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Tripwire
Find contracts. Test them. Review real vulns.

Analysis Run

019b3836-2d76-71c8-97dc-996004a4b3cf

complete
Chain ID
1
Address
Block Number
Created
Fri, Dec 19, 2025 8:03 PM
Review Summary

What survived the funnel

Open this run to answer one question: is this real attacker-relevant behavior with real impact, or just normal contract plumbing?

Confirmed
2
Validated
2
Source
Bytecode only
Review Backing
Present
Best current signal
Untrusted CALL target/value reachable
crit 0 high 2 direct contract
Review Checklist
1. Read the findings table first. Ignore raw jobs until the result looks real.
2. Confirm attacker control, not just the existence of a sink.
3. Confirm money or privilege impact.
4. Keep it if the behavior is real. Kill it if this is normal proxy, admin, or upgrade plumbing.

Processing Jobs

Status & attempts
ID Type Status Attempts Heartbeat
2101 artifact.fetch complete 1 / 3 3 months ago
2102 tool.cast_disasm complete 1 / 3 3 months ago
45224 analysis.bundle complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
45225 capability.graph complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
45226 detector.run complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
45227 validation.fork complete 1 / 3 1 week ago
113237 report.consolidate complete 1 / 6 1 week ago

Artifact

Runtime bytecode: available
Creation TX:
Deployer:
Proxy: no
Implementation:
Verified Source: no

Slither

tool.slither

No slither job recorded yet.

Codex

report.consolidate
Job Status
complete
Attempts
1 / 6
Findings
2
No findings?
no
Summary
Bytecode looks like a small legacy ERC20-style token with `name`, `symbol`, `decimals`, `balanceOf`, and `transfer`. I did not find evidence of proxy logic, `DELEGATECALL`, owner-only admin paths, or a meaningful reentrancy surface. The reported high-severity `CALL` at `pc:0x188` is better explained as an old Solidity string-return helper that appears to hit precompile `0x04`; I do not treat that detector hit as a standalone vulnerability. The meaningful bytecode-level issues are legacy ABI/payability behaviors: transfers are decoded without explicit calldata-length checks, and the contract appears to accept ETH with no visible recovery path.
View stdout
{"no_findings":false,"summary":"Bytecode looks like a small legacy ERC20-style token with `name`, `symbol`, `decimals`, `balanceOf`, and `transfer`. I did not find evidence of proxy logic, `DELEGATECALL`, owner-only admin paths, or a meaningful reentrancy surface. The reported high-severity `CALL` at `pc:0x188` is better explained as an old Solidity string-return helper that appears to hit precompile `0x04`; I do not treat that detector hit as a standalone vulnerability. The meaningful bytecode-level issues are legacy ABI/payability behaviors: transfers are decoded without explicit calldata-length checks, and the contract appears to accept ETH with no visible recovery path.","findings":[{"severity":"low","category":"other","title":"`transfer` decodes calldata without an explicit length check","exploit_scenario":"A third-party integration that builds malformed calldata can trigger classic short-calldata/short-address style misdecoding. In that case the contract will zero-pad missing bytes instead of rejecting the call, so the decoded recipient and/or amount can differ from what the integration intended, potentially causing unintended token movements for that integration's users.","recommendation":"Reject undersized calldata before decoding arguments, or redeploy behind a modern compiler/ABI decoder that enforces argument length. If the contract is immutable, only expose it through wrappers/integrations that validate calldata length before forwarding.","evidence":"In the `0xa9059cbb` path, arguments are read directly with `CALLDATALOAD` at `pc:0x129` and `pc:0x12c`. I do not see a selector-specific `CALLDATASIZE` guard before those loads; the dispatcher simply routes by selector and falls through to execution. From bytecode alone I cannot prove a currently exploitable caller, so severity is kept low, but the decode pattern is the legacy one associated with short-calldata risk.","locations":["selector:0xa9059cbb","pc:0x129","pc:0x12c"]},{"severity":"low","category":"other","title":"Contract appears payable and can trap ETH permanently","exploit_scenario":"A user or integration accidentally sends ETH either directly to the contract or alongside a token call. The call appears to succeed, increasing the contract's ETH balance, but there is no visible bytecode path to withdraw or recover that ETH, so the value becomes stuck.","recommendation":"Add a `msg.value == 0` check on all entrypoints or provide an authorized recovery/sweep function. If the code is immutable, document clearly that ETH must never be sent to this address.","evidence":"The runtime contains no `CALLVALUE` check, and the unknown-selector / fallback path ends in `STOP` at `pc:0x45` rather than reverting. I also do not see any admin, withdraw, proxy, or selfdestruct path in the artifact; the only `CALL` sink is the string-return helper at `pc:0x188`, which is consistent with a precompile-assisted memory copy rather than an ETH recovery function. This is bytecode-only reasoning, so the conclusion is limited to visible runtime behavior.","locations":["pc:0x0","pc:0x45","pc:0x188"]}]}
View stderr
OpenAI Codex v0.118.0 (research preview)
--------
workdir: /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
model: gpt-5.4
provider: openai
approval: never
sandbox: read-only
reasoning effort: high
reasoning summaries: none
session id: 019d5b77-e8f2-7ca1-877b-af14983ed4c3
--------
user
You are a security auditor. You ONLY have runtime bytecode + analysis artifacts.
You MUST read `BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json` before concluding; it contains the bytecode summary,
evidence bundle, callsites, storage slots, and detector findings.

Special cases when reasoning from bytecode (be explicit about uncertainty):
- Selector inference is best-effort; missing selectors are common.
- Fallback/receive paths may be the only entrypoints.
- CALL vs DELEGATECALL semantics differ; DELEGATECALL executes in caller storage.
- Proxy patterns (EIP-1967, minimal proxies, beacon) change which storage is authoritative.
- Storage slots are raw; mappings/arrays appear via keccak patterns, names are unknown.
- Guard detection is heuristic; absence of guards does NOT mean unguarded.
- Returndata checking is unknown unless explicitly shown in evidence.
- Precompiles (0x1..0x9) and common ERC20 transfer selectors may appear; do not over-claim.

Output MUST be valid JSON matching the provided schema.
- If you find nothing meaningful: set no_findings=true and findings=[].
- Otherwise: set no_findings=false and include findings with severity/category/title.
- Locations can be pc references like "pc:0x123" or selectors like "selector:0xa9059cbb".

