Analysis Run

019c0ea9-07ed-70da-abbb-d6eab83f6cb6

complete

Chain ID

1

Address

0x02b758ce469af940c57a42ad1de5d404122bc283

Block Number

—

Created

Fri, Jan 30, 2026 11:28 AM

Review Summary

What survived the funnel

Open this run to answer one question: is this real attacker-relevant behavior with real impact, or just normal contract plumbing?

back to vulns open contract

Confirmed

0

Validated

0

Source

Verified

Review Backing

Present

Best current signal

Untrusted DELEGATECALL target reachable

crit 0 high 0 proxy context implementation known

Review Checklist

1. Read the findings table first. Ignore raw jobs until the result looks real.

2. Confirm attacker control, not just the existence of a sink.

3. Confirm money or privilege impact.

4. Keep it if the behavior is real. Kill it if this is normal proxy, admin, or upgrade plumbing.

Processing Jobs

Status & attempts

ID	Type	Status	Attempts	Heartbeat
41711	artifact.fetch	complete	1 / 3	2 months ago
41712	proxy.resolve	complete	1 / 3	2 months ago
41713	tool.cast_disasm	complete	1 / 3	2 months ago
41714	analysis.bundle	complete	1 / 3	2 months ago
41715	capability.graph	complete	1 / 3	2 months ago
41716	detector.run	complete	1 / 3	2 months ago
41717	validation.fork	complete	1 / 3	2 months ago
42295	report.consolidate	complete	1 / 6	2 months ago
42296	tool.slither	complete	1 / 2	2 months ago

Artifact

Runtime bytecode: available

Creation TX: —

Deployer: —

Proxy: yes confirmed

Implementation:

0x438285fbccba55ce8cdef276030e6b35a0b65b6b target (child run)

Verified Source: yes

Proxy evidence

{
    "method": "etherscan+onchain",
    "status": "confirmed",
    "etherscan_hint": {
        "source": "etherscan",
        "etherscan": {
            "proxy_flag": true,
            "implementation": "0x438285fbccba55ce8cdef276030e6b35a0b65b6b"
        }
    },
    "implementation": "0x438285fbccba55ce8cdef276030e6b35a0b65b6b",
    "onchain_method": "eip1967"
}

Slither

tool.slither

Status

complete

Attempts

1 / 2

Findings

0

Solc

0.8.0 (solc-select)

View stderr

'forge clean' running (wd: /tmp/slither-obs3i23f)
'forge config --json' running
'forge build --build-info --skip ./test/** ./script/** --force' running (wd: /tmp/slither-obs3i23f)

TransparentUpgradeableProxy.admin() (contracts/Contract.sol#791-796) calls TransparentUpgradeableProxy.ifAdmin() (contracts/Contract.sol#782-783) which halt the execution return(uint256,uint256)(0,returndatasize()()) (contracts/Contract.sol#37-38)
TransparentUpgradeableProxy.implementation() (contracts/Contract.sol#811-812) calls TransparentUpgradeableProxy.ifAdmin() (contracts/Contract.sol#782-783) which halt the execution return(uint256,uint256)(0,returndatasize()()) (contracts/Contract.sol#37-38)
TransparentUpgradeableProxy.changeAdmin(address) (contracts/Contract.sol#816-822) calls TransparentUpgradeableProxy.ifAdmin() (contracts/Contract.sol#782-783) which halt the execution return(uint256,uint256)(0,returndatasize()()) (contracts/Contract.sol#37-38)
TransparentUpgradeableProxy.upgradeTo(address) (contracts/Contract.sol#824-825) calls TransparentUpgradeableProxy.ifAdmin() (contracts/Contract.sol#782-783) which halt the execution return(uint256,uint256)(0,returndatasize()()) (contracts/Contract.sol#37-38)
TransparentUpgradeableProxy.upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes) (contracts/Contract.sol#837-840) calls TransparentUpgradeableProxy.ifAdmin() (contracts/Contract.sol#782-783) which halt the execution return(uint256,uint256)(0,returndatasize()()) (contracts/Contract.sol#37-38)
TransparentUpgradeableProxy.ifAdmin() (contracts/Contract.sol#782-783) calls Proxy._fallback() (contracts/Contract.sol#51-54) which halt the execution return(uint256,uint256)(0,returndatasize()()) (contracts/Contract.sol#37-38)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-return-in-assembly

