external calls: return value ignored on token transfers enabling fake tokens
[codex:663] - Cross-function reentrancy: state read in function A, modified via reentrant call, used stale in A
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] For each finding, you MUST provide:
[codex:663] 1. Exact file and line numbers of vulnerable code
[codex:663] 2. Step-by-step exploit transaction sequence
[codex:663] 3. Estimated profit potential (order of magnitude: contract balance, LP reserves, etc.)
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] If no concrete profit path exists: set no_findings=true. Do NOT pad with low-severity noise.
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] Output MUST be valid JSON matching the provided schema.
[codex:663] - severity: info, low, medium, high, critical (use high/critical ONLY for clear extraction paths)
[codex:663] - category: access_control, reentrancy, math, oracle, upgradeability, auth, other
[codex:663] mcp startup: no servers
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] thinking
[codex:663] **Opening audit instructions**
[codex:663] exec
[codex:663] /bin/bash -lc ls in /tmp/codex-multi-d208nf5f succeeded in 5ms:
[codex:663] AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt
[codex:663] codex-output-schema.json
[codex:663] contracts
[codex:663] exec
[codex:663] /bin/bash -lc 'cat AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt' in /tmp/codex-multi-d208nf5f succeeded in 5ms:
[codex:663] This file concatenates first-party Solidity sources only (lib/@openzeppelin excluded).
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] ================================================================================
[codex:663] FILE: contracts/Contract.sol
[codex:663] ================================================================================
[codex:663] contract MyToken {
[codex:663]   /* Public variables of the token */
[codex:663]   string public name;
[codex:663]   string public symbol;
[codex:663]   uint8 public decimals;
[codex:663]   /* This creates an array with all balances */
[codex:663]   mapping (address => uint256) public balanceOf;
[codex:663]   /* This generates a public event on the blockchain that will notify clients */
[codex:663]   event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);
[codex:663]   /* Initializes contract with initial supply tokens to the creator of the contract */
[codex:663]   function MyToken(uint256 _supply, string _name, string _symbol, uint8 _decimals) {
[codex:663]     /* if supply not given then generate 1 million of the smallest unit of the token */
[codex:663]     if (_supply == 0) _supply = 1000000;
[codex:663]     /* Unless you add other functions these variables will never change */
[codex:663]     balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply;
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] thinking
[codex:663] **Analyzing constructor vulnerability in token contract**
[codex:663] exec
[codex:663] /bin/bash -lc 'nl -ba contracts/Contract.sol' in /tmp/codex-multi-d208nf5f succeeded in 5ms:
[codex:663]      1	contract MyToken {
[codex:663]      2	  /* Public variables of the token */
[codex:663]      3	  string public name;
[codex:663]      4	  string public symbol;
[codex:663]      5	  uint8 public decimals;
[codex:663]      6	  /* This creates an array with all balances */
[codex:663]      7	  mapping (address => uint256) public balanceOf;
[codex:663]      8	  /* This generates a public event on the blockchain that will notify clients */
[codex:663]      9	  event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);
[codex:663]     10	  /* Initializes contract with initial supply tokens to the creator of the contract */
[codex:663]     11	  function MyToken(uint256 _supply, string _name, string _symbol, uint8 _decimals) {
[codex:663]     12	    /* if supply not given then generate 1 million of the smallest unit of the token */
[codex:663]     13	    if (_supply == 0) _supply = 1000000;
[codex:663]     14	    /* Unless you add other functions these variables will never change */
[codex:663]     15	    balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply;
[codex:663]     16	    name = _name; 
[codex:663]     17	    symbol = _symbol;
[codex:663]     18	    /* If you want a divisible token then add the amount of decimals the base unit has */
[codex:663]     19	    decimals = _decimals;
[codex:663]     20	  }
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] thinking
[codex:663] **Analyzing constructor vulnerability and exploit potential**
[codex:663] 
[codex:663] I'm working through a detailed analysis of a missing constructor keyword vulnerability in a Solidity contract lacking a pragma version, focusing on how it enables arbitrary minting if compiled with Solidity 0.4.22 or later. I'm preparing a JSON report with a high-severity finding describing the exploit scenario, impact bounded by external liquidity, line references, and mitigation advice, following the provided schema carefully.
