TW
Tripwire
Find contracts. Test them. Review real vulns.

Analysis Run

019c0ea9-07c1-72fc-b499-c22be17f1945

failed
Chain ID
1
Address
Block Number
Created
Fri, Jan 30, 2026 11:28 AM
Review Summary

What survived the funnel

Open this run to answer one question: is this real attacker-relevant behavior with real impact, or just normal contract plumbing?

Confirmed
0
Validated
0
Source
Verified
Review Backing
Present
Best current signal
Untrusted DELEGATECALL target reachable
crit 0 high 0 proxy context implementation known
Review Checklist
1. Read the findings table first. Ignore raw jobs until the result looks real.
2. Confirm attacker control, not just the existence of a sink.
3. Confirm money or privilege impact.
4. Keep it if the behavior is real. Kill it if this is normal proxy, admin, or upgrade plumbing.

Processing Jobs

Status & attempts
ID Type Status Attempts Heartbeat
41669 artifact.fetch complete 1 / 3 2 months ago
41670 proxy.resolve complete 1 / 3 2 months ago
41671 tool.cast_disasm complete 1 / 3 2 months ago
41672 analysis.bundle complete 1 / 3 2 months ago
41673 capability.graph complete 1 / 3 2 months ago
41674 detector.run complete 1 / 3 2 months ago
41675 validation.fork complete 1 / 3 2 months ago
42264 report.consolidate complete 1 / 6 2 months ago
42265 tool.slither failed 2 / 2 2 months ago

Artifact

Runtime bytecode: available
Creation TX:
Deployer:
Proxy: yes onchain_only
Verified Source: yes
Proxy evidence
{
    "method": "minimal_proxy",
    "status": "onchain_only",
    "implementation": "0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8",
    "onchain_method": "minimal_proxy"
}

Slither

tool.slither
Status
failed slither failed (exit 1): 'forge clean' running (wd: /tmp/slither-_e4123ko) 'forge config --json' running 'forge build --build-info --skip ./test/** ./script/** --force' running (wd: /tmp/slither-_e4123ko) 'forge' returned non-zero exit code 1 Compiling 5 files with Solc 0.8.0 stdout: Solc 0.8.0 finished in 9.61ms Error: Compiler run failed: stderr: Error (6546): Documentation tag @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow not valid for contracts. stderr: --> src/utils/Initializable.sol:6:1: stderr: | stderr: 6 | /** stderr: | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines). Traceback (most recent call last): File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/bin/slither", line 10, in <module> sys.exit(main()) ~~~~^^ File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/slither/__main__.py", line 776, in main main_impl(all_detector_classes=detectors, all_printer_classes=printers) ~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/slither/__main__.py", line 882, in main_impl ) = process_all(filename, args, detector_classes, printer_classes) ~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/slither/__main__.py", line 96, in process_all compilations = compile_all(target, **vars(args)) File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 722, in compile_all compilations.append(CryticCompile(target, **kwargs)) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 211, in __init__ self._compile(**kwargs) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^ File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 633, in _compile self._platform.compile(self, **kwargs) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/platform/foundry.py", line 102, in compile hardhat_like_parsing( ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^ crytic_compile, str(self._target), build_directory, str(self._project_root) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ) ^ File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/platform/hardhat.py", line 52, in hardhat_like_parsing raise InvalidCompilation(txt) crytic_compile.platform.exceptions.InvalidCompilation: Compilation failed. Can you run build command? /tmp/slither-_e4123ko/out/build-info is not a directory.
Attempts
2 / 2
Findings
0
Solc
View stderr
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/worker.py", line 198, in main
    payload = dispatch_job(job_type, job_id, job_meta, run_data, config, laravel_client)
  File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/worker.py", line 114, in dispatch_job
    return slither_run.run(job_id, job_meta, run_data, config, log, laravel_client)
           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/jobs/slither_run.py", line 1084, in run
    stdout_text, stderr_text, result_json = _run_slither(
                                            ~~~~~~~~~~~~^
        workspace,
        ^^^^^^^^^^
    ...<4 lines>...
        target_path=target_path,
        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
    )
    ^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/jobs/slither_run.py", line 958, in _run_slither
    raise RuntimeError(f"slither failed (exit {result.returncode}): {stderr_text or stdout_text}")
RuntimeError: slither failed (exit 1): 'forge clean' running (wd: /tmp/slither-_e4123ko)
'forge config --json' running
'forge build --build-info --skip ./test/** ./script/** --force' running (wd: /tmp/slither-_e4123ko)
'forge' returned non-zero exit code 1
Compiling 5 files with Solc 0.8.0
stdout: Solc 0.8.0 finished in 9.61ms
Error: Compiler run failed:
stderr: Error (6546): Documentation tag @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow not valid for contracts.
stderr:  --> src/utils/Initializable.sol:6:1:
stderr:   |
stderr: 6 | /**
stderr:   | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/bin/slither", line 10, in <module>
    sys.exit(main())
             ~~~~^^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/slither/__main__.py", line 776, in main
    main_impl(all_detector_classes=detectors, all_printer_classes=printers)
    ~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/slither/__main__.py", line 882, in main_impl
    ) = process_all(filename, args, detector_classes, printer_classes)
        ~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/slither/__main__.py", line 96, in process_all
    compilations = compile_all(target, **vars(args))
  File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 722, in compile_all
    compilations.append(CryticCompile(target, **kwargs))
                        ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 211, in __init__
    self._compile(**kwargs)
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 633, in _compile
    self._platform.compile(self, **kwargs)
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/platform/foundry.py", line 102, in compile
    hardhat_like_parsing(
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
        crytic_compile, str(self._target), build_directory, str(self._project_root)
        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
    )
    ^
  File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/platform/hardhat.py", line 52, in hardhat_like_parsing
    raise InvalidCompilation(txt)
crytic_compile.platform.exceptions.InvalidCompilation: Compilation failed. Can you run build command?
/tmp/slither-_e4123ko/out/build-info is not a directory.