ERC1967Upgrade._upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes,bool) (contracts/Contract.sol#133-140) ignores return value by Address.functionDelegateCall(newImplementation,data) (contracts/Contract.sol#139-140)
ERC1967Upgrade._upgradeToAndCallSecure(address,bytes,bool) (contracts/Contract.sol#147-175) ignores return value by Address.functionDelegateCall(newImplementation,data) (contracts/Contract.sol#152-155)
ERC1967Upgrade._upgradeToAndCallSecure(address,bytes,bool) (contracts/Contract.sol#147-175) ignores return value by Address.functionDelegateCall(newImplementation,abi.encodeWithSignature(upgradeTo(address),oldImplementation)) (contracts/Contract.sol#162-166)
ERC1967Upgrade._upgradeBeaconToAndCall(address,bytes,bool) (contracts/Contract.sol#182-188) ignores return value by Address.functionDelegateCall(IBeacon(newBeacon).implementation(),data) (contracts/Contract.sol#187-188)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

AdminUpgradeabilityProxy.constructor(address,address,bytes).admin (contracts/Contract.sol#857-858) shadows:
	- TransparentUpgradeableProxy.admin() (contracts/Contract.sol#791-796) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing

Modifier TransparentUpgradeableProxy.ifAdmin() (contracts/Contract.sol#782-783) does not always execute _; or revert
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-modifier

Reentrancy in ERC1967Upgrade._upgradeToAndCallSecure(address,bytes,bool) (contracts/Contract.sol#147-175):
	External calls:
	- Address.functionDelegateCall(newImplementation,data) (contracts/Contract.sol#152-155)
	- Address.functionDelegateCall(newImplementation,abi.encodeWithSignature(upgradeTo(address),oldImplementation)) (contracts/Contract.sol#162-166)
	Event emitted after the call(s):
	- Upgraded(newImplementation) (contracts/Contract.sol#174)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

Proxy._delegate(address) (contracts/Contract.sol#18-38) uses assembly
	- INLINE ASM (contracts/Contract.sol#21-38)
Address.isContract(address) (contracts/Contract.sol#290-300) uses assembly
	- INLINE ASM (contracts/Contract.sol#299-300)
Address._verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (contracts/Contract.sol#435-449) uses assembly
	- INLINE ASM (contracts/Contract.sol#444-447)
StorageSlot.getAddressSlot(bytes32) (contracts/Contract.sol#483-488) uses assembly
	- INLINE ASM (contracts/Contract.sol#488)
StorageSlot.getBooleanSlot(bytes32) (contracts/Contract.sol#495-504) uses assembly
	- INLINE ASM (contracts/Contract.sol#500-504)
StorageSlot.getBytes32Slot(bytes32) (contracts/Contract.sol#508-512) uses assembly
	- INLINE ASM (contracts/Contract.sol#510-512)
StorageSlot.getUint256Slot(bytes32) (contracts/Contract.sol#517-521) uses assembly
	- INLINE ASM (contracts/Contract.sol#519-521)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage

Context._msgData() (contracts/Contract.sol#546-548) is never used and should be removed
ERC1967Upgrade._getBeacon() (contracts/Contract.sol#236-240) is never used and should be removed
ERC1967Upgrade._setBeacon(address) (contracts/Contract.sol#244-256) is never used and should be removed
ERC1967Upgrade._upgradeBeaconToAndCall(address,bytes,bool) (contracts/Contract.sol#182-188) is never used and should be removed
ERC1967Upgrade._upgradeTo(address) (contracts/Contract.sol#120-128) is never used and should be removed
TransparentUpgradeableProxy._admin() (contracts/Contract.sol#844-846) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