Focus on: reentrancy, access control, upgradeability/proxy issues, signature validation,
accounting/invariant breaks, dangerous delegatecall, and untrusted external calls.
Be conservative: if evidence is weak, mark severity low/medium and explain why.
warning: Codex could not find system bubblewrap on PATH. Please install bubblewrap with your package manager. Codex will use the vendored bubblewrap in the meantime.
  → Inspect BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json and related artifacts to understand contract structure and detector evidence
  • Assess potential vulnerabilities from bytecode evidence with explicit uncertainty
  • Produce final JSON report matching the required schema
exec
/bin/bash -lc pwd in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
/tmp/codex-vpms2yxl

exec
/bin/bash -lc 'rg --files' in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json
codex-output-schema.json

exec
/bin/bash -lc "sed -n '1,260p' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
{
  "analysis_artifact": {
    "address": "0xbd247894dc95d7022363ac7c12a507a5db2e689c",
    "artifact_hash": "0x6837c46bf74b1e53cbda8c75cdac4a2af785b3b0e5a3ee41bbda5eabd02513f3",
    "artifact_json": {
      "auth": {
        "guards": []
      },
      "basic_blocks": [
        {
          "end_pc": 24,
          "hash": "0x6a350686911b120d699f8e8d1e9440d4ce17c4434492baee43484e2ef083a112",
          "opcodes": [
            "PUSH1",
            "PUSH1",
            "MSTORE",
            "PUSH1",
            "PUSH1",
            "EXP",
            "PUSH1",
            "CALLDATALOAD",
            "DIV",
            "PUSH4",
            "OP_81",
            "EQ",
            "PUSH2",
            "JUMPI"
          ],
          "start_pc": 0
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 35,
          "hash": "0x09fc75e3aa8fb02b98e24881cc463925488c7dfa7ef308570a5930c5c420c614",
          "opcodes": [
            "OP_80",
            "PUSH4",
            "EQ",
            "PUSH2",
            "JUMPI"
          ],
          "start_pc": 25
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 46,
          "hash": "0x976103db32485bde438fb5c3f9f54ee02f48623f2e3b08249411cd4aee3c334a",
          "opcodes": [
            "OP_80",
            "PUSH4",
            "EQ",
            "PUSH2",
            "JUMPI"
          ],
          "start_pc": 36
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 57,
          "hash": "0x3c19c073e27395dc44272beb525b6373ad140a4045aabbd1b653e498e1806824",
          "opcodes": [
            "OP_80",
            "PUSH4",
            "EQ",
            "PUSH2",
            "JUMPI"
          ],
          "start_pc": 47
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 68,
          "hash": "0x3a122683470ea7901e31e80e6378780a829a06da64b04e691b5d5c5621392507",
          "opcodes": [
            "OP_80",
            "PUSH4",
            "EQ",
            "PUSH2",
            "JUMPI"
          ],
          "start_pc": 58
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 70,
          "hash": "0x55afd043d32294d5f0189f5a0aa04f3174e4c087a31c85396f49b5f17813cb96",
          "opcodes": [
            "JUMPDEST",
            "STOP"
          ],
          "start_pc": 69
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 136,
          "hash": "0xec67f3874a81e276f4497a4f9168afd2521b3b861d4cc15c8da4a0556656b752",
          "opcodes": [
            "JUMPDEST",
            "PUSH2",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_80",
            "SLOAD",
            "PUSH1",
            "PUSH1",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_83",
            "AND",
            "ISZERO",
            "PUSH2",
            "MUL",
            "PUSH1",
            "NOT",
            "ADD",
            "OP_90",
            "OP_92",
            "AND",
            "OP_91",
            "OP_90",
            "OP_91",
            "DIV",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_81",
            "ADD",
            "OP_82",
            "OP_90",
            "DIV",
            "OP_90",
            "OP_91",
            "MUL",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_90",
            "OP_81",
            "ADD",
            "PUSH1",
            "MSTORE",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_82",
            "OP_81",
            "MSTORE",
            "OP_92",
            "OP_91",
            "OP_90",
            "OP_82",
            "OP_82",
            "OP_80",
            "ISZERO",
            "PUSH2",
            "JUMPI"
          ],
          "start_pc": 71
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 144,
          "hash": "0x38fe7e3cebe2dd28488c693680c8c0a0a5a5585741c1ccbdb984bb79acc2d6d5",
          "opcodes": [
            "OP_80",
            "PUSH1",
            "LT",
            "PUSH2",
            "JUMPI"
          ],
          "start_pc": 137
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 163,
          "hash": "0x39d82d062f67a4ee303cb8ba95f6d709cb38320623002519adc99ca3f1c5bac0",
          "opcodes": [
            "PUSH2",
            "OP_80",
            "OP_83",
            "SLOAD",
            "DIV",
            "MUL",
            "OP_83",
            "MSTORE",
            "OP_91",
            "PUSH1",
            "ADD",
            "OP_91",
            "PUSH2",
            "JUMP"
          ],
          "start_pc": 145
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 175,
          "hash": "0x938aee19a0e1094c19b5a9528f839968d51c237564158e673ab6899436584f6e",
          "opcodes": [
            "JUMPDEST",
            "PUSH2",
            "PUSH1",
            "SLOAD",
            "PUSH1",
            "AND",
            "OP_81",
            "JUMP"
          ],
          "start_pc": 164
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 199,
          "hash": "0x7b0565c261db3d55c39f20ac0ee4d4710d6951f51b6844e361a4647909dcfc38",
          "opcodes": [
            "JUMPDEST",
            "PUSH2",
            "PUSH1",
            "CALLDATALOAD",
            "PUSH1",
            "PUSH1",
            "MSTORE",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_90",
            "OP_81",
            "MSTORE",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_90",
            "SHA3",
            "SLOAD",
            "OP_81",
            "JUMP"
          ],
          "start_pc": 176
        },
        {
          "end_pc": 263,
          "hash": "0x2dd3321e3d3cee3d8772c60a1b65a39fac69bc39f743fc4373df122a940b48c8",
          "opcodes": [
            "JUMPDEST",
            "PUSH2",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_80",
            "SLOAD",
            "PUSH1",
            "PUSH1",
            "PUSH1",
            "PUSH1",
            "NOT",
            "PUSH2",
            "OP_85",
            "OP_87",
            "AND",
            "ISZERO",
            "MUL",
            "ADD",
            "OP_90",
            "OP_93",
            "AND",
            "OP_92",
            "OP_90",
            "OP_92",
            "DIV",
            "OP_91",
            "OP_82",
            "ADD",
            "OP_81",
            "OP_90",
            "DIV",
            "MUL",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_90",
            "OP_81",
            "ADD",
            "PUSH1",
            "MSTORE",
            "PUSH1",
            "OP_82",

