a25574b3-98b2-47d6-a359-93e0ea8f3871
Open this run to answer one question: is this real attacker-relevant behavior with real impact, or just normal contract plumbing?
| ID | Type | Status | Attempts | Heartbeat |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31133 | report.consolidate | complete | 1 / 1 | 3 months ago |
| 76612 | artifact.fetch | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 76613 | tool.cast_disasm | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 76614 | analysis.bundle | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 76615 | capability.graph | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 76616 | detector.run | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 76617 | validation.fork | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
No slither job recorded yet.
[codex:1323213] OpenAI Codex v0.77.0 (research preview)
[codex:1323213] --------
[codex:1323213] workdir: /tmp/codex-multi-63gpgari
[codex:1323213] model: gpt-5.2-codex
[codex:1323213] provider: openai
[codex:1323213] approval: never
[codex:1323213] sandbox: read-only
[codex:1323213] reasoning effort: xhigh
[codex:1323213] reasoning summaries: auto
[codex:1323213] session id: 019b7b64-e22b-7d53-908d-8b3c62f80cb9
[codex:1323213] --------
[codex:1323213] user
[codex:1323213] You are a profit-focused exploit hunter analyzing EVM bytecode. Your ONLY goal is finding ways to extract value (ETH, tokens, NFTs) from this contract.
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] Read `BYTECODE_BUNDLE.txt` completely before concluding.
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] ONLY REPORT if you find a CONCRETE, EXPLOITABLE path to profit. We do NOT care about:
[codex:1323213] - Gas inefficiency, code quality, or best practices
[codex:1323213] - Theoretical vulnerabilities without a clear extraction path
[codex:1323213] - Generic footguns (unchecked return values, etc.) unless they enable theft
[codex:1323213] - Issues requiring social engineering or off-chain coordination
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] PATTERNS WORTH INVESTIGATING in bytecode:
[codex:1323213] - CALL/DELEGATECALL with controllable destination or calldata
[codex:1323213] - Value transfers (CALL with non-zero value) without prior CALLER/ORIGIN checks
[codex:1323213] - SSTORE to low slots (0-10) that might be owner/admin storage
[codex:1323213] - ecrecover (signature validation) - look for missing nonce/replay protection
[codex:1323213] - External calls before state updates (reentrancy)
[codex:1323213] - SELFDESTRUCT with controllable beneficiary
[codex:1323213] - Proxy patterns (DELEGATECALL to storage slot) with unprotected upgrade paths
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] For each finding, you MUST explain:
[codex:1323213] 1. The specific bytecode pattern/offsets that indicate the vulnerability
[codex:1323213] 2. The concrete sequence of transactions to extract value
[codex:1323213] 3. Why you believe this is exploitable (not just suspicious)
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] If you cannot identify a concrete profit path from bytecode alone: set no_findings=true.
[codex:1323213] Do NOT hallucinate. Bytecode-only analysis is limited - be honest about uncertainty.
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] Output MUST be valid JSON matching the provided schema.
[codex:1323213] - severity: info, low, medium, high, critical (use high/critical ONLY for clear extraction paths)
[codex:1323213] - category: access_control, reentrancy, math, oracle, upgradeability, auth, other
[codex:1323213] mcp startup: no servers
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] thinking
[codex:1323213] **Preparing to read instructions**
[codex:1323213] exec
[codex:1323213] /bin/bash -lc ls in /tmp/codex-multi-63gpgari succeeded in 6ms:
[codex:1323213] BYTECODE_BUNDLE.txt
[codex:1323213] codex-output-schema.json
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] thinking
[codex:1323213] **Reading file**
[codex:1323213] exec
[codex:1323213] /bin/bash -lc 'cat BYTECODE_BUNDLE.txt' in /tmp/codex-multi-63gpgari succeeded in 5ms:
[codex:1323213] Runtime bytecode bundle for best-effort auditing.
[codex:1323213] Note: without verified source, conclusions are low-confidence unless a concrete pattern is visible.
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] FILE: runtime_bytecode.hex
[codex:1323213] 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
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] thinking
[codex:1323213] **Analyzing bytecode for proxy pattern**
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] I'm carefully parsing the bytecode to understand how this contract acts as a proxy calling a fixed registry address to get an implementation and delegate calls. I'm piecing together the control flow, staticcall usage, and fallback logic to see if any exploitable upgrade paths or vulnerabilities exist purely from the bytecode, while reasoning about event logs and calldata/value checks.
