019c0ea9-07c1-72fc-b499-c22be17f1945
Open this run to answer one question: is this real attacker-relevant behavior with real impact, or just normal contract plumbing?
| ID | Type | Status | Attempts | Heartbeat |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 41669 | artifact.fetch | complete | 1 / 3 | 2 months ago |
| 41670 | proxy.resolve | complete | 1 / 3 | 2 months ago |
| 41671 | tool.cast_disasm | complete | 1 / 3 | 2 months ago |
| 41672 | analysis.bundle | complete | 1 / 3 | 2 months ago |
| 41673 | capability.graph | complete | 1 / 3 | 2 months ago |
| 41674 | detector.run | complete | 1 / 3 | 2 months ago |
| 41675 | validation.fork | complete | 1 / 3 | 2 months ago |
| 42264 | report.consolidate | complete | 1 / 6 | 2 months ago |
| 42265 | tool.slither | failed | 2 / 2 | 2 months ago |
{
"method": "minimal_proxy",
"status": "onchain_only",
"implementation": "0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8",
"onchain_method": "minimal_proxy"
}
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/worker.py", line 198, in main
payload = dispatch_job(job_type, job_id, job_meta, run_data, config, laravel_client)
File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/worker.py", line 114, in dispatch_job
return slither_run.run(job_id, job_meta, run_data, config, log, laravel_client)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/jobs/slither_run.py", line 1084, in run
stdout_text, stderr_text, result_json = _run_slither(
~~~~~~~~~~~~^
workspace,
^^^^^^^^^^
...<4 lines>...
target_path=target_path,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
)
^
File "/var/www/tripwire/worker/jobs/slither_run.py", line 958, in _run_slither
raise RuntimeError(f"slither failed (exit {result.returncode}): {stderr_text or stdout_text}")
RuntimeError: slither failed (exit 1): 'forge clean' running (wd: /tmp/slither-_e4123ko)
'forge config --json' running
'forge build --build-info --skip ./test/** ./script/** --force' running (wd: /tmp/slither-_e4123ko)
'forge' returned non-zero exit code 1
Compiling 5 files with Solc 0.8.0
stdout: Solc 0.8.0 finished in 9.61ms
Error: Compiler run failed:
stderr: Error (6546): Documentation tag @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow not valid for contracts.
stderr: --> src/utils/Initializable.sol:6:1:
stderr: |
stderr: 6 | /**
stderr: | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/bin/slither", line 10, in <module>
sys.exit(main())
~~~~^^
File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/slither/__main__.py", line 776, in main
main_impl(all_detector_classes=detectors, all_printer_classes=printers)
~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/slither/__main__.py", line 882, in main_impl
) = process_all(filename, args, detector_classes, printer_classes)
~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/slither/__main__.py", line 96, in process_all
compilations = compile_all(target, **vars(args))
File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 722, in compile_all
compilations.append(CryticCompile(target, **kwargs))
~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 211, in __init__
self._compile(**kwargs)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^
File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 633, in _compile
self._platform.compile(self, **kwargs)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/platform/foundry.py", line 102, in compile
hardhat_like_parsing(
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
crytic_compile, str(self._target), build_directory, str(self._project_root)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
)
^
File "/var/www/tripwire/.venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/crytic_compile/platform/hardhat.py", line 52, in hardhat_like_parsing
raise InvalidCompilation(txt)
crytic_compile.platform.exceptions.InvalidCompilation: Compilation failed. Can you run build command?
/tmp/slither-_e4123ko/out/build-info is not a directory.
{"no_findings":false,"summary":"One high-severity reentrancy issue allows a signed transaction to be executed multiple times within a single call before the nonce is marked used.","findings":[{"severity":"high","category":"reentrancy","title":"Nonce marked after external call allows reentrant replay of the same signed transaction","exploit_scenario":"A signer executes a transaction that calls a malicious contract. That contract reenters `execute` using the same `nonce/to/value/data` and signatures (which it can receive via calldata), and because `flagUsed` hasn’t run yet, the nonce is still free. The wallet then performs the same transfer/call again, allowing repeated execution and draining more funds than intended in a single transaction.","recommendation":"Mark the nonce as used before performing the external call (or add a reentrancy guard). Because a revert will roll back state, marking the nonce early won’t burn it on failed calls.","evidence":"`execute` performs `Address.functionCallWithValue(to, data, value);` before `flagUsed(nonce);`, allowing reentrancy before the nonce is consumed.","locations":["src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:70","src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:73","src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:74"]}]}
OpenAI Codex v0.77.0 (research preview)
--------
workdir: /tmp/codex-1p5atdhm
model: gpt-5.2-codex
provider: openai
approval: never
sandbox: read-only
reasoning effort: high
reasoning summaries: auto
session id: 019c0eec-6e74-7713-af8c-ae6744208636
--------
user
Context: The user requested the proxy at 0x4d307525b22897ca07af7e34079397f3d7ae60a2.