[codex:663] codex
[codex:663] {"no_findings":false,"summary":"Found 1 concrete profit path: a publicly callable constructor-like function lets anyone mint arbitrary tokens (if compiled/deployed with Solidity >=0.4.22).","findings":[{"severity":"high","category":"access_control","title":"Publicly callable constructor-like function enables arbitrary minting","exploit_scenario":"1) Attacker calls `MyToken(_supply, _name, _symbol, _decimals)` after deployment (possible when compiled with Solidity >=0.4.22 where this is not a constructor).\n2) The function sets `balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply`, minting an arbitrary amount to the attacker.\n3) Attacker sells/transfers minted tokens into any available liquidity (DEX pools/OTC) to extract ETH or other tokens.","recommendation":"Use the `constructor` keyword and add a pragma to lock the compiler version. If legacy syntax must be supported, make the initializer `internal` or add access control so it cannot be called post-deployment.","evidence":"`function MyToken(...)` is a public function and assigns `balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply` with no access control, allowing arbitrary minting post-deployment when not treated as a constructor.","locations":["contracts/Contract.sol:11"]}]}
[codex:663] tokens used
[codex:663] 13,720
[codex:663] {"no_findings":false,"summary":"Found 1 concrete profit path: a publicly callable constructor-like function lets anyone mint arbitrary tokens (if compiled/deployed with Solidity >=0.4.22).","findings":[{"severity":"high","category":"access_control","title":"Publicly callable constructor-like function enables arbitrary minting","exploit_scenario":"1) Attacker calls `MyToken(_supply, _name, _symbol, _decimals)` after deployment (possible when compiled with Solidity >=0.4.22 where this is not a constructor).\n2) The function sets `balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply`, minting an arbitrary amount to the attacker.\n3) Attacker sells/transfers minted tokens into any available liquidity (DEX pools/OTC) to extract ETH or other tokens.","recommendation":"Use the `constructor` keyword and add a pragma to lock the compiler version. If legacy syntax must be supported, make the initializer `internal` or add access control so it cannot be called post-deployment.","evidence":"`function MyToken(...)` is a public function and assigns `balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply` with no access control, allowing arbitrary minting post-deployment when not treated as a constructor.","locations":["contracts/Contract.sol:11"]}]}
Metadata 
{
    "codex": {
        "ran_at": "2026-01-04T04:13:04.384692+00:00",
        "returncode": 0
    },
    "summary": "Found 1 concrete profit path: a publicly callable constructor-like function lets anyone mint arbitrary tokens (if compiled/deployed with Solidity >=0.4.22).",
    "raw_final": {
        "summary": "Found 1 concrete profit path: a publicly callable constructor-like function lets anyone mint arbitrary tokens (if compiled/deployed with Solidity >=0.4.22).",
        "findings": [
            {
                "title": "Publicly callable constructor-like function enables arbitrary minting",
                "category": "access_control",
                "evidence": "`function MyToken(...)` is a public function and assigns `balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply` with no access control, allowing arbitrary minting post-deployment when not treated as a constructor.",
                "severity": "high",
                "locations": [
                    "contracts/Contract.sol:11"
                ],
                "recommendation": "Use the `constructor` keyword and add a pragma to lock the compiler version. If legacy syntax must be supported, make the initializer `internal` or add access control so it cannot be called post-deployment.",
                "exploit_scenario": "1) Attacker calls `MyToken(_supply, _name, _symbol, _decimals)` after deployment (possible when compiled with Solidity >=0.4.22 where this is not a constructor).\n2) The function sets `balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply`, minting an arbitrary amount to the attacker.\n3) Attacker sells/transfers minted tokens into any available liquidity (DEX pools/OTC) to extract ETH or other tokens."