exec
/bin/bash -lc "sed -n '1,220p' codex-output-schema.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
{"type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["no_findings", "summary", "findings"], "properties": {"no_findings": {"type": "boolean"}, "summary": {"type": "string"}, "findings": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["severity", "category", "title", "evidence", "locations", "exploit_scenario", "recommendation"], "properties": {"severity": {"type": "string", "enum": ["info", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"]}, "category": {"type": "string", "enum": ["access_control", "reentrancy", "math", "oracle", "upgradeability", "auth", "other"]}, "title": {"type": "string"}, "exploit_scenario": {"type": "string"}, "recommendation": {"type": "string"}, "evidence": {"type": "string"}, "locations": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}}}}}}}
exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq 'keys' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
[
  "analysis_artifact",
  "analysis_run",
  "artifact",
  "capability_graph",
  "detector_findings",
  "heuristics_summary"
]

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.analysis_artifact.artifact_json | keys' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
[
  "auth",
  "basic_blocks",
  "callsites",
  "cfg_edges",
  "cfg_hash",
  "dispatcher_type",
  "function_entries",
  "functions",
  "selectors",
  "sinks",
  "storage",
  "version"
]

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.analysis_artifact.artifact_json.detectors // empty' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.analysis_artifact.artifact_json.selectors // empty' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
 succeeded in 0ms:
[
  "0x06fdde03",
  "0x313ce567",
  "0x70a08231",
  "0x95d89b41",
  "0xa9059cbb"
]

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.analysis_artifact.artifact_json.function_entries' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
[
  {
    "entry_pc": null,
    "selector": "0x06fdde03"
  },
  {
    "entry_pc": 1889567281,
    "selector": "0x313ce567"
  },
  {
    "entry_pc": 2514000705,
    "selector": "0x70a08231"
  },
  {
    "entry_pc": 2835717307,
    "selector": "0x95d89b41"
  },
  {
    "entry_pc": null,
    "selector": "0xa9059cbb"
  }
]

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.analysis_artifact.artifact_json.functions' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
[
  {
    "auth": {
      "guards": []
    },
    "entry_pc": null,
    "selector": "0x06fdde03",
    "sinks": {
      "call": 1,
      "delegatecall": 0,
      "selfdestruct": 0,
      "staticcall": 0
    },
    "storage": {
      "reads": 11,
      "slots": [
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 78,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 150,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 170,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 207,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 277,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        }
      ],
      "writes": 2
    }
  },
  {
    "auth": {
      "guards": []
    },
    "entry_pc": 1889567281,
    "selector": "0x313ce567",
    "sinks": {
      "call": 1,
      "delegatecall": 0,
      "selfdestruct": 0,
      "staticcall": 0
    },
    "storage": {
      "reads": 11,
      "slots": [
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 78,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 150,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 170,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 207,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 277,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        }
      ],
      "writes": 2
    }
  },
  {
    "auth": {
      "guards": []
    },
    "entry_pc": 2514000705,
    "selector": "0x70a08231",
    "sinks": {
      "call": 1,
      "delegatecall": 0,
      "selfdestruct": 0,
      "staticcall": 0
    },
    "storage": {
      "reads": 11,
      "slots": [
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 78,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 150,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 170,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 207,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 277,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        }
      ],
      "writes": 2
    }
  },
  {
    "auth": {
      "guards": []
    },
    "entry_pc": 2835717307,
    "selector": "0x95d89b41",
    "sinks": {
      "call": 1,
      "delegatecall": 0,
      "selfdestruct": 0,
      "staticcall": 0
    },
    "storage": {
      "reads": 11,
      "slots": [
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 78,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 150,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 170,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 207,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 277,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        }
      ],
      "writes": 2
    }
  },
  {
    "auth": {
      "guards": []
    },
    "entry_pc": null,
    "selector": "0xa9059cbb",
    "sinks": {
      "call": 1,
      "delegatecall": 0,
      "selfdestruct": 0,
      "staticcall": 0
    },
    "storage": {
      "reads": 11,
      "slots": [
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 78,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 150,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 170,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 207,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
        },
        {
          "op": "SLOAD",
          "pc": 277,
          "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
        }
      ],
      "writes": 2
    }
  }
]

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.analysis_artifact.artifact_json.callsites' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
[
  {
    "opcode": "CALL",
    "pc": 392,
    "returndata_checked": null,
    "target_expression_category": "computed",
    "value_expression_category": "computed"
  }
]

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.analysis_artifact.artifact_json.storage' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
{
  "keccak_count": 6,
  "reads": 11,
  "slots": [
    {
      "op": "SLOAD",
      "pc": 78,
      "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    },
    {
      "op": "SLOAD",
      "pc": 150,
      "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
    },
    {
      "op": "SLOAD",
      "pc": 170,
      "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002"
    },
    {
      "op": "SLOAD",
      "pc": 207,
      "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
    },
    {
      "op": "SLOAD",
      "pc": 277,
      "slot": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100"
    }
  ],
  "writes": 2
}