Audit the implementation at 0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8.
Findings should refer to the implementation unless explicitly about proxy mechanics.
You are a security auditor. Audit this Solidity codebase for exploitable vulnerabilities.
Focus on: reentrancy, access control, upgradeability/proxy issues, signature validation, oracle manipulation,
accounting/invariant breaks, external call patterns, unchecked return values, and dangerous delegatecall.
Scope rules:
- You MUST fully read `AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt` before concluding. It contains the complete contents of all first-party Solidity sources in this workspace.
- Treat `lib/` and `@openzeppelin/` as third-party dependencies; skip them unless there is a concrete misuse angle in first-party code.
- If there are only dependency files and no first-party sources, set no_findings=true and explain in summary.
Output MUST be valid JSON matching the provided schema.
- If you find nothing meaningful: set no_findings=true and findings=[].
- Otherwise: set no_findings=false and include findings with severity/category/title and file/line locations when possible.
Output constraints (IMPORTANT):
- severity MUST be exactly one of: info, low, medium, high, critical (lowercase).
- category MUST be exactly one of: access_control, reentrancy, math, oracle, upgradeability, auth, other.
Keep summary short and concrete.
mcp startup: no servers
exec
/bin/bash -lc ls in /tmp/codex-1p5atdhm succeeded in 7ms:
AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt
codex-output-schema.json
src
exec
/bin/bash -lc 'cat AUDIT_BUNDLE.txt' in /tmp/codex-1p5atdhm succeeded in 7ms:
This file concatenates the full contents of first-party Solidity sources for auditing.
Do not treat dependency code under lib/ or @openzeppelin/ as first-party.
================================================================================
FILE: src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol
================================================================================
/**
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*/
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "../utils/Address.sol";
import "../utils/Initializable.sol";
import "./RLPEncode.sol";
import "./Nonce.sol";
/**
* Documented in ../../doc/multisig.md
*/
exec
/bin/bash -lc "nl -ba src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol | sed -n '1,220p'" in /tmp/codex-1p5atdhm succeeded in 8ms:
1 /**
2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
3 */
4
5 pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
6
7 import "../utils/Address.sol";
8 import "../utils/Initializable.sol";
9 import "./RLPEncode.sol";
10 import "./Nonce.sol";
11
12 /**
13 * Documented in ../../doc/multisig.md
14 */
15 contract MultiSigWalletV3 is Nonce, Initializable {
16
17 mapping (address => uint8) public signers; // The addresses that can co-sign transactions and the number of signatures needed
18
19 uint16 public signerCount;
20 bytes public contractId; // most likely unique id of this contract
codex
{"no_findings":false,"summary":"One high-severity reentrancy issue allows a signed transaction to be executed multiple times within a single call before the nonce is marked used.","findings":[{"severity":"high","category":"reentrancy","title":"Nonce marked after external call allows reentrant replay of the same signed transaction","exploit_scenario":"A signer executes a transaction that calls a malicious contract. That contract reenters `execute` using the same `nonce/to/value/data` and signatures (which it can receive via calldata), and because `flagUsed` hasn’t run yet, the nonce is still free. The wallet then performs the same transfer/call again, allowing repeated execution and draining more funds than intended in a single transaction.","recommendation":"Mark the nonce as used before performing the external call (or add a reentrancy guard). Because a revert will roll back state, marking the nonce early won’t burn it on failed calls.","evidence":"`execute` performs `Address.functionCallWithValue(to, data, value);` before `flagUsed(nonce);`, allowing reentrancy before the nonce is consumed.","locations":["src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:70","src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:73","src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:74"]}]}
tokens used
23,188
{
"codex": {
"ran_at": "2026-01-30T12:44:55.588598+00:00",
"returncode": 0
},
"project": {
"mode": "source",
"file_count": 5,
"import_count": 4,
"first_party_contracts_count": 5
},
"summary": "One high-severity reentrancy issue allows a signed transaction to be executed multiple times within a single call before the nonce is marked used.",
"raw_final": {
"summary": "One high-severity reentrancy issue allows a signed transaction to be executed multiple times within a single call before the nonce is marked used.",
"findings": [
{
"title": "Nonce marked after external call allows reentrant replay of the same signed transaction",
"category": "reentrancy",
"evidence": "`execute` performs `Address.functionCallWithValue(to, data, value);` before `flagUsed(nonce);`, allowing reentrancy before the nonce is consumed.",
"severity": "high",
"locations": [
"src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:70",
"src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:73",
"src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:74"
],
"recommendation": "Mark the nonce as used before performing the external call (or add a reentrancy guard). Because a revert will roll back state, marking the nonce early won\u2019t burn it on failed calls.",
"exploit_scenario": "A signer executes a transaction that calls a malicious contract. That contract reenters `execute` using the same `nonce/to/value/data` and signatures (which it can receive via calldata), and because `flagUsed` hasn\u2019t run yet, the nonce is still free. The wallet then performs the same transfer/call again, allowing repeated execution and draining more funds than intended in a single transaction."