[codex:1323213] exec
[codex:1323213] /bin/bash -lc "python - <<'PY'
[codex:1323213] import binascii, textwrap
[codex:1323213] code=open('BYTECODE_BUNDLE.txt').read().split('0x')[1].split('\\n')[0]
[codex:1323213] code=code.strip()
[codex:1323213] # Convert to bytes
[codex:1323213] b=bytes.fromhex(code)
[codex:1323213] # Opcode map
[codex:1323213] opcodes={
[codex:1323213] 0x00:'STOP',0x01:'ADD',0x02:'MUL',0x03:'SUB',0x04:'DIV',0x05:'SDIV',0x06:'MOD',0x07:'SMOD',0x08:'ADDMOD',0x09:'MULMOD',0x0a:'EXP',0x0b:'SIGNEXTEND',
[codex:1323213] 0x10:'LT',0x11:'GT',0x12:'SLT',0x13:'SGT',0x14:'EQ',0x15:'ISZERO',0x16:'AND',0x17:'OR',0x18:'XOR',0x19:'NOT',0x1a:'BYTE',0x1b:'SHL',0x1c:'SHR',0x1d:'SAR',
[codex:1323213] 0x20:'SHA3',
[codex:1323213] 0x30:'ADDRESS',0x31:'BALANCE',0x32:'ORIGIN',0x33:'CALLER',0x34:'CALLVALUE',0x35:'CALLDATALOAD',0x36:'CALLDATASIZE',0x37:'CALLDATACOPY',0x38:'CODESIZE',0x39:'CODECOPY',0x3a:'GASPRICE',0x3b:'EXTCODESIZE',0x3c:'EXTCODECOPY',0x3d:'RETURNDATASIZE',0x3e:'RETURNDATACOPY',0x3f:'EXTCODEHASH',
[codex:1323213] 0x40:'BLOCKHASH',0x41:'COINBASE',0x42:'TIMESTAMP',0x43:'NUMBER',0x44:'DIFFICULTY',0x45:'GASLIMIT',0x46:'CHAINID',0x47:'SELFBALANCE',0x48:'BASEFEE',
[codex:1323213] 0x50:'POP',0x51:'MLOAD',0x52:'MSTORE',0x53:'MSTORE8',0x54:'SLOAD',0x55:'SSTORE',0x56:'JUMP',0x57:'JUMPI',0x58:'PC',0x59:'MSIZE',0x5a:'GAS',0x5b:'JUMPDEST',0x5c:'TLOAD',0x5d:'TSTORE',0x5e:'MCOPY',0x5f:'PUSH0',
[codex:1323213] 0x60:'PUSH1',0x61:'PUSH2',0x62:'PUSH3',0x63:'PUSH4',0x64:'PUSH5',0x65:'PUSH6',0x66:'PUSH7',0x67:'PUSH8',0x68:'PUSH9',0x69:'PUSH10',0x6a:'PUSH11',0x6b:'PUSH12',0x6c:'PUSH13',0x6d:'PUSH14',0x6e:'PUSH15',0x6f:'PUSH16',
[codex:1323213] 0x70:'PUSH17',0x71:'PUSH18',0x72:'PUSH19',0x73:'PUSH20',0x74:'PUSH21',0x75:'PUSH22',0x76:'PUSH23',0x77:'PUSH24',0x78:'PUSH25',0x79:'PUSH26',0x7a:'PUSH27',0x7b:'PUSH28',0x7c:'PUSH29',0x7d:'PUSH30',0x7e:'PUSH31',0x7f:'PUSH32',
[codex:1323213] 0x80:'DUP1',0x81:'DUP2',0x82:'DUP3',0x83:'DUP4',0x84:'DUP5',0x85:'DUP6',0x86:'DUP7',0x87:'DUP8',0x88:'DUP9',0x89:'DUP10',0x8a:'DUP11',0x8b:'DUP12',0x8c:'DUP13',0x8d:'DUP14',0x8e:'DUP15',0x8f:'DUP16',
[codex:1323213] 0x90:'SWAP1',0x91:'SWAP2',0x92:'SWAP3',0x93:'SWAP4',0x94:'SWAP5',0x95:'SWAP6',0x96:'SWAP7',0x97:'SWAP8',0x98:'SWAP9',0x99:'SWAP10',0x9a:'SWAP11',0x9b:'SWAP12',0x9c:'SWAP13',0x9d:'SWAP14',0x9e:'SWAP15',0x9f:'SWAP16',