Codex

report.consolidate
Job Status
complete
Attempts
1 / 6
Findings
1
No findings?
no
Summary
One high-severity reentrancy issue allows a signed transaction to be executed multiple times within a single call before the nonce is marked used.
View stdout
{"no_findings":false,"summary":"One high-severity reentrancy issue allows a signed transaction to be executed multiple times within a single call before the nonce is marked used.","findings":[{"severity":"high","category":"reentrancy","title":"Nonce marked after external call allows reentrant replay of the same signed transaction","exploit_scenario":"A signer executes a transaction that calls a malicious contract. That contract reenters `execute` using the same `nonce/to/value/data` and signatures (which it can receive via calldata), and because `flagUsed` hasn’t run yet, the nonce is still free. The wallet then performs the same transfer/call again, allowing repeated execution and draining more funds than intended in a single transaction.","recommendation":"Mark the nonce as used before performing the external call (or add a reentrancy guard). Because a revert will roll back state, marking the nonce early won’t burn it on failed calls.","evidence":"`execute` performs `Address.functionCallWithValue(to, data, value);` before `flagUsed(nonce);`, allowing reentrancy before the nonce is consumed.","locations":["src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:70","src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:73","src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:74"]}]}
View stderr
OpenAI Codex v0.77.0 (research preview)
--------
workdir: /tmp/codex-1p5atdhm
model: gpt-5.2-codex
provider: openai
approval: never
sandbox: read-only
reasoning effort: high
reasoning summaries: auto
session id: 019c0eec-6e74-7713-af8c-ae6744208636
--------
user
Context: The user requested the proxy at 0x4d307525b22897ca07af7e34079397f3d7ae60a2.
Audit the implementation at 0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8.
Findings should refer to the implementation unless explicitly about proxy mechanics.

You are a security auditor. Audit this Solidity codebase for exploitable vulnerabilities.
Focus on: reentrancy, access control, upgradeability/proxy issues, signature validation, oracle manipulation,
accounting/invariant breaks, external call patterns, unchecked return values, and dangerous delegatecall.

Scope rules:
- You MUST fully read `AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt` before concluding. It contains the complete contents of all first-party Solidity sources in this workspace.
- Treat `lib/` and `@openzeppelin/` as third-party dependencies; skip them unless there is a concrete misuse angle in first-party code.
- If there are only dependency files and no first-party sources, set no_findings=true and explain in summary.