Version constraint ^0.8.0 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)
	- FullInlinerNonExpressionSplitArgumentEvaluationOrder
	- MissingSideEffectsOnSelectorAccess
	- AbiReencodingHeadOverflowWithStaticArrayCleanup
	- DirtyBytesArrayToStorage
	- DataLocationChangeInInternalOverride
	- NestedCalldataArrayAbiReencodingSizeValidation
	- SignedImmutables
	- ABIDecodeTwoDimensionalArrayMemory
	- KeccakCaching.
It is used by:
	- ^0.8.0 (contracts/Contract.sol#1-2)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Contract.sol#321-326):
	- (success,None) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Contract.sol#324)
Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (contracts/Contract.sol#377-387):
	- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (contracts/Contract.sol#385-387)
Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (contracts/Contract.sol#400-412):
	- (success,returndata) = target.staticcall(data) (contracts/Contract.sol#407-408)
Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (contracts/Contract.sol#424-434):
	- (success,returndata) = target.delegatecall(data) (contracts/Contract.sol#431)
Low level call in ProxyAdmin.getProxyImplementation(TransparentUpgradeableProxy) (contracts/Contract.sol#622-633):
	- (success,returndata) = address(proxy).staticcall(0x5c60da1b) (contracts/Contract.sol#630-631)
Low level call in ProxyAdmin.getProxyAdmin(TransparentUpgradeableProxy) (contracts/Contract.sol#640-646):
	- (success,returndata) = address(proxy).staticcall(0xf851a440) (contracts/Contract.sol#644-645)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Redundant expression "this (contracts/Contract.sol#546-547)" inContext (contracts/Contract.sol#539-549)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
. analyzed (14 contracts with 100 detectors), 34 result(s) found

Metadata

{
    "solc": {
        "status": "ok",
        "use_rc": 0,
        "version": "0.8.0",
        "strategy": "solc-select",
        "solc_path": "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/bin/solc",
        "install_rc": 0,
        "use_stderr": null,
        "use_stdout": "Switched global version to 0.8.0",
        "install_stderr": null,
        "install_stdout": "Version '0.8.0' is already installed, skipping..."
    },
    "solc_args": "--base-path /tmp/slither-obs3i23f --allow-paths /tmp/slither-obs3i23f,/tmp/slither-obs3i23f/lib,/tmp/slither-obs3i23f/src",
    "remappings": [],
    "source_files": [
        "contracts/Contract.sol"
    ],
    "contract_count": 0,
    "contract_names": [],
    "detector_count": 34,
    "workspace_hash": "004a4d714c2510d061abc52f244da717eb36ff316e31e0eba522179640ee3bae",
    "duration_seconds": 1.3392176628112793,
    "solc_version_requested": "0.8.2"
}

Codex

report.consolidate

Job Status

complete

Attempts

1 / 6

Findings

1

No findings?

no

Summary

Signature validation lacks contract/domain separation, so the same validator signatures can be replayed across multiple GenericBridge deployments on the same chain.

View stdout

{"no_findings":false,"summary":"Signature validation lacks contract/domain separation, so the same validator signatures can be replayed across multiple GenericBridge deployments on the same chain.","findings":[{"severity":"medium","category":"auth","title":"Signatures are not bound to the bridge contract, enabling cross-contract replay","exploit_scenario":"If validators sign a claim for one GenericBridge deployment, an attacker can reuse the same signatures on a second GenericBridge instance on the same chain (or a redeployed instance with the same validator set) because the signed message omits `address(this)`. This can mint/withdraw assets from the unintended bridge instance.","recommendation":"Include `address(this)` (and optionally chainId) in the signed payload, or switch to EIP-712 with a domain separator bound to the contract address. Ensure both `claimToken` and `DTOBridgeToken.claimBridgeToken` compute claim IDs with the same domain binding.","evidence":"`claimToken` builds `_claimId` from origin token, recipient, amount, chainIds, txHash, name/symbol/decimals only, and `verifySignatures` checks this hash without any contract/domain binding.","locations":["contracts/generic/GenericBridge.sol"]}]}

View stderr

OpenAI Codex v0.77.0 (research preview)
--------
workdir: /tmp/codex-d0ccrm3s
model: gpt-5.2-codex
provider: openai
approval: never
sandbox: read-only
reasoning effort: high
reasoning summaries: auto
session id: 019c0efd-352c-7cb1-b0a0-1fa5d2d58a38
--------
user
Context: The user requested the proxy at 0x02b758ce469af940c57a42ad1de5d404122bc283.
Audit the implementation at 0x438285fbccba55ce8cdef276030e6b35a0b65b6b.
Findings should refer to the implementation unless explicitly about proxy mechanics.