}
],
"no_findings": false
},
"no_findings": false,
"proxy_context": {
"proxy_run_id": "019c0ea9-07c1-72fc-b499-c22be17f1945",
"proxy_address": "0x4d307525b22897ca07af7e34079397f3d7ae60a2",
"implementation_run_id": "019c0ea9-e9be-73c6-a611-a0ba6ee4b415",
"implementation_address": "0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8"
},
"schema_version": 1
}
00000000: CALLDATASIZE 00000001: RETURNDATASIZE 00000002: RETURNDATASIZE 00000003: CALLDATACOPY 00000004: RETURNDATASIZE 00000005: RETURNDATASIZE 00000006: RETURNDATASIZE 00000007: CALLDATASIZE 00000008: RETURNDATASIZE 00000009: PUSH20 0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8 0000001e: GAS 0000001f: DELEGATECALL 00000020: RETURNDATASIZE 00000021: DUP3 00000022: DUP1 00000023: RETURNDATACOPY 00000024: SWAP1 00000025: RETURNDATASIZE 00000026: SWAP2 00000027: PUSH1 0x2b 00000029: JUMPI 0000002a: REVERT 0000002b: JUMPDEST 0000002c: RETURN
| Severity | Category | Tool | Title | Confidence | Validated | Confirmed | Details |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| critical | upgradeability | detector | Untrusted DELEGATECALL target reachable | 70 | no | no |
viewtrace_id: 0x439eabcd768f4def84c3c5767dc1bdb8657669a5d6f7b8c80676be78807313e4
call_targets:
0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8
target_varies:
no
classification:
constant_target
validation_json{
"sink": "DELEGATECALL",
"errors": 0,
"status": "sink_reached",
"attempts": 1,
"trace_id": "0x439eabcd768f4def84c3c5767dc1bdb8657669a5d6f7b8c80676be78807313e4",
"confirmed": false,
"trace_mode": "callTracer",
"call_targets": [
"0x43ffaa65fe273d2ef9edd78418091d41b1aa40e8"
],
"matched_probe": null,
"target_varies": false,
"classification": "constant_target"
}
witness_json{
"notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata",
"constraints": [],
"entrypoints": [
{
"calldata": "0x",
"selector": "fallback",
"calldata_variants": [
"0x"
]
}
]
}
evidence_json{
"examples": [
{
"pc": 31,
"opcode": "DELEGATECALL",
"returndata_checked": null,
"value_expression_category": "n/a",
"target_expression_category": "computed"
}
],
"guards_detected": [],
"delegatecall_count": 1,
"untrusted_delegatecall_count": 1
}
|
| high | reentrancy | codex | Nonce marked after external call allows reentrant replay of the same signed transaction | 85 | no | — |
viewevidence_json{
"evidence": "`execute` performs `Address.functionCallWithValue(to, data, value);` before `flagUsed(nonce);`, allowing reentrancy before the nonce is consumed.",
"locations": [
"src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:70",
"src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:73",
"src/multisig/MultiSigWalletV3.sol:74"
],
"recommendation": "Mark the nonce as used before performing the external call (or add a reentrancy guard). Because a revert will roll back state, marking the nonce early won\u2019t burn it on failed calls.",
"exploit_scenario": "A signer executes a transaction that calls a malicious contract. That contract reenters `execute` using the same `nonce/to/value/data` and signatures (which it can receive via calldata), and because `flagUsed` hasn\u2019t run yet, the nonce is still free. The wallet then performs the same transfer/call again, allowing repeated execution and draining more funds than intended in a single transaction."
}
|
| medium | upgradeability | cast | DELEGATECALL present | 80 | no | — |
viewevidence_json{
"notes": "delegatecall enables execution in caller context; common in proxies/upgradeable patterns",
"delegatecall_count": 1
}
|