[codex:1323213] 0xa0:'LOG0',0xa1:'LOG1',0xa2:'LOG2',0xa3:'LOG3',0xa4:'LOG4',
[codex:1323213] 0xf0:'CREATE',0xf1:'CALL',0xf2:'CALLCODE',0xf3:'RETURN',0xf4:'DELEGATECALL',0xf5:'CREATE2',0xf6:'staticcall?',0xfa:'STATICCALL',0xfd:'REVERT',0xfe:'INVALID',0xff:'SELFDESTRUCT'
[codex:1323213] }
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] pc=0
[codex:1323213] out=[]
[codex:1323213] while pc < len(b):
[codex:1323213] op=b[pc]
[codex:1323213] name=opcodes.get(op, f'OP{op:02x}')
[codex:1323213] pc0=pc
[codex:1323213] pc+=1
[codex:1323213] if 0x60 <= op <= 0x7f:
[codex:1323213] n=op-0x5f
[codex:1323213] data=b[pc:pc+n]
[codex:1323213] pc+=n
[codex:1323213] out.append(f\"{pc0:04x}: {name} 0x{data.hex()}\")
[codex:1323213] else:
[codex:1323213] out.append(f\"{pc0:04x}: {name}\")
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] print(\"\\n\".join(out))
[codex:1323213] PY" in /tmp/codex-multi-63gpgari succeeded in 26ms:
[codex:1323213] 0000: PUSH1 0x80
[codex:1323213] 0002: PUSH1 0x40
[codex:1323213] 0004: MSTORE
[codex:1323213] 0005: CALLDATASIZE
[codex:1323213] 0006: PUSH2 0x0053
[codex:1323213] 0009: JUMPI
[codex:1323213] 000a: CALLVALUE
[codex:1323213] 000b: ISZERO
[codex:1323213] 000c: PUSH2 0x0051
[codex:1323213] 000f: JUMPI
[codex:1323213] 0010: CALLER
[codex:1323213] 0011: PUSH1 0x01
[codex:1323213] 0013: PUSH1 0x01
[codex:1323213] 0015: PUSH1 0xa0
[codex:1323213] 0017: SHL
[codex:1323213] 0018: SUB
[codex:1323213] 0019: AND
[codex:1323213] 001a: PUSH32 0xe1fffcc4923d04b559f4d29a8bfc6cda04eb5b0d3c460751c2402c5c5cc9109c
[codex:1323213] 003b: CALLVALUE
[codex:1323213] 003c: PUSH1 0x40
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] thinking
[codex:1323213] **Summarizing bytecode analysis findings**
[codex:1323213]
[codex:1323213] This bytecode looks like a proxy that staticcalls a fixed registry to fetch its implementation and then delegatecalls it; calls with nonzero calldata require zero value, and no selfdestruct or controllable target or value transfer is visible. I’m preparing a precise JSON summary confirming no exploit path found, sticking strictly to the required schema and cautious about output validity.