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.detector_findings' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
[
  {
    "confidence": 60,
    "evidence_json": {
      "call_count": 1,
      "examples": [
        {
          "opcode": "CALL",
          "pc": 392,
          "returndata_checked": null,
          "target_expression_category": "computed",
          "value_expression_category": "computed"
        }
      ],
      "guards_detected": [],
      "untrusted_call_count": 1
    },
    "normalized_json": {
      "sink": "CALL"
    },
    "severity": "high",
    "title": "Untrusted CALL target/value reachable",
    "validated": true,
    "validation_json": {
      "attempts": 1,
      "call_targets": [
        "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004",
        "0xbd247894dc95d7022363ac7c12a507a5db2e689c"
      ],
      "classification": "target_varies",
      "confirmed": true,
      "errors": 0,
      "matched_probe": null,
      "sink": "CALL",
      "status": "confirmed",
      "target_varies": true,
      "trace_id": "0x9d132b36b9df7d489b16da31efba4682bd87d8729dd2caa4a8e3db2e69132a95",
      "trace_mode": "callTracer"
    }
  },
  {
    "confidence": 55,
    "evidence_json": {
      "eth_value_calls": 1,
      "examples": [
        {
          "opcode": "CALL",
          "pc": 392,
          "returndata_checked": null,
          "target_expression_category": "computed",
          "value_expression_category": "computed"
        }
      ],
      "guards_detected": []
    },
    "normalized_json": {
      "sink": "CALL",
      "value": "nonzero"
    },
    "severity": "high",
    "title": "ETH value transfer possible",
    "validated": true,
    "validation_json": {
      "attempts": 1,
      "call_targets": [
        "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004",
        "0xbd247894dc95d7022363ac7c12a507a5db2e689c"
      ],
      "classification": "target_varies",
      "confirmed": true,
      "errors": 0,
      "matched_probe": null,
      "sink": "CALL",
      "status": "confirmed",
      "target_varies": true,
      "trace_id": "0x9d132b36b9df7d489b16da31efba4682bd87d8729dd2caa4a8e3db2e69132a95",
      "trace_mode": "callTracer"
    }
  }
]

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.heuristics_summary' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
{
  "create2_count": 0,
  "delegatecall_count": 0,
  "flags": [],
  "selfdestruct_count": 0
}

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.artifact | keys' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
[
  "codehash",
  "compiler_json",
  "implementation_address",
  "is_proxy",
  "runtime_bytecode",
  "verified_source"
]

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.artifact.is_proxy, .artifact.implementation_address, .artifact.compiler_json, .artifact.verified_source' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
false
null
{
  "etherscan": {
    "skipped": true
  }
}
false

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.capability_graph' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
{
  "address": "0xbd247894dc95d7022363ac7c12a507a5db2e689c",
  "block_number": null,
  "chain_id": 1,
  "codehash": "0x2d0d94bc8df800def9388324c0e757f6698e1ac7cb0759d76291296932c88a18",
  "created_at": "2026-04-04T19:53:06.000000Z",
  "graph_hash": "0x0d5a018eb2c8f4c399af48c44d6f56fb7ee6742d663fdfebd8b747e191439b42",
  "graph_json": {
    "edges": [
      {
        "from": "bb:0",
        "to": "bb:71",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:0",
        "to": "bb:25",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:25",
        "to": "bb:164",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:25",
        "to": "bb:36",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:36",
        "to": "bb:176",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:36",
        "to": "bb:47",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:47",
        "to": "bb:200",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:47",
        "to": "bb:58",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:58",
        "to": "bb:291",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:58",
        "to": "bb:69",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:71",
        "to": "bb:708",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:71",
        "to": "bb:137",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:137",
        "to": "bb:665",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:137",
        "to": "bb:145",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:145",
        "to": "bb:708",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:200",
        "to": "bb:708",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:200",
        "to": "bb:264",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:264",
        "to": "bb:665",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:264",
        "to": "bb:272",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:272",
        "to": "bb:708",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:291",
        "to": "bb:458",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:291",
        "to": "bb:334",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:338",
        "to": "bb:434",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:338",
        "to": "bb:409",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:409",
        "to": "bb:434",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:458",
        "to": "bb:492",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:458",
        "to": "bb:488",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:665",
        "to": "bb:679",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:679",
        "to": "bb:679",
        "type": "control_flow"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:679",
        "to": "bb:699",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:699",
        "to": "bb:708",
        "type": "control_flow_fallthrough"
      },
      {
        "from": "fn:0x313ce567",
        "to": "bb:1889567281",
        "type": "entry"
      },
      {
        "from": "fn:0x70a08231",
        "to": "bb:2514000705",
        "type": "entry"
      },
      {
        "from": "fn:0x95d89b41",
        "to": "bb:2835717307",
        "type": "entry"
      },
      {
        "from": "bb:338",
        "to": "call:392",
        "type": "contains"
      },
      {
        "from": "call:392",
        "to": "sink:call",
        "type": "capability"
      }
    ],
    "nodes": [
      {
        "end_pc": 24,
        "hash": "0x6a350686911b120d699f8e8d1e9440d4ce17c4434492baee43484e2ef083a112",
        "id": "bb:0",
        "start_pc": 0,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 35,
        "hash": "0x09fc75e3aa8fb02b98e24881cc463925488c7dfa7ef308570a5930c5c420c614",
        "id": "bb:25",
        "start_pc": 25,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 46,
        "hash": "0x976103db32485bde438fb5c3f9f54ee02f48623f2e3b08249411cd4aee3c334a",
        "id": "bb:36",
        "start_pc": 36,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 57,
        "hash": "0x3c19c073e27395dc44272beb525b6373ad140a4045aabbd1b653e498e1806824",
        "id": "bb:47",
        "start_pc": 47,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 68,
        "hash": "0x3a122683470ea7901e31e80e6378780a829a06da64b04e691b5d5c5621392507",
        "id": "bb:58",
        "start_pc": 58,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 70,
        "hash": "0x55afd043d32294d5f0189f5a0aa04f3174e4c087a31c85396f49b5f17813cb96",
        "id": "bb:69",
        "start_pc": 69,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 136,
        "hash": "0xec67f3874a81e276f4497a4f9168afd2521b3b861d4cc15c8da4a0556656b752",
        "id": "bb:71",
        "start_pc": 71,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 144,
        "hash": "0x38fe7e3cebe2dd28488c693680c8c0a0a5a5585741c1ccbdb984bb79acc2d6d5",
        "id": "bb:137",
        "start_pc": 137,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 163,
        "hash": "0x39d82d062f67a4ee303cb8ba95f6d709cb38320623002519adc99ca3f1c5bac0",
        "id": "bb:145",
        "start_pc": 145,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 175,
        "hash": "0x938aee19a0e1094c19b5a9528f839968d51c237564158e673ab6899436584f6e",
        "id": "bb:164",
        "start_pc": 164,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 199,
        "hash": "0x7b0565c261db3d55c39f20ac0ee4d4710d6951f51b6844e361a4647909dcfc38",
        "id": "bb:176",
        "start_pc": 176,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 263,
        "hash": "0x2dd3321e3d3cee3d8772c60a1b65a39fac69bc39f743fc4373df122a940b48c8",
        "id": "bb:200",
        "start_pc": 200,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 271,
        "hash": "0xf48897fe83e8a1c08c2d0a4c53c8e3efbe26a20090e2685c70de180198db9cd6",
        "id": "bb:264",
        "start_pc": 264,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 290,
        "hash": "0x104a032d4fc7353fcb25eead7bbb8424937000b97270e2a1e39430f6e1787b82",
        "id": "bb:272",
        "start_pc": 272,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 333,
        "hash": "0x3701c3a8e82a5d4ddfedacd82f061822678b81cd9b3e04365c3d36dbf3fdbf1e",
        "id": "bb:291",
        "start_pc": 291,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 337,
        "hash": "0x5ebda49c75a90269902080f51db6f1c7b1af883a7fd6baf1d61b81a8b96dcdca",
        "id": "bb:334",
        "start_pc": 334,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 408,
        "hash": "0x8260bcfbd4c1d49f77b482640c6297cd133661f3ada7f52d07e1835f240b06d3",
        "id": "bb:338",
        "start_pc": 338,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 433,
        "hash": "0xc0a703c2254334f9171c8126ae06fea5cf289341f4c19c890fa2f6b928c400e4",
        "id": "bb:409",
        "start_pc": 409,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 447,
        "hash": "0xbbf38bd955ec6188d491c8a752950f390e38b6a9203b6891438ecf3d66b81c51",
        "id": "bb:434",
        "start_pc": 434,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 457,
        "hash": "0xe40870dc717cbfdedea9fbb4d2473ca373d3dd88734eda3a8e7ff7e0a08a80de",
        "id": "bb:448",
        "start_pc": 448,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 487,
        "hash": "0x418b0fde511679c511110cd65c959067f3759b652c05b9b5da7482388254699e",
        "id": "bb:458",
        "start_pc": 458,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 491,
        "hash": "0x8f4bf7636b663e8793c58303ec18606236d677f96f3ca2e04c131b00709b1be1",
        "id": "bb:488",
        "start_pc": 488,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 664,
        "hash": "0xc9d850040a439217133da6682d76ee8c6d05277a847fb1bb17bd89529d66c1b9",
        "id": "bb:492",
        "start_pc": 492,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 678,
        "hash": "0x4ebd3e4182c294e7e0cfcee32fa54a9c518a3bf7316c128ec5f3adae1aea52d7",
        "id": "bb:665",
        "start_pc": 665,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 698,
        "hash": "0xdbd538713982294e8d700fcb95e735f41532da59590c25f6e1bcf58812962b6c",
        "id": "bb:679",
        "start_pc": 679,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 707,
        "hash": "0x3d326e1ae9b5522da4b7bc7795b735c25eed77ef0d3716ee451b8ba034d2046e",
        "id": "bb:699",
        "start_pc": 699,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "end_pc": 715,
        "hash": "0x0fbc397827201e77529cd13bfad147697e40ac8cbd7c51e40d923a2dd215bc23",
        "id": "bb:708",
        "start_pc": 708,
        "type": "basic_block"
      },
      {
        "id": "call:392",
        "opcode": "CALL",
        "pc": 392,
        "type": "callsite"
      },
      {
        "id": "sink:call",
        "type": "sink"
      },
      {
        "entry_pc": null,
        "id": "fn:0x06fdde03",
        "selector": "0x06fdde03",
        "type": "function"
      },
      {
        "entry_pc": 1889567281,
        "id": "fn:0x313ce567",
        "selector": "0x313ce567",
        "type": "function"
      },
      {
        "entry_pc": 2514000705,
        "id": "fn:0x70a08231",
        "selector": "0x70a08231",
        "type": "function"
      },
      {
        "entry_pc": 2835717307,
        "id": "fn:0x95d89b41",
        "selector": "0x95d89b41",
        "type": "function"
      },
      {
        "entry_pc": null,
        "id": "fn:0xa9059cbb",
        "selector": "0xa9059cbb",
        "type": "function"
      }
    ],
    "version": "capability_graph_v1"
  },
  "id": 1964,
  "updated_at": "2026-04-04T19:53:06.000000Z",
  "version": "capability_graph_v1"
}