You are a security auditor. Audit this Solidity codebase for exploitable vulnerabilities.
Focus on: reentrancy, access control, upgradeability/proxy issues, signature validation, oracle manipulation,
accounting/invariant breaks, external call patterns, unchecked return values, and dangerous delegatecall.

Scope rules:
- You MUST fully read `AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt` before concluding. It contains the complete contents of all first-party Solidity sources in this workspace.
- Treat `lib/` and `@openzeppelin/` as third-party dependencies; skip them unless there is a concrete misuse angle in first-party code.
- If there are only dependency files and no first-party sources, set no_findings=true and explain in summary.

Output MUST be valid JSON matching the provided schema.
- If you find nothing meaningful: set no_findings=true and findings=[].
- Otherwise: set no_findings=false and include findings with severity/category/title and file/line locations when possible.

Output constraints (IMPORTANT):
- severity MUST be exactly one of: info, low, medium, high, critical (lowercase).
- category MUST be exactly one of: access_control, reentrancy, math, oracle, upgradeability, auth, other.
Keep summary short and concrete.
mcp startup: no servers
exec
/bin/bash -lc ls in /tmp/codex-d0ccrm3s succeeded in 8ms:
AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt
codex-output-schema.json
contracts
@openzeppelin
exec
/bin/bash -lc 'cat AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt' in /tmp/codex-d0ccrm3s succeeded in 6ms:
This file concatenates the full contents of first-party Solidity sources for auditing.
Do not treat dependency code under lib/ or @openzeppelin/ as first-party.

================================================================================
FILE: contracts/generic/DTOBridgeToken.sol
================================================================================
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/math/SafeMathUpgradeable.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/IERC20Upgradeable.sol"; // for WETH
import "../interfaces/IDTOTokenBridge.sol";
// import "./Governable.sol";
import "../lib/ChainIdHolding.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20BurnableUpgradeable.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol";

contract DTOBridgeToken is
    ERC20BurnableUpgradeable,
    IDTOTokenBridge,
    OwnableUpgradeable,
codex
{"no_findings":false,"summary":"Signature validation lacks contract/domain separation, so the same validator signatures can be replayed across multiple GenericBridge deployments on the same chain.","findings":[{"severity":"medium","category":"auth","title":"Signatures are not bound to the bridge contract, enabling cross-contract replay","exploit_scenario":"If validators sign a claim for one GenericBridge deployment, an attacker can reuse the same signatures on a second GenericBridge instance on the same chain (or a redeployed instance with the same validator set) because the signed message omits `address(this)`. This can mint/withdraw assets from the unintended bridge instance.","recommendation":"Include `address(this)` (and optionally chainId) in the signed payload, or switch to EIP-712 with a domain separator bound to the contract address. Ensure both `claimToken` and `DTOBridgeToken.claimBridgeToken` compute claim IDs with the same domain binding.","evidence":"`claimToken` builds `_claimId` from origin token, recipient, amount, chainIds, txHash, name/symbol/decimals only, and `verifySignatures` checks this hash without any contract/domain binding.","locations":["contracts/generic/GenericBridge.sol"]}]}
tokens used
22,633

Metadata

{
    "codex": {
        "ran_at": "2026-01-30T13:04:14.333611+00:00",
        "returncode": 0
    },
    "project": {
        "mode": "source",
        "file_count": 25,
        "import_count": 35,
        "first_party_contracts_count": 7
    },
    "summary": "Signature validation lacks contract/domain separation, so the same validator signatures can be replayed across multiple GenericBridge deployments on the same chain.",
    "raw_final": {
        "summary": "Signature validation lacks contract/domain separation, so the same validator signatures can be replayed across multiple GenericBridge deployments on the same chain.",
        "findings": [
            {
                "title": "Signatures are not bound to the bridge contract, enabling cross-contract replay",
                "category": "auth",
                "evidence": "`claimToken` builds `_claimId` from origin token, recipient, amount, chainIds, txHash, name/symbol/decimals only, and `verifySignatures` checks this hash without any contract/domain binding.",
                "severity": "medium",
                "locations": [
                    "contracts/generic/GenericBridge.sol"
                ],
                "recommendation": "Include `address(this)` (and optionally chainId) in the signed payload, or switch to EIP-712 with a domain separator bound to the contract address. Ensure both `claimToken` and `DTOBridgeToken.claimBridgeToken` compute claim IDs with the same domain binding.",
                "exploit_scenario": "If validators sign a claim for one GenericBridge deployment, an attacker can reuse the same signatures on a second GenericBridge instance on the same chain (or a redeployed instance with the same validator set) because the signed message omits `address(this)`. This can mint/withdraw assets from the unintended bridge instance."
            }
        ],
        "no_findings": false
    },
    "no_findings": false,
    "proxy_context": {
        "proxy_run_id": "019c0ea9-07ed-70da-abbb-d6eab83f6cb6",
        "proxy_address": "0x02b758ce469af940c57a42ad1de5d404122bc283",
        "implementation_run_id": "019c0eaa-1573-73c9-bdcd-698f810a9fbd",
        "implementation_address": "0x438285fbccba55ce8cdef276030e6b35a0b65b6b"
    },
    "schema_version": 1
}