            }
        ],
        "no_findings": false
    },
    "no_findings": false,
    "schema_version": 1
}

Opcode Heuristics

tool.cast_disasm
Delegatecall
0
Selfdestruct
0
CREATE2
0
CALL-family (heavy)
1
EXT*/BALANCE
0
Total opcodes
511
Flags
No heuristic flags raised.
View cast disassembly output 
00000000: PUSH1 0x60
00000002: PUSH1 0x40
00000004: MSTORE
00000005: PUSH1 0xe0
00000007: PUSH1 0x02
00000009: EXP
0000000a: PUSH1 0x00
0000000c: CALLDATALOAD
0000000d: DIV
0000000e: PUSH4 0x06fdde03
00000013: DUP2
00000014: EQ
00000015: PUSH2 0x0047
00000018: JUMPI
00000019: DUP1
0000001a: PUSH4 0x313ce567
0000001f: EQ
00000020: PUSH2 0x00a4
00000023: JUMPI
00000024: DUP1
00000025: PUSH4 0x70a08231
0000002a: EQ
0000002b: PUSH2 0x00b0
0000002e: JUMPI
0000002f: DUP1
00000030: PUSH4 0x95d89b41
00000035: EQ
00000036: PUSH2 0x00c8
00000039: JUMPI
0000003a: DUP1
0000003b: PUSH4 0xa9059cbb
00000040: EQ
00000041: PUSH2 0x0123
00000044: JUMPI
00000045: JUMPDEST
00000046: STOP
00000047: JUMPDEST
00000048: PUSH2 0x0152
0000004b: PUSH1 0x00
0000004d: DUP1
0000004e: SLOAD
0000004f: PUSH1 0x20
00000051: PUSH1 0x02
00000053: PUSH1 0x01
00000055: DUP4
00000056: AND
00000057: ISZERO
00000058: PUSH2 0x0100
0000005b: MUL
0000005c: PUSH1 0x00
0000005e: NOT
0000005f: ADD
00000060: SWAP1
00000061: SWAP3
00000062: AND
00000063: SWAP2
00000064: SWAP1
00000065: SWAP2
00000066: DIV
00000067: PUSH1 0x1f
00000069: DUP2
0000006a: ADD
0000006b: DUP3
0000006c: SWAP1
0000006d: DIV
0000006e: SWAP1
0000006f: SWAP2
00000070: MUL
00000071: PUSH1 0x80
00000073: SWAP1
00000074: DUP2
00000075: ADD
00000076: PUSH1 0x40
00000078: MSTORE
00000079: PUSH1 0x60
0000007b: DUP3
0000007c: DUP2
0000007d: MSTORE
0000007e: SWAP3
0000007f: SWAP2
00000080: SWAP1
00000081: DUP3
00000082: DUP3
00000083: DUP1
00000084: ISZERO
00000085: PUSH2 0x01f5
00000088: JUMPI
00000089: DUP1
0000008a: PUSH1 0x1f
0000008c: LT
0000008d: PUSH2 0x01ca
00000090: JUMPI
00000091: PUSH2 0x0100
00000094: DUP1
00000095: DUP4
00000096: SLOAD
00000097: DIV
00000098: MUL
00000099: DUP4
0000009a: MSTORE
0000009b: SWAP2
0000009c: PUSH1 0x20
0000009e: ADD
0000009f: SWAP2
000000a0: PUSH2 0x01f5
000000a3: JUMP
000000a4: JUMPDEST
000000a5: PUSH2 0x01c0
000000a8: PUSH1 0x02
000000aa: SLOAD
000000ab: PUSH1 0xff
000000ad: AND
000000ae: DUP2
000000af: JUMP
000000b0: JUMPDEST
000000b1: PUSH2 0x01c0
000000b4: PUSH1 0x04
000000b6: CALLDATALOAD
000000b7: PUSH1 0x03
000000b9: PUSH1 0x20
000000bb: MSTORE
000000bc: PUSH1 0x00
000000be: SWAP1
000000bf: DUP2
000000c0: MSTORE
000000c1: PUSH1 0x40
000000c3: SWAP1