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.analysis_run' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
{
  "address": "0xbd247894dc95d7022363ac7c12a507a5db2e689c",
  "block_number": null,
  "chain_id": 1,
  "child_links": [],
  "created_at": "2025-12-19T20:03:53.000000Z",
  "id": "019b3836-2d76-71c8-97dc-996004a4b3cf",
  "parent_links": [],
  "status": "running",
  "updated_at": "2026-04-04T19:53:06.000000Z"
}

I’ve confirmed the bundle exposes a single `CALL` sink at pc `0x188`/392 and ERC20-like selectors. Next I’m disassembling the transfer path around that sink to determine whether it is an actual external-value transfer, a precompile call, or detector noise.
  ✓ Inspect BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json and related artifacts to understand contract structure and detector evidence
  → Assess potential vulnerabilities from bytecode evidence with explicit uncertainty
  • Produce final JSON report matching the required schema
exec
/bin/bash -lc "python - <<'PY'
import json
from pathlib import Path
obj=json.loads(Path('BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json').read_text())
code=obj['artifact']['runtime_bytecode']
print('len_bytes', (len(code)-2)//2)
print(code[:120])
print(code[-120:])
PY" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 exited 1 in 0ms:
len_bytes 1
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "<stdin>", line 6, in <module>
KeyError: slice(None, 120, None)

exec
/bin/bash -lc "jq '.artifact.runtime_bytecode' BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
{
  "full": "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",
  "head": null,
  "length": 1434,
  "tail": null,
  "truncated": false
}