Output MUST be valid JSON matching the provided schema.
- If you find nothing meaningful: set no_findings=true and findings=[].
- Otherwise: set no_findings=false and include findings with severity/category/title and file/line locations when possible.

Output constraints (IMPORTANT):
- severity MUST be exactly one of: info, low, medium, high, critical (lowercase).
- category MUST be exactly one of: access_control, reentrancy, math, oracle, upgradeability, auth, other.
Keep summary short and concrete.
mcp startup: no servers
exec
/bin/bash -lc ls in /tmp/codex-1p5atdhm succeeded in 7ms:
AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt
codex-output-schema.json
src
exec
/bin/bash -lc 'cat AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt' in /tmp/codex-1p5atdhm succeeded in 7ms:
This file concatenates the full contents of first-party Solidity sources for auditing.
Do not treat dependency code under lib/ or @openzeppelin/ as first-party.

================================================================================
FILE: src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol
================================================================================
/**
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
 */

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import "../utils/Address.sol";
import "../utils/Initializable.sol";
import "./RLPEncode.sol";
import "./Nonce.sol";

/**
 * Documented in ../../doc/multisig.md
 */
exec
/bin/bash -lc "nl -ba src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol | sed -n '1,220p'" in /tmp/codex-1p5atdhm succeeded in 8ms:
     1	/**
     2	 * SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
     3	 */
     4	
     5	pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
     6	
     7	import "../utils/Address.sol";
     8	import "../utils/Initializable.sol";
     9	import "./RLPEncode.sol";
    10	import "./Nonce.sol";
    11	
    12	/**
    13	 * Documented in ../../doc/multisig.md
    14	 */
    15	contract MultiSigWalletV3 is Nonce, Initializable {
    16	
    17	  mapping (address => uint8) public signers; // The addresses that can co-sign transactions and the number of signatures needed
    18	
    19	  uint16 public signerCount;
    20	  bytes public contractId; // most likely unique id of this contract
codex
{"no_findings":false,"summary":"One high-severity reentrancy issue allows a signed transaction to be executed multiple times within a single call before the nonce is marked used.","findings":[{"severity":"high","category":"reentrancy","title":"Nonce marked after external call allows reentrant replay of the same signed transaction","exploit_scenario":"A signer executes a transaction that calls a malicious contract. That contract reenters `execute` using the same `nonce/to/value/data` and signatures (which it can receive via calldata), and because `flagUsed` hasn’t run yet, the nonce is still free. The wallet then performs the same transfer/call again, allowing repeated execution and draining more funds than intended in a single transaction.","recommendation":"Mark the nonce as used before performing the external call (or add a reentrancy guard). Because a revert will roll back state, marking the nonce early won’t burn it on failed calls.","evidence":"`execute` performs `Address.functionCallWithValue(to, data, value);` before `flagUsed(nonce);`, allowing reentrancy before the nonce is consumed.","locations":["src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:70","src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:73","src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:74"]}]}
tokens used
23,188
Metadata
{
    "codex": {
        "ran_at": "2026-01-30T12:44:55.588598+00:00",
        "returncode": 0
    },
    "project": {
        "mode": "source",
        "file_count": 5,
        "import_count": 4,
        "first_party_contracts_count": 5
    },
    "summary": "One high-severity reentrancy issue allows a signed transaction to be executed multiple times within a single call before the nonce is marked used.",
    "raw_final": {
        "summary": "One high-severity reentrancy issue allows a signed transaction to be executed multiple times within a single call before the nonce is marked used.",
        "findings": [
            {
                "title": "Nonce marked after external call allows reentrant replay of the same signed transaction",
                "category": "reentrancy",
                "evidence": "`execute` performs `Address.functionCallWithValue(to, data, value);` before `flagUsed(nonce);`, allowing reentrancy before the nonce is consumed.",
                "severity": "high",
                "locations": [
                    "src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:70",
                    "src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:73",
                    "src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:74"
                ],
                "recommendation": "Mark the nonce as used before performing the external call (or add a reentrancy guard). Because a revert will roll back state, marking the nonce early won\u2019t burn it on failed calls.",
                "exploit_scenario": "A signer executes a transaction that calls a malicious contract. That contract reenters `execute` using the same `nonce/to/value/data` and signatures (which it can receive via calldata), and because `flagUsed` hasn\u2019t run yet, the nonce is still free. The wallet then performs the same transfer/call again, allowing repeated execution and draining more funds than intended in a single transaction."
            }
        ],
        "no_findings": false
    },
    "no_findings": false,
    "proxy_context": {
        "proxy_run_id": "019c0ea9-07c1-72fc-b499-c22be17f1945",
        "proxy_address": "0x4d307525b22897ca07af7e34079397f3d7ae60a2",
        "implementation_run_id": "019c0ea9-e9be-73c6-a611-a0ba6ee4b415",
        "implementation_address": "0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8"
    },
    "schema_version": 1
}