Opcode Heuristics

tool.cast_disasm

Delegatecall

2

Selfdestruct

0

CREATE2

0

CALL-family (heavy)

0

EXT*/BALANCE

2

Total opcodes

413

Flags

delegatecall_present create_opcodes_present

View cast disassembly output

00000000: PUSH1 0x80
00000002: PUSH1 0x40
00000004: MSTORE
00000005: CALLDATASIZE
00000006: PUSH2 0x0013
00000009: JUMPI
0000000a: PUSH2 0x0011
0000000d: PUSH2 0x0017
00000010: JUMP
00000011: JUMPDEST
00000012: STOP
00000013: JUMPDEST
00000014: PUSH2 0x0011
00000017: JUMPDEST
00000018: PUSH2 0x0027
0000001b: PUSH2 0x0022
0000001e: PUSH2 0x005e
00000021: JUMP
00000022: JUMPDEST
00000023: PUSH2 0x0096
00000026: JUMP
00000027: JUMPDEST
00000028: JUMP
00000029: JUMPDEST
0000002a: PUSH1 0x60
0000002c: PUSH2 0x004e
0000002f: DUP4
00000030: DUP4
00000031: PUSH1 0x40
00000033: MLOAD
00000034: DUP1
00000035: PUSH1 0x60
00000037: ADD
00000038: PUSH1 0x40
0000003a: MSTORE
0000003b: DUP1
0000003c: PUSH1 0x27
0000003e: DUP2
0000003f: MSTORE
00000040: PUSH1 0x20
00000042: ADD
00000043: PUSH2 0x024c
00000046: PUSH1 0x27
00000048: SWAP2
00000049: CODECOPY
0000004a: PUSH2 0x00ba
0000004d: JUMP
0000004e: JUMPDEST
0000004f: SWAP4
00000050: SWAP3
00000051: POP
00000052: POP
00000053: POP
00000054: JUMP
00000055: JUMPDEST
00000056: EXTCODESIZE
00000057: ISZERO
00000058: ISZERO
00000059: SWAP1
0000005a: JUMP
0000005b: JUMPDEST
0000005c: SWAP1
0000005d: JUMP
0000005e: JUMPDEST
0000005f: PUSH1 0x00
00000061: PUSH2 0x0091
00000064: PUSH32 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc
00000085: SLOAD
00000086: PUSH1 0x01
00000088: PUSH1 0x01
0000008a: PUSH1 0xa0
0000008c: SHL
0000008d: SUB
0000008e: AND
0000008f: SWAP1
00000090: JUMP
00000091: JUMPDEST
00000092: SWAP1
00000093: POP
00000094: SWAP1
00000095: JUMP
00000096: JUMPDEST
00000097: CALLDATASIZE
00000098: PUSH1 0x00
0000009a: DUP1
0000009b: CALLDATACOPY
0000009c: PUSH1 0x00
0000009e: DUP1
0000009f: CALLDATASIZE
000000a0: PUSH1 0x00
000000a2: DUP5
000000a3: GAS
000000a4: DELEGATECALL
000000a5: RETURNDATASIZE
000000a6: PUSH1 0x00
000000a8: DUP1
000000a9: RETURNDATACOPY
000000aa: DUP1
000000ab: DUP1
000000ac: ISZERO
000000ad: PUSH2 0x00b5
000000b0: JUMPI
000000b1: RETURNDATASIZE
000000b2: PUSH1 0x00
000000b4: RETURN
000000b5: JUMPDEST
000000b6: RETURNDATASIZE
000000b7: PUSH1 0x00
000000b9: REVERT
000000ba: JUMPDEST
000000bb: PUSH1 0x60
000000bd: DUP4
000000be: EXTCODESIZE
000000bf: PUSH2 0x011e
000000c2: JUMPI
000000c3: PUSH1 0x40
000000c5: MLOAD
000000c6: PUSH3 0x461bcd
000000ca: PUSH1 0xe5
000000cc: SHL
000000cd: DUP2
000000ce: MSTORE
000000cf: PUSH1 0x20
000000d1: PUSH1 0x04
000000d3: DUP3