exec
/bin/bash -lc "python - <<'PY'
import json
from pathlib import Path
obj=json.loads(Path('BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json').read_text())
code=obj['artifact']['runtime_bytecode']['full'][2:]
b=bytes.fromhex(code)
ops={0x00:'STOP',0x01:'ADD',0x02:'MUL',0x03:'SUB',0x04:'DIV',0x05:'SDIV',0x06:'MOD',0x07:'SMOD',0x08:'ADDMOD',0x09:'MULMOD',0x0a:'EXP',0x0b:'SIGNEXTEND',0x10:'LT',0x11:'GT',0x12:'SLT',0x13:'SGT',0x14:'EQ',0x15:'ISZERO',0x16:'AND',0x17:'OR',0x18:'XOR',0x19:'NOT',0x1a:'BYTE',0x1b:'SHL',0x1c:'SHR',0x1d:'SAR',0x20:'SHA3',0x30:'ADDRESS',0x31:'BALANCE',0x32:'ORIGIN',0x33:'CALLER',0x34:'CALLVALUE',0x35:'CALLDATALOAD',0x36:'CALLDATASIZE',0x37:'CALLDATACOPY',0x38:'CODESIZE',0x39:'CODECOPY',0x3a:'GASPRICE',0x3b:'EXTCODESIZE',0x3c:'EXTCODECOPY',0x3d:'RETURNDATASIZE',0x3e:'RETURNDATACOPY',0x3f:'EXTCODEHASH',0x40:'BLOCKHASH',0x41:'COINBASE',0x42:'TIMESTAMP',0x43:'NUMBER',0x44:'DIFFICULTY',0x45:'GASLIMIT',0x46:'CHAINID',0x47:'SELFBALANCE',0x48:'BASEFEE',0x50:'POP',0x51:'MLOAD',0x52:'MSTORE',0x53:'MSTORE8',0x54:'SLOAD',0x55:'SSTORE',0x56:'JUMP',0x57:'JUMPI',0x58:'PC',0x59:'MSIZE',0x5a:'GAS',0x5b:'JUMPDEST',0xf0:'CREATE',0xf1:'CALL',0xf2:'CALLCODE',0xf3:'RETURN',0xf4:'DELEGATECALL',0xf5:'CREATE2',0xfa:'STATICCALL',0xfd:'REVERT',0xfe:'INVALID',0xff:'SELFDESTRUCT'}
for i in range(1,33): ops[0x5f+i]=f'PUSH{i}'
for i in range(1,17): ops[0x7f+i]=f'DUP{i}'
for i in range(1,17): ops[0x8f+i]=f'SWAP{i}'
for i in range(0,5): ops[0xa0+i]=f'LOG{i}'
pc=0
rows=[]
while pc < len(b):
    op=b[pc]
    name=ops.get(op,f'OP_{op:02x}')
    if name.startswith('PUSH'):
        n=int(name[4:])
        arg=b[pc+1:pc+1+n]
        rows.append((pc,name,'0x'+arg.hex()))
        pc += 1+n
    else:
        rows.append((pc,name,''))
        pc += 1
for start,end in [(0,90),(90,220),(220,420),(420,520),(520,760)]:
    print('\\n--',start,end,'--')
    for pc,name,arg in rows:
        if start <= pc < end:
            print(f'{pc:04x}: {name:12} {arg}')
PY" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:

-- 0 90 --
0000: PUSH1        0x60
0002: PUSH1        0x40
0004: MSTORE       
0005: PUSH1        0xe0
0007: PUSH1        0x02
0009: EXP          
000a: PUSH1        0x00
000c: CALLDATALOAD 
000d: DIV          
000e: PUSH4        0x06fdde03
0013: DUP2         
0014: EQ           
0015: PUSH2        0x0047
0018: JUMPI        
0019: DUP1         
001a: PUSH4        0x313ce567
001f: EQ           
0020: PUSH2        0x00a4
0023: JUMPI        
0024: DUP1         
0025: PUSH4        0x70a08231
002a: EQ           
002b: PUSH2        0x00b0
002e: JUMPI        
002f: DUP1         
0030: PUSH4        0x95d89b41
0035: EQ           
0036: PUSH2        0x00c8
0039: JUMPI        
003a: DUP1         
003b: PUSH4        0xa9059cbb
0040: EQ           
0041: PUSH2        0x0123
0044: JUMPI        
0045: JUMPDEST     
0046: STOP         
0047: JUMPDEST     
0048: PUSH2        0x0152
004b: PUSH1        0x00
004d: DUP1         
004e: SLOAD        
004f: PUSH1        0x20
0051: PUSH1        0x02
0053: PUSH1        0x01
0055: DUP4         
0056: AND          
0057: ISZERO       
0058: PUSH2        0x0100

-- 90 220 --
005b: MUL          
005c: PUSH1        0x00
005e: NOT          
005f: ADD          
0060: SWAP1        
0061: SWAP3        
0062: AND          
0063: SWAP2        
0064: SWAP1        
0065: SWAP2        
0066: DIV          
0067: PUSH1        0x1f
0069: DUP2         
006a: ADD          
006b: DUP3         
006c: SWAP1        
006d: DIV          
006e: SWAP1        
006f: SWAP2        
0070: MUL          
0071: PUSH1        0x80
0073: SWAP1        
0074: DUP2         
0075: ADD          
0076: PUSH1        0x40
0078: MSTORE       
0079: PUSH1        0x60
007b: DUP3         
007c: DUP2         
007d: MSTORE       
007e: SWAP3        
007f: SWAP2        
0080: SWAP1        
0081: DUP3         
0082: DUP3         
0083: DUP1         
0084: ISZERO       
0085: PUSH2        0x02c4
0088: JUMPI        
0089: DUP1         
008a: PUSH1        0x1f
008c: LT           
008d: PUSH2        0x0299
0090: JUMPI        
0091: PUSH2        0x0100
0094: DUP1         
0095: DUP4         
0096: SLOAD        
0097: DIV          
0098: MUL          
0099: DUP4         
009a: MSTORE       
009b: SWAP2        
009c: PUSH1        0x20
009e: ADD          
009f: SWAP2        
00a0: PUSH2        0x02c4
00a3: JUMP         
00a4: JUMPDEST     
00a5: PUSH2        0x01c0
00a8: PUSH1        0x02
00aa: SLOAD        
00ab: PUSH1        0xff
00ad: AND          
00ae: DUP2         
00af: JUMP         
00b0: JUMPDEST     
00b1: PUSH2        0x01c0
00b4: PUSH1        0x04
00b6: CALLDATALOAD 
00b7: PUSH1        0x03
00b9: PUSH1        0x20
00bb: MSTORE       
00bc: PUSH1        0x00
00be: SWAP1        
00bf: DUP2         
00c0: MSTORE       
00c1: PUSH1        0x40
00c3: SWAP1        
00c4: SHA3         
00c5: SLOAD        
00c6: DUP2         
00c7: JUMP         
00c8: JUMPDEST     
00c9: PUSH2        0x0152
00cc: PUSH1        0x01
00ce: DUP1         
00cf: SLOAD        
00d0: PUSH1        0x20
00d2: PUSH1        0x1f
00d4: PUSH1        0x02
00d6: PUSH1        0x00
00d8: NOT          
00d9: PUSH2        0x0100