000000c4: KECCAK256
000000c5: SLOAD
000000c6: DUP2
000000c7: JUMP
000000c8: JUMPDEST
000000c9: PUSH2 0x0152
000000cc: PUSH1 0x01
000000ce: DUP1
000000cf: SLOAD
000000d0: PUSH1 0x20
000000d2: PUSH1 0x1f
000000d4: PUSH1 0x02
000000d6: PUSH1 0x00
000000d8: NOT
000000d9: PUSH2 0x0100
000000dc: DUP6
000000dd: DUP8
000000de: AND
000000df: ISZERO
000000e0: MUL
000000e1: ADD
000000e2: SWAP1
000000e3: SWAP4
000000e4: AND
000000e5: SWAP3
000000e6: SWAP1
000000e7: SWAP3
000000e8: DIV
000000e9: SWAP2
000000ea: DUP3
000000eb: ADD
000000ec: DUP2
000000ed: SWAP1
000000ee: DIV
000000ef: MUL
000000f0: PUSH1 0x80
000000f2: SWAP1
000000f3: DUP2
000000f4: ADD
000000f5: PUSH1 0x40
000000f7: MSTORE
000000f8: PUSH1 0x60
000000fa: DUP3
000000fb: DUP2
000000fc: MSTORE
000000fd: SWAP3
000000fe: SWAP2
000000ff: SWAP1
00000100: DUP3
00000101: DUP3
00000102: DUP1
00000103: ISZERO
00000104: PUSH2 0x01f5
00000107: JUMPI
00000108: DUP1
00000109: PUSH1 0x1f
0000010b: LT
0000010c: PUSH2 0x01ca
0000010f: JUMPI
00000110: PUSH2 0x0100
00000113: DUP1
00000114: DUP4
00000115: SLOAD
00000116: DIV
00000117: MUL
00000118: DUP4
00000119: MSTORE
0000011a: SWAP2
0000011b: PUSH1 0x20
0000011d: ADD
0000011e: SWAP2
0000011f: PUSH2 0x01f5
00000122: JUMP
00000123: JUMPDEST
00000124: PUSH2 0x0045
00000127: PUSH1 0x04
00000129: CALLDATALOAD
0000012a: PUSH1 0x24
0000012c: CALLDATALOAD
0000012d: PUSH1 0x01
0000012f: PUSH1 0xa0
00000131: PUSH1 0x02
00000133: EXP
00000134: SUB
00000135: CALLER
00000136: AND
00000137: PUSH1 0x00
00000139: SWAP1
0000013a: DUP2
0000013b: MSTORE
0000013c: PUSH1 0x03
0000013e: PUSH1 0x20
00000140: MSTORE
00000141: PUSH1 0x40
00000143: SWAP1
00000144: KECCAK256
00000145: SLOAD
00000146: DUP2
00000147: SWAP1
00000148: LT
00000149: ISZERO
0000014a: PUSH2 0x01fd
0000014d: JUMPI
0000014e: PUSH2 0x0002
00000151: JUMP
00000152: JUMPDEST
00000153: PUSH1 0x40
00000155: MLOAD
00000156: DUP1
00000157: DUP1
00000158: PUSH1 0x20
0000015a: ADD
0000015b: DUP3
0000015c: DUP2
0000015d: SUB
0000015e: DUP3
0000015f: MSTORE
00000160: DUP4
00000161: DUP2
00000162: DUP2
00000163: MLOAD
00000164: DUP2
00000165: MSTORE
00000166: PUSH1 0x20
00000168: ADD
00000169: SWAP2
0000016a: POP
0000016b: DUP1
0000016c: MLOAD
0000016d: SWAP1
0000016e: PUSH1 0x20
00000170: ADD
00000171: SWAP1
00000172: DUP1
00000173: DUP4
00000174: DUP4
00000175: DUP3
00000176: SWAP1
00000177: PUSH1 0x00
00000179: PUSH1 0x04
0000017b: PUSH1 0x20
0000017d: DUP5
0000017e: PUSH1 0x1f
00000180: ADD
00000181: DIV
00000182: PUSH1 0x03
00000184: MUL
00000185: PUSH1 0x0f
00000187: ADD
00000188: CALL
00000189: POP