Opcode Heuristics

tool.cast_disasm
Delegatecall
1
Selfdestruct
0
CREATE2
0
CALL-family (heavy)
0
EXT*/BALANCE
0
Total opcodes
24
Flags
delegatecall_present
View cast disassembly output
00000000: CALLDATASIZE
00000001: RETURNDATASIZE
00000002: RETURNDATASIZE
00000003: CALLDATACOPY
00000004: RETURNDATASIZE
00000005: RETURNDATASIZE
00000006: RETURNDATASIZE
00000007: CALLDATASIZE
00000008: RETURNDATASIZE
00000009: PUSH20 0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8
0000001e: GAS
0000001f: DELEGATECALL
00000020: RETURNDATASIZE
00000021: DUP3
00000022: DUP1
00000023: RETURNDATACOPY
00000024: SWAP1
00000025: RETURNDATASIZE
00000026: SWAP2
00000027: PUSH1 0x2b
00000029: JUMPI
0000002a: REVERT
0000002b: JUMPDEST
0000002c: RETURN

Findings

validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others
Severity Category Tool Title Confidence Validated Confirmed Details
critical upgradeability detector Untrusted DELEGATECALL target reachable 70 no no
view
trace_id: 0x439eabcd768f4def84c3c5767dc1bdb8657669a5d6f7b8c80676be78807313e4
call_targets: 0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8
target_varies: no
classification: constant_target
validation_json
{
    "sink": "DELEGATECALL",
    "errors": 0,
    "status": "sink_reached",
    "attempts": 1,
    "trace_id": "0x439eabcd768f4def84c3c5767dc1bdb8657669a5d6f7b8c80676be78807313e4",
    "confirmed": false,
    "trace_mode": "callTracer",
    "call_targets": [
        "0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8"
    ],
    "matched_probe": null,
    "target_varies": false,
    "classification": "constant_target"
}
witness_json
{
    "notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata",
    "constraints": [],
    "entrypoints": [
        {
            "calldata": "0x",
            "selector": "fallback",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x"
            ]
        }
    ]
}
evidence_json
{
    "examples": [
        {
            "pc": 31,
            "opcode": "DELEGATECALL",
            "returndata_checked": null,
            "value_expression_category": "n/a",
            "target_expression_category": "computed"
        }
    ],
    "guards_detected": [],
    "delegatecall_count": 1,
    "untrusted_delegatecall_count": 1
}
high reentrancy codex Nonce marked after external call allows reentrant replay of the same signed transaction 85 no
view
evidence_json
{
    "evidence": "`execute` performs `Address.functionCallWithValue(to, data, value);` before `flagUsed(nonce);`, allowing reentrancy before the nonce is consumed.",
    "locations": [
        "src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:70",
        "src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:73",
        "src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:74"
    ],
    "recommendation": "Mark the nonce as used before performing the external call (or add a reentrancy guard). Because a revert will roll back state, marking the nonce early won\u2019t burn it on failed calls.",
    "exploit_scenario": "A signer executes a transaction that calls a malicious contract. That contract reenters `execute` using the same `nonce/to/value/data` and signatures (which it can receive via calldata), and because `flagUsed` hasn\u2019t run yet, the nonce is still free. The wallet then performs the same transfer/call again, allowing repeated execution and draining more funds than intended in a single transaction."
}
medium upgradeability cast DELEGATECALL present 80 no
view
evidence_json
{
    "notes": "delegatecall enables execution in caller context; common in proxies/upgradeable patterns",
    "delegatecall_count": 1
}