-- 220 420 --
00dc: DUP6         
00dd: DUP8         
00de: AND          
00df: ISZERO       
00e0: MUL          
00e1: ADD          
00e2: SWAP1        
00e3: SWAP4        
00e4: AND          
00e5: SWAP3        
00e6: SWAP1        
00e7: SWAP3        
00e8: DIV          
00e9: SWAP2        
00ea: DUP3         
00eb: ADD          
00ec: DUP2         
00ed: SWAP1        
00ee: DIV          
00ef: MUL          
00f0: PUSH1        0x80
00f2: SWAP1        
00f3: DUP2         
00f4: ADD          
00f5: PUSH1        0x40
00f7: MSTORE       
00f8: PUSH1        0x60
00fa: DUP3         
00fb: DUP2         
00fc: MSTORE       
00fd: SWAP3        
00fe: SWAP2        
00ff: SWAP1        
0100: DUP3         
0101: DUP3         
0102: DUP1         
0103: ISZERO       
0104: PUSH2        0x02c4
0107: JUMPI        
0108: DUP1         
0109: PUSH1        0x1f
010b: LT           
010c: PUSH2        0x0299
010f: JUMPI        
0110: PUSH2        0x0100
0113: DUP1         
0114: DUP4         
0115: SLOAD        
0116: DIV          
0117: MUL          
0118: DUP4         
0119: MSTORE       
011a: SWAP2        
011b: PUSH1        0x20
011d: ADD          
011e: SWAP2        
011f: PUSH2        0x02c4
0122: JUMP         
0123: JUMPDEST     
0124: PUSH2        0x0045
0127: PUSH1        0x04
0129: CALLDATALOAD 
012a: PUSH1        0x24
012c: CALLDATALOAD 
012d: PUSH1        0x01
012f: PUSH1        0xa0
0131: PUSH1        0x02
0133: EXP          
0134: SUB          
0135: CALLER       
0136: AND          
0137: PUSH1        0x00
0139: SWAP1        
013a: DUP2         
013b: MSTORE       
013c: PUSH1        0x03
013e: PUSH1        0x20
0140: MSTORE       
0141: PUSH1        0x40
0143: SWAP1        
0144: SHA3         
0145: SLOAD        
0146: DUP2         
0147: SWAP1        
0148: LT           
0149: ISZERO       
014a: PUSH2        0x01ca
014d: JUMPI        
014e: PUSH2        0x0002
0151: JUMP         
0152: JUMPDEST     
0153: PUSH1        0x40
0155: MLOAD        
0156: DUP1         
0157: DUP1         
0158: PUSH1        0x20
015a: ADD          
015b: DUP3         
015c: DUP2         
015d: SUB          
015e: DUP3         
015f: MSTORE       
0160: DUP4         
0161: DUP2         
0162: DUP2         
0163: MLOAD        
0164: DUP2         
0165: MSTORE       
0166: PUSH1        0x20
0168: ADD          
0169: SWAP2        
016a: POP          
016b: DUP1         
016c: MLOAD        
016d: SWAP1        
016e: PUSH1        0x20
0170: ADD          
0171: SWAP1        
0172: DUP1         
0173: DUP4         
0174: DUP4         
0175: DUP3         
0176: SWAP1        
0177: PUSH1        0x00
0179: PUSH1        0x04
017b: PUSH1        0x20
017d: DUP5         
017e: PUSH1        0x1f
0180: ADD          
0181: DIV          
0182: PUSH1        0x0f
0184: MUL          
0185: PUSH1        0x03
0187: ADD          
0188: CALL         
0189: POP          
018a: SWAP1        
018b: POP          
018c: SWAP1        
018d: DUP2         
018e: ADD          
018f: SWAP1        
0190: PUSH1        0x1f
0192: AND          
0193: DUP1         
0194: ISZERO       
0195: PUSH2        0x01b2
0198: JUMPI        
0199: DUP1         
019a: DUP3         
019b: SUB          
019c: DUP1         
019d: MLOAD        
019e: PUSH1        0x01
01a0: DUP4         
01a1: PUSH1        0x20
01a3: SUB          

-- 420 520 --
01a4: PUSH2        0x0100
01a7: EXP          
01a8: SUB          
01a9: NOT          
01aa: AND          
01ab: DUP2         
01ac: MSTORE       
01ad: PUSH1        0x20
01af: ADD          
01b0: SWAP2        
01b1: POP          
01b2: JUMPDEST     
01b3: POP          
01b4: SWAP3        
01b5: POP          
01b6: POP          
01b7: POP          
01b8: PUSH1        0x40
01ba: MLOAD        
01bb: DUP1         
01bc: SWAP2        
01bd: SUB          
01be: SWAP1        
01bf: RETURN       
01c0: JUMPDEST     
01c1: PUSH1        0x60
01c3: SWAP1        
01c4: DUP2         
01c5: MSTORE       
01c6: PUSH1        0x20
01c8: SWAP1        
01c9: RETURN       
01ca: JUMPDEST     
01cb: PUSH1        0x01
01cd: PUSH1        0xa0
01cf: PUSH1        0x02
01d1: EXP          
01d2: SUB          
01d3: DUP3         
01d4: AND          
01d5: PUSH1        0x00
01d7: SWAP1        
01d8: DUP2         
01d9: MSTORE       
01da: PUSH1        0x40
01dc: SWAP1        
01dd: SHA3         
01de: SLOAD        
01df: DUP1         
01e0: DUP3         
01e1: ADD          
01e2: LT           
01e3: ISZERO       
01e4: PUSH2        0x01ec
01e7: JUMPI        
01e8: PUSH2        0x0002
01eb: JUMP         
01ec: JUMPDEST     
01ed: DUP1         
01ee: PUSH1        0x03
01f0: PUSH1        0x00
01f2: POP          
01f3: PUSH1        0x00
01f5: CALLER       
01f6: PUSH1        0x01
01f8: PUSH1        0xa0
01fa: PUSH1        0x02
01fc: EXP          
01fd: SUB          
01fe: AND          
01ff: DUP2         
0200: MSTORE       
0201: PUSH1        0x20
0203: ADD          
0204: SWAP1        
0205: DUP2         
0206: MSTORE       
0207: PUSH1        0x20