0000018a: SWAP1
0000018b: POP
0000018c: SWAP1
0000018d: DUP2
0000018e: ADD
0000018f: SWAP1
00000190: PUSH1 0x1f
00000192: AND
00000193: DUP1
00000194: ISZERO
00000195: PUSH2 0x01b2
00000198: JUMPI
00000199: DUP1
0000019a: DUP3
0000019b: SUB
0000019c: DUP1
0000019d: MLOAD
0000019e: PUSH1 0x01
000001a0: DUP4
000001a1: PUSH1 0x20
000001a3: SUB
000001a4: PUSH2 0x0100
000001a7: EXP
000001a8: SUB
000001a9: NOT
000001aa: AND
000001ab: DUP2
000001ac: MSTORE
000001ad: PUSH1 0x20
000001af: ADD
000001b0: SWAP2
000001b1: POP
000001b2: JUMPDEST
000001b3: POP
000001b4: SWAP3
000001b5: POP
000001b6: POP
000001b7: POP
000001b8: PUSH1 0x40
000001ba: MLOAD
000001bb: DUP1
000001bc: SWAP2
000001bd: SUB
000001be: SWAP1
000001bf: RETURN
000001c0: JUMPDEST
000001c1: PUSH1 0x60
000001c3: SWAP1
000001c4: DUP2
000001c5: MSTORE
000001c6: PUSH1 0x20
000001c8: SWAP1
000001c9: RETURN
000001ca: JUMPDEST
000001cb: DUP3
000001cc: ADD
000001cd: SWAP2
000001ce: SWAP1
000001cf: PUSH1 0x00
000001d1: MSTORE
000001d2: PUSH1 0x20
000001d4: PUSH1 0x00
000001d6: KECCAK256
000001d7: SWAP1
000001d8: JUMPDEST
000001d9: DUP2
000001da: SLOAD
000001db: DUP2
000001dc: MSTORE
000001dd: SWAP1
000001de: PUSH1 0x01
000001e0: ADD
000001e1: SWAP1
000001e2: PUSH1 0x20
000001e4: ADD
000001e5: DUP1
000001e6: DUP4
000001e7: GT
000001e8: PUSH2 0x01d8
000001eb: JUMPI
000001ec: DUP3
000001ed: SWAP1
000001ee: SUB
000001ef: PUSH1 0x1f
000001f1: AND
000001f2: DUP3
000001f3: ADD
000001f4: SWAP2
000001f5: JUMPDEST
000001f6: POP
000001f7: POP
000001f8: POP
000001f9: POP
000001fa: POP
000001fb: DUP2
000001fc: JUMP
000001fd: JUMPDEST
000001fe: PUSH1 0x01
00000200: PUSH1 0xa0
00000202: PUSH1 0x02
00000204: EXP
00000205: SUB
00000206: DUP3
00000207: AND
00000208: PUSH1 0x00
0000020a: SWAP1
0000020b: DUP2
0000020c: MSTORE
0000020d: PUSH1 0x40
0000020f: SWAP1
00000210: KECCAK256
00000211: SLOAD
00000212: DUP1
00000213: DUP3
00000214: ADD
00000215: LT
00000216: ISZERO
00000217: PUSH2 0x021f
0000021a: JUMPI
0000021b: PUSH2 0x0002
0000021e: JUMP
0000021f: JUMPDEST
00000220: DUP1
00000221: PUSH1 0x03
00000223: PUSH1 0x00
00000225: POP
00000226: PUSH1 0x00
00000228: CALLER
00000229: PUSH1 0x01
0000022b: PUSH1 0xa0
0000022d: PUSH1 0x02
0000022f: EXP
00000230: SUB
00000231: AND
00000232: DUP2
00000233: MSTORE
00000234: PUSH1 0x20
00000236: ADD
00000237: SWAP1
00000238: DUP2
00000239: MSTORE
0000023a: PUSH1 0x20
0000023c: ADD
0000023d: PUSH1 0x00
0000023f: KECCAK256
00000240: PUSH1 0x00
00000242: DUP3
00000243: DUP3
00000244: DUP3
00000245: POP
00000246: SLOAD
00000247: SUB
00000248: SWAP3
00000249: POP