000000d4: ADD
000000d5: MSTORE
000000d6: PUSH1 0x26
000000d8: PUSH1 0x24
000000da: DUP3
000000db: ADD
000000dc: MSTORE
000000dd: PUSH32 0x416464726573733a2064656c65676174652063616c6c20746f206e6f6e2d636f
000000fe: PUSH1 0x44
00000100: DUP3
00000101: ADD
00000102: MSTORE
00000103: PUSH6 0x1b9d1c9858dd
0000010a: PUSH1 0xd2
0000010c: SHL
0000010d: PUSH1 0x64
0000010f: DUP3
00000110: ADD
00000111: MSTORE
00000112: PUSH1 0x84
00000114: ADD
00000115: JUMPDEST
00000116: PUSH1 0x40
00000118: MLOAD
00000119: DUP1
0000011a: SWAP2
0000011b: SUB
0000011c: SWAP1
0000011d: REVERT
0000011e: JUMPDEST
0000011f: PUSH1 0x00
00000121: DUP1
00000122: DUP6
00000123: PUSH1 0x01
00000125: PUSH1 0x01
00000127: PUSH1 0xa0
00000129: SHL
0000012a: SUB
0000012b: AND
0000012c: DUP6
0000012d: PUSH1 0x40
0000012f: MLOAD
00000130: PUSH2 0x0139
00000133: SWAP2
00000134: SWAP1
00000135: PUSH2 0x01cc
00000138: JUMP
00000139: JUMPDEST
0000013a: PUSH1 0x00
0000013c: PUSH1 0x40
0000013e: MLOAD
0000013f: DUP1
00000140: DUP4
00000141: SUB
00000142: DUP2
00000143: DUP6
00000144: GAS
00000145: DELEGATECALL
00000146: SWAP2
00000147: POP
00000148: POP
00000149: RETURNDATASIZE
0000014a: DUP1
0000014b: PUSH1 0x00
0000014d: DUP2
0000014e: EQ
0000014f: PUSH2 0x0174
00000152: JUMPI
00000153: PUSH1 0x40
00000155: MLOAD
00000156: SWAP2
00000157: POP
00000158: PUSH1 0x1f
0000015a: NOT
0000015b: PUSH1 0x3f
0000015d: RETURNDATASIZE
0000015e: ADD
0000015f: AND
00000160: DUP3
00000161: ADD
00000162: PUSH1 0x40
00000164: MSTORE
00000165: RETURNDATASIZE
00000166: DUP3
00000167: MSTORE
00000168: RETURNDATASIZE
00000169: PUSH1 0x00
0000016b: PUSH1 0x20
0000016d: DUP5
0000016e: ADD
0000016f: RETURNDATACOPY
00000170: PUSH2 0x0179
00000173: JUMP
00000174: JUMPDEST
00000175: PUSH1 0x60
00000177: SWAP2
00000178: POP
00000179: JUMPDEST
0000017a: POP
0000017b: SWAP2
0000017c: POP
0000017d: SWAP2
0000017e: POP
0000017f: PUSH2 0x0189
00000182: DUP3
00000183: DUP3
00000184: DUP7
00000185: PUSH2 0x0193
00000188: JUMP
00000189: JUMPDEST
0000018a: SWAP7
0000018b: SWAP6
0000018c: POP
0000018d: POP
0000018e: POP
0000018f: POP
00000190: POP
00000191: POP
00000192: JUMP
00000193: JUMPDEST
00000194: PUSH1 0x60
00000196: DUP4
00000197: ISZERO
00000198: PUSH2 0x01a2
0000019b: JUMPI
0000019c: POP
0000019d: DUP2
0000019e: PUSH2 0x004e
000001a1: JUMP
000001a2: JUMPDEST
000001a3: DUP3
000001a4: MLOAD
000001a5: ISZERO
000001a6: PUSH2 0x01b2
000001a9: JUMPI
000001aa: DUP3
000001ab: MLOAD
000001ac: DUP1
000001ad: DUP5
000001ae: PUSH1 0x20
000001b0: ADD
000001b1: REVERT
000001b2: JUMPDEST
000001b3: DUP2
000001b4: PUSH1 0x40
000001b6: MLOAD