-- 520 760 --
0209: ADD          
020a: PUSH1        0x00
020c: SHA3         
020d: PUSH1        0x00
020f: DUP3         
0210: DUP3         
0211: DUP3         
0212: POP          
0213: SLOAD        
0214: SUB          
0215: SWAP3        
0216: POP          
0217: POP          
0218: DUP2         
0219: SWAP1        
021a: SSTORE       
021b: POP          
021c: DUP1         
021d: PUSH1        0x03
021f: PUSH1        0x00
0221: POP          
0222: PUSH1        0x00
0224: DUP5         
0225: PUSH1        0x01
0227: PUSH1        0xa0
0229: PUSH1        0x02
022b: EXP          
022c: SUB          
022d: AND          
022e: DUP2         
022f: MSTORE       
0230: PUSH1        0x20
0232: ADD          
0233: SWAP1        
0234: DUP2         
0235: MSTORE       
0236: PUSH1        0x20
0238: ADD          
0239: PUSH1        0x00
023b: SHA3         
023c: PUSH1        0x00
023e: DUP3         
023f: DUP3         
0240: DUP3         
0241: POP          
0242: SLOAD        
0243: ADD          
0244: SWAP3        
0245: POP          
0246: POP          
0247: DUP2         
0248: SWAP1        
0249: SSTORE       
024a: POP          
024b: DUP2         
024c: PUSH1        0x01
024e: PUSH1        0xa0
0250: PUSH1        0x02
0252: EXP          
0253: SUB          
0254: AND          
0255: CALLER       
0256: PUSH1        0x01
0258: PUSH1        0xa0
025a: PUSH1        0x02
025c: EXP          
025d: SUB          
025e: AND          
025f: PUSH32       0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef
0280: DUP4         
0281: PUSH1        0x40
0283: MLOAD        
0284: DUP1         
0285: DUP3         
0286: DUP2         
0287: MSTORE       
0288: PUSH1        0x20
028a: ADD          
028b: SWAP2        
028c: POP          
028d: POP          
028e: PUSH1        0x40
0290: MLOAD        
0291: DUP1         
0292: SWAP2        
0293: SUB          
0294: SWAP1        
0295: LOG3         
0296: POP          
0297: POP          
0298: JUMP         
0299: JUMPDEST     
029a: DUP3         
029b: ADD          
029c: SWAP2        
029d: SWAP1        
029e: PUSH1        0x00
02a0: MSTORE       
02a1: PUSH1        0x20
02a3: PUSH1        0x00
02a5: SHA3         
02a6: SWAP1        
02a7: JUMPDEST     
02a8: DUP2         
02a9: SLOAD        
02aa: DUP2         
02ab: MSTORE       
02ac: SWAP1        
02ad: PUSH1        0x01
02af: ADD          
02b0: SWAP1        
02b1: PUSH1        0x20
02b3: ADD          
02b4: DUP1         
02b5: DUP4         
02b6: GT           
02b7: PUSH2        0x02a7
02ba: JUMPI        
02bb: DUP3         
02bc: SWAP1        
02bd: SUB          
02be: PUSH1        0x1f
02c0: AND          
02c1: DUP3         
02c2: ADD          
02c3: SWAP2        
02c4: JUMPDEST     
02c5: POP          
02c6: POP          
02c7: POP          
02c8: POP          
02c9: POP          
02ca: DUP2         
02cb: JUMP         

exec
/bin/bash -lc "python - <<'PY'
import json
from pathlib import Path
obj=json.loads(Path('BYTECODE_BUNDLE.json').read_text())
code=bytes.fromhex(obj['artifact']['runtime_bytecode']['full'][2:])
print([i for i,b in enumerate(code) if b==0x34])
PY" in /tmp/codex-vpms2yxl
 succeeded in 0ms:
[]

codex
{"no_findings":false,"summary":"Bytecode looks like a small legacy ERC20-style token with `name`, `symbol`, `decimals`, `balanceOf`, and `transfer`. I did not find evidence of proxy logic, `DELEGATECALL`, owner-only admin paths, or a meaningful reentrancy surface. The reported high-severity `CALL` at `pc:0x188` is better explained as an old Solidity string-return helper that appears to hit precompile `0x04`; I do not treat that detector hit as a standalone vulnerability. The meaningful bytecode-level issues are legacy ABI/payability behaviors: transfers are decoded without explicit calldata-length checks, and the contract appears to accept ETH with no visible recovery path.","findings":[{"severity":"low","category":"other","title":"`transfer` decodes calldata without an explicit length check","exploit_scenario":"A third-party integration that builds malformed calldata can trigger classic short-calldata/short-address style misdecoding. In that case the contract will zero-pad missing bytes instead of rejecting the call, so the decoded recipient and/or amount can differ from what the integration intended, potentially causing unintended token movements for that integration's users.","recommendation":"Reject undersized calldata before decoding arguments, or redeploy behind a modern compiler/ABI decoder that enforces argument length. If the contract is immutable, only expose it through wrappers/integrations that validate calldata length before forwarding.","evidence":"In the `0xa9059cbb` path, arguments are read directly with `CALLDATALOAD` at `pc:0x129` and `pc:0x12c`. I do not see a selector-specific `CALLDATASIZE` guard before those loads; the dispatcher simply routes by selector and falls through to execution. From bytecode alone I cannot prove a currently exploitable caller, so severity is kept low, but the decode pattern is the legacy one associated with short-calldata risk.","locations":["selector:0xa9059cbb","pc:0x129","pc:0x12c"]},{"severity":"low","category":"other","title":"Contract appears payable and can trap ETH permanently","exploit_scenario":"A user or integration accidentally sends ETH either directly to the contract or alongside a token call. The call appears to succeed, increasing the contract's ETH balance, but there is no visible bytecode path to withdraw or recover that ETH, so the value becomes stuck.","recommendation":"Add a `msg.value == 0` check on all entrypoints or provide an authorized recovery/sweep function. If the code is immutable, document clearly that ETH must never be sent to this address.","evidence":"The runtime contains no `CALLVALUE` check, and the unknown-selector / fallback path ends in `STOP` at `pc:0x45` rather than reverting. I also do not see