0000024a: POP
0000024b: DUP2
0000024c: SWAP1
0000024d: SSTORE
0000024e: POP
0000024f: DUP1
00000250: PUSH1 0x03
00000252: PUSH1 0x00
00000254: POP
00000255: PUSH1 0x00
00000257: DUP5
00000258: PUSH1 0x01
0000025a: PUSH1 0xa0
0000025c: PUSH1 0x02
0000025e: EXP
0000025f: SUB
00000260: AND
00000261: DUP2
00000262: MSTORE
00000263: PUSH1 0x20
00000265: ADD
00000266: SWAP1
00000267: DUP2
00000268: MSTORE
00000269: PUSH1 0x20
0000026b: ADD
0000026c: PUSH1 0x00
0000026e: KECCAK256
0000026f: PUSH1 0x00
00000271: DUP3
00000272: DUP3
00000273: DUP3
00000274: POP
00000275: SLOAD
00000276: ADD
00000277: SWAP3
00000278: POP
00000279: POP
0000027a: DUP2
0000027b: SWAP1
0000027c: SSTORE
0000027d: POP
0000027e: DUP2
0000027f: PUSH1 0x01
00000281: PUSH1 0xa0
00000283: PUSH1 0x02
00000285: EXP
00000286: SUB
00000287: AND
00000288: CALLER
00000289: PUSH1 0x01
0000028b: PUSH1 0xa0
0000028d: PUSH1 0x02
0000028f: EXP
00000290: SUB
00000291: AND
00000292: PUSH32 0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef
000002b3: DUP4
000002b4: PUSH1 0x40
000002b6: MLOAD
000002b7: DUP1
000002b8: DUP3
000002b9: DUP2
000002ba: MSTORE
000002bb: PUSH1 0x20
000002bd: ADD
000002be: SWAP2
000002bf: POP
000002c0: POP
000002c1: PUSH1 0x40
000002c3: MLOAD
000002c4: DUP1
000002c5: SWAP2
000002c6: SUB
000002c7: SWAP1
000002c8: LOG3
000002c9: POP
000002ca: POP
000002cb: JUMP

Findings

validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others
Severity Category Tool Title Confidence Validated Confirmed Details
high access_control codex Publicly callable constructor-like function enables arbitrary minting 85 no —
view
evidence_json 
{
    "evidence": "`function MyToken(...)` is a public function and assigns `balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply` with no access control, allowing arbitrary minting post-deployment when not treated as a constructor.",
    "locations": [
        "contracts/Contract.sol:11"
    ],
    "recommendation": "Use the `constructor` keyword and add a pragma to lock the compiler version. If legacy syntax must be supported, make the initializer `internal` or add access control so it cannot be called post-deployment.",
    "exploit_scenario": "1) Attacker calls `MyToken(_supply, _name, _symbol, _decimals)` after deployment (possible when compiled with Solidity >=0.4.22 where this is not a constructor).\n2) The function sets `balanceOf[msg.sender] = _supply`, minting an arbitrary amount to the attacker.\n3) Attacker sells/transfers minted tokens into any available liquidity (DEX pools/OTC) to extract ETH or other tokens."