000001b7: PUSH3 0x461bcd
000001bb: PUSH1 0xe5
000001bd: SHL
000001be: DUP2
000001bf: MSTORE
000001c0: PUSH1 0x04
000001c2: ADD
000001c3: PUSH2 0x0115
000001c6: SWAP2
000001c7: SWAP1
000001c8: PUSH2 0x01e8
000001cb: JUMP
000001cc: JUMPDEST
000001cd: PUSH1 0x00
000001cf: DUP3
000001d0: MLOAD
000001d1: PUSH2 0x01de
000001d4: DUP2
000001d5: DUP5
000001d6: PUSH1 0x20
000001d8: DUP8
000001d9: ADD
000001da: PUSH2 0x021b
000001dd: JUMP
000001de: JUMPDEST
000001df: SWAP2
000001e0: SWAP1
000001e1: SWAP2
000001e2: ADD
000001e3: SWAP3
000001e4: SWAP2
000001e5: POP
000001e6: POP
000001e7: JUMP
000001e8: JUMPDEST
000001e9: PUSH1 0x00
000001eb: PUSH1 0x20
000001ed: DUP3
000001ee: MSTORE
000001ef: DUP3
000001f0: MLOAD
000001f1: DUP1
000001f2: PUSH1 0x20
000001f4: DUP5
000001f5: ADD
000001f6: MSTORE
000001f7: PUSH2 0x0207
000001fa: DUP2
000001fb: PUSH1 0x40
000001fd: DUP6
000001fe: ADD
000001ff: PUSH1 0x20
00000201: DUP8
00000202: ADD
00000203: PUSH2 0x021b
00000206: JUMP
00000207: JUMPDEST
00000208: PUSH1 0x1f
0000020a: ADD
0000020b: PUSH1 0x1f
0000020d: NOT
0000020e: AND
0000020f: SWAP2
00000210: SWAP1
00000211: SWAP2
00000212: ADD
00000213: PUSH1 0x40
00000215: ADD
00000216: SWAP3
00000217: SWAP2
00000218: POP
00000219: POP
0000021a: JUMP
0000021b: JUMPDEST
0000021c: PUSH1 0x00
0000021e: JUMPDEST
0000021f: DUP4
00000220: DUP2
00000221: LT
00000222: ISZERO
00000223: PUSH2 0x0236
00000226: JUMPI
00000227: DUP2
00000228: DUP2
00000229: ADD
0000022a: MLOAD
0000022b: DUP4
0000022c: DUP3
0000022d: ADD
0000022e: MSTORE
0000022f: PUSH1 0x20
00000231: ADD
00000232: PUSH2 0x021e
00000235: JUMP
00000236: JUMPDEST
00000237: DUP4
00000238: DUP2
00000239: GT
0000023a: ISZERO
0000023b: PUSH2 0x0245
0000023e: JUMPI
0000023f: PUSH1 0x00
00000241: DUP5
00000242: DUP5
00000243: ADD
00000244: MSTORE
00000245: JUMPDEST
00000246: POP
00000247: POP
00000248: POP
00000249: POP
0000024a: JUMP
0000024b: INVALID
0000024c: COINBASE
0000024d: PUSH5 0x6472657373
00000253: GASPRICE
00000254: KECCAK256
00000255: PUSH13 0x6f772d6c6576656c2064656c65
00000263: PUSH8 0x6174652063616c6c
0000026c: KECCAK256
0000026d: PUSH7 0x61696c6564a264
00000275: PUSH10 0x706673582212209b8470
00000280: CREATE
00000281: PUSH15 0x8a3960c912103fc2be177edaad6958
00000291: UNKNOWN(0x4E)
00000292: UNKNOWN(0xE3)
00000293: UNKNOWN(0xC7)
00000294: UNKNOWN(0xD2)
00000295: DUP1
00000296: SWAP15
00000297: UNKNOWN(0xE7)
00000298: CALLDATACOPY
00000299: UNKNOWN(0xE7)
0000029a: SWAP5
0000029b: ADDMOD
0000029c: UNKNOWN(0xE7)
0000029d: PUSH5 0x736f6c6343
000002a3: STOP
000002a4: ADDMOD
000002a5: MUL
000002a6: STOP
000002a7: CALLER