[codex:1323213] codex
[codex:1323213] {"no_findings":true,"summary":"Reviewed runtime bytecode: it is a proxy that STATICCALLs a fixed registry (0x657975f60cd55b81e0c029dd0572d5e678b3a9cf) for an implementation address and then DELEGATECALLs. No controllable call target/value transfer or selfdestruct path is visible from bytecode alone.","findings":[]}
[codex:1323213] tokens used
[codex:1323213] 16,341
[codex:1323213] {"no_findings":true,"summary":"Reviewed runtime bytecode: it is a proxy that STATICCALLs a fixed registry (0x657975f60cd55b81e0c029dd0572d5e678b3a9cf) for an implementation address and then DELEGATECALLs. No controllable call target/value transfer or selfdestruct path is visible from bytecode alone.","findings":[]}
{
"codex": {
"ran_at": "2026-01-01T21:11:22.608794+00:00",
"returncode": 0
},
"summary": "Reviewed runtime bytecode: it is a proxy that STATICCALLs a fixed registry (0x657975f60cd55b81e0c029dd0572d5e678b3a9cf) for an implementation address and then DELEGATECALLs. No controllable call target/value transfer or selfdestruct path is visible from bytecode alone.",
"raw_final": {
"summary": "Reviewed runtime bytecode: it is a proxy that STATICCALLs a fixed registry (0x657975f60cd55b81e0c029dd0572d5e678b3a9cf) for an implementation address and then DELEGATECALLs. No controllable call target/value transfer or selfdestruct path is visible from bytecode alone.",
"findings": [],
"no_findings": true
},
"no_findings": true,
"schema_version": 1
}
00000000: PUSH1 0x80 00000002: PUSH1 0x40 00000004: MSTORE 00000005: CALLDATASIZE 00000006: PUSH2 0x0053 00000009: JUMPI 0000000a: CALLVALUE 0000000b: ISZERO 0000000c: PUSH2 0x0051 0000000f: JUMPI 00000010: CALLER 00000011: PUSH1 0x01 00000013: PUSH1 0x01 00000015: PUSH1 0xa0 00000017: SHL 00000018: SUB 00000019: AND 0000001a: PUSH32 0xe1fffcc4923d04b559f4d29a8bfc6cda04eb5b0d3c460751c2402c5c5cc9109c 0000003b: CALLVALUE 0000003c: PUSH1 0x40 0000003e: MLOAD 0000003f: PUSH2 0x0048 00000042: SWAP2 00000043: SWAP1 00000044: PUSH2 0x014b 00000047: JUMP 00000048: JUMPDEST 00000049: PUSH1 0x40 0000004b: MLOAD 0000004c: DUP1 0000004d: SWAP2 0000004e: SUB 0000004f: SWAP1 00000050: LOG2 00000051: JUMPDEST 00000052: STOP 00000053: JUMPDEST 00000054: CALLVALUE 00000055: DUP1 00000056: ISZERO 00000057: PUSH2 0x005f 0000005a: JUMPI 0000005b: PUSH1 0x00 0000005d: DUP1 0000005e: REVERT 0000005f: JUMPDEST 00000060: POP 00000061: PUSH1 0x00 00000063: PUSH32 0x000000000000000000000000657975f60cd55b81e0c029dd0572d5e678b3a9cf 00000084: PUSH1 0x01 00000086: PUSH1 0x01 00000088: PUSH1 0xa0 0000008a: SHL 0000008b: SUB 0000008c: AND 0000008d: PUSH4 0x34c5c27e 00000092: PUSH1 0x40 00000094: MLOAD 00000095: DUP2 00000096: PUSH4 0xffffffff 0000009b: AND 0000009c: PUSH1 0xe0 0000009e: SHL 0000009f: DUP2 000000a0: MSTORE 000000a1: PUSH1 0x04 000000a3: ADD 000000a4: PUSH1 0x20 000000a6: PUSH1 0x40 000000a8: MLOAD 000000a9: DUP1 000000aa: DUP4 000000ab: SUB 000000ac: DUP2 000000ad: DUP7 000000ae: DUP1 000000af: EXTCODESIZE 000000b0: ISZERO 000000b1: DUP1 000000b2: ISZERO 000000b3: PUSH2 0x00bb 000000b6: JUMPI 000000b7: PUSH1 0x00 000000b9: DUP1 000000ba: REVERT 000000bb: JUMPDEST 000000bc: POP 000000bd: GAS 000000be: STATICCALL 000000bf: ISZERO 000000c0: DUP1 000000c1: ISZERO 000000c2: PUSH2 0x00cf 000000c5: JUMPI 000000c6: RETURNDATASIZE 000000c7: PUSH1 0x00 000000c9: DUP1 000000ca: RETURNDATACOPY 000000cb: RETURNDATASIZE 000000cc: PUSH1 0x00 000000ce: REVERT 000000cf: JUMPDEST 000000d0: POP 000000d1: POP 000000d2: POP 000000d3: POP 000000d4: PUSH1 0x40 000000d6: MLOAD 000000d7: RETURNDATASIZE 000000d8: PUSH1 0x1f 000000da: NOT 000000db: PUSH1 0x1f 000000dd: DUP3 000000de: ADD 000000df: AND 000000e0: DUP3 000000e1: ADD 000000e2: DUP1 000000e3: PUSH1 0x40 000000e5: MSTORE 000000e6: POP 000000e7: DUP2 000000e8: ADD 000000e9: SWAP1 000000ea: PUSH2 0x00f3 000000ed: SWAP2 000000ee: SWAP1 000000ef: PUSH2 0x011d 000000f2: JUMP 000000f3: JUMPDEST 000000f4: SWAP1 000000f5: POP 000000f6: PUSH1 0x40 000000f8: MLOAD 000000f9: CALLDATASIZE 000000fa: DUP1 000000fb: PUSH1 0x00 000000fd: DUP4 000000fe: CALLDATACOPY 000000ff: PUSH1 0x00 00000101: DUP1 00000102: DUP3 00000103: DUP5 00000104: DUP7 00000105: GAS 00000106: DELEGATECALL 00000107: RETURNDATASIZE 00000108: SWAP2 00000109: POP 0000010a: DUP2 0000010b: PUSH1 0x00 0000010d: DUP5 0000010e: RETURNDATACOPY 0000010f: DUP1 00000110: DUP1 00000111: ISZERO 00000112: PUSH2 0x0119 00000115: JUMPI 00000116: DUP3 00000117: DUP5 00000118: RETURN 00000119: JUMPDEST 0000011a: DUP3 0000011b: DUP5 0000011c: REVERT 0000011d: JUMPDEST 0000011e: PUSH1 0x00 00000120: PUSH1 0x20 00000122: DUP3 00000123: DUP5 00000124: SUB 00000125: SLT 00000126: ISZERO 00000127: PUSH2 0x012e 0000012a: JUMPI 0000012b: DUP1 0000012c: DUP2 0000012d: REVERT 0000012e: JUMPDEST 0000012f: DUP2 00000130: MLOAD 00000131: PUSH1 0x01 00000133: PUSH1 0x01 00000135: PUSH1 0xa0 00000137: SHL 00000138: SUB 00000139: DUP2 0000013a: AND 0000013b: DUP2 0000013c: EQ 0000013d: PUSH2 0x0144 00000140: JUMPI 00000141: DUP2 00000142: DUP3 00000143: REVERT 00000144: JUMPDEST 00000145: SWAP4 00000146: SWAP3 00000147: POP 00000148: POP 00000149: POP 0000014a: JUMP 0000014b: JUMPDEST 0000014c: SWAP1 0000014d: DUP2 0000014e: MSTORE 0000014f: PUSH1 0x20 00000151: ADD 00000152: SWAP1 00000153: JUMP 00000154: INVALID 00000155: LOG2 00000156: PUSH5 0x6970667358 0000015c: UNKNOWN(0x22) 0000015d: SLT 0000015e: KECCAK256 0000015f: STATICCALL 00000160: RETURNDATACOPY 00000161: SHR 00000162: SWAP11 00000163: BASEFEE 00000164: PUSH3 0x74819c 00000168: MSIZE 00000169: CALLDATALOAD 0000016a: UNKNOWN(0xCE) 0000016b: UNKNOWN(0x0D) 0000016c: ADDRESS 0000016d: SWAP13 0000016e: SWAP7 0000016f: CLZ 00000170: UNKNOWN(0xEC) 00000171: UNKNOWN(0x1F) 00000172: PUSH0 00000173: REVERT 00000174: PC 00000175: MCOPY 00000176: UNKNOWN(0xB6) 00000177: PUSH13 0xbd1141ed03540164736f6c6343 00000185: STOP 00000186: ADDMOD 00000187: STOP 00000188: STOP 00000189: CALLER
| Severity | Category | Tool | Title | Confidence | Validated | Confirmed | Details |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| critical | upgradeability | detector | Untrusted DELEGATECALL target reachable | 70 | no | no |
viewvalidation_json{
"sink": "DELEGATECALL",
"errors": 10,
"status": "unknown",
"attempts": 11,
"confirmed": false,
"trace_mode": "callTracer",
"call_targets": null,
"matched_probe": null,
"target_varies": null,
"classification": "no_sink"
}
witness_json{
"notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata",
"constraints": [],
"entrypoints": [
{
"calldata": "0x",
"selector": "fallback",
"calldata_variants": [
"0x"
]
}
]
}
evidence_json{
"examples": [
{
"pc": 262,
"opcode": "DELEGATECALL",
"returndata_checked": null,
"value_expression_category": "n/a",
"target_expression_category": "computed"
}
],
"guards_detected": [],
"delegatecall_count": 1,
"untrusted_delegatecall_count": 1
}
|
| medium | upgradeability | cast | DELEGATECALL present | 80 | no | — |
viewevidence_json{
"notes": "delegatecall enables execution in caller context; common in proxies/upgradeable patterns",
"delegatecall_count": 1
}
|