}
high other detector Untrusted CALL target/value reachable 60 yes yes
view
trace_id: 0x95ec84e6cea7eb4fbc202596fc7b06af58aa852a0cfdc8ea1586495d7781a1ce
call_targets: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004, 0xb6307611c06c57257ee2ad83beed39cc6650163e
target_varies: yes
classification: target_varies
validation_json 
{
    "sink": "CALL",
    "errors": 0,
    "status": "confirmed",
    "attempts": 1,
    "trace_id": "0x95ec84e6cea7eb4fbc202596fc7b06af58aa852a0cfdc8ea1586495d7781a1ce",
    "confirmed": true,
    "trace_mode": "callTracer",
    "call_targets": [
        "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004",
        "0xb6307611c06c57257ee2ad83beed39cc6650163e"
    ],
    "matched_probe": null,
    "target_varies": true,
    "classification": "target_varies"
}
witness_json 
{
    "notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata",
    "constraints": [],
    "entrypoints": [
        {
            "calldata": "0x06fdde03",
            "selector": "0x06fdde03",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x06fdde03",
                "0x06fdde030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x313ce567",
            "selector": "0x313ce567",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x313ce567",
                "0x313ce5670000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x70a08231",
            "selector": "0x70a08231",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x70a08231",
                "0x70a082310000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x95d89b41",
            "selector": "0x95d89b41",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x95d89b41",
                "0x95d89b410000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0xa9059cbb",
            "selector": "0xa9059cbb",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0xa9059cbb",
                "0xa9059cbb0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        }
    ]
}
evidence_json 
{
    "examples": [
        {
            "pc": 392,
            "opcode": "CALL",
            "returndata_checked": null,
            "value_expression_category": "computed",
            "target_expression_category": "computed"
        }
    ],
    "call_count": 1,
    "guards_detected": [],
    "untrusted_call_count": 1
}
high other detector ETH value transfer possible 55 yes yes
view
trace_id: 0x95ec84e6cea7eb4fbc202596fc7b06af58aa852a0cfdc8ea1586495d7781a1ce
call_targets: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004, 0xb6307611c06c57257ee2ad83beed39cc6650163e
target_varies: yes
classification: target_varies
validation_json 
{
    "sink": "CALL",
    "errors": 0,
    "status": "confirmed",
    "attempts": 1,
    "trace_id": "0x95ec84e6cea7eb4fbc202596fc7b06af58aa852a0cfdc8ea1586495d7781a1ce",
    "confirmed": true,
    "trace_mode": "callTracer",
    "call_targets": [
        "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004",
        "0xb6307611c06c57257ee2ad83beed39cc6650163e"
    ],
    "matched_probe": null,
    "target_varies": true,
    "classification": "target_varies"
}
witness_json 
{
    "notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata",
    "constraints": [],
    "entrypoints": [
        {
            "calldata": "0x06fdde03",
            "selector": "0x06fdde03",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x06fdde03",
                "0x06fdde030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x313ce567",
            "selector": "0x313ce567",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x313ce567",
                "0x313ce5670000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x70a08231",
            "selector": "0x70a08231",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x70a08231",
                "0x70a082310000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x95d89b41",
            "selector": "0x95d89b41",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x95d89b41",
                "0x95d89b410000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0xa9059cbb",
            "selector": "0xa9059cbb",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0xa9059cbb",
                "0xa9059cbb0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        }
    ]
}
evidence_json 
{
    "examples": [
        {
            "pc": 392,
            "opcode": "CALL",
            "returndata_checked": null,
            "value_expression_category": "computed",
            "target_expression_category": "computed"
        }
    ],
    "eth_value_calls": 1,
    "guards_detected": []
}