Findings

validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others

Severity	Category	Tool	Title	Confidence	Validated	Confirmed	Details
critical	upgradeability	detector	Untrusted DELEGATECALL target reachable	70	no	no	view trace_id: 0xe289a5a8544c7d688fce39bf115b46f295aa208cbb97e4c77d55192835ae40f3 call_targets: 0x438285fbccba55ce8cdef276030e6b35a0b65b6b target_varies: no classification: constant_target validation_json { "sink": "DELEGATECALL", "errors": 0, "status": "sink_reached", "attempts": 1, "trace_id": "0xe289a5a8544c7d688fce39bf115b46f295aa208cbb97e4c77d55192835ae40f3", "confirmed": false, "trace_mode": "callTracer", "call_targets": [ "0x438285fbccba55ce8cdef276030e6b35a0b65b6b" ], "matched_probe": null, "target_varies": false, "classification": "constant_target" } witness_json { "notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata", "constraints": [], "entrypoints": [ { "calldata": "0x", "selector": "fallback", "calldata_variants": [ "0x" ] } ] } evidence_json { "examples": [ { "pc": 164, "opcode": "DELEGATECALL", "returndata_checked": null, "value_expression_category": "n/a", "target_expression_category": "computed" }, { "pc": 325, "opcode": "DELEGATECALL", "returndata_checked": null, "value_expression_category": "n/a", "target_expression_category": "computed" } ], "guards_detected": [], "delegatecall_count": 2, "untrusted_delegatecall_count": 2 }
medium	auth	codex	Signatures are not bound to the bridge contract, enabling cross-contract replay	75	no	—	view evidence_json { "evidence": "`claimToken` builds `_claimId` from origin token, recipient, amount, chainIds, txHash, name/symbol/decimals only, and `verifySignatures` checks this hash without any contract/domain binding.", "locations": [ "contracts/generic/GenericBridge.sol" ], "recommendation": "Include `address(this)` (and optionally chainId) in the signed payload, or switch to EIP-712 with a domain separator bound to the contract address. Ensure both `claimToken` and `DTOBridgeToken.claimBridgeToken` compute claim IDs with the same domain binding.", "exploit_scenario": "If validators sign a claim for one GenericBridge deployment, an attacker can reuse the same signatures on a second GenericBridge instance on the same chain (or a redeployed instance with the same validator set) because the signed message omits `address(this)`. This can mint/withdraw assets from the unintended bridge instance." }
medium	upgradeability	cast	DELEGATECALL present	80	no	—	view evidence_json { "notes": "delegatecall enables execution in caller context; common in proxies/upgradeable patterns", "delegatecall_count": 2 }
medium	other	detector	CREATE/CREATE2 reachable	45	no	no	view trace_id: 0x22d8eb680a9beef109971d1166a20e6fb9a74d43497148f156c495b2aa9474fe validation_json { "sink": "CREATE", "errors": 0, "status": "unknown", "attempts": 1, "trace_id": "0x22d8eb680a9beef109971d1166a20e6fb9a74d43497148f156c495b2aa9474fe", "confirmed": false, "trace_mode": "structLogs", "call_targets": null, "matched_probe": null, "target_varies": null, "classification": "no_sink" } witness_json { "notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata", "constraints": [], "entrypoints": [ { "calldata": "0x", "selector": "fallback", "calldata_variants": [ "0x" ] } ] } evidence_json { "create_count": 1, "create2_count": 0 }
low	other	cast	Contract creation opcode present	60	no	—	view evidence_json { "notes": "runtime can deploy contracts dynamically via CREATE/CREATE2", "create_count": 1, "create2_count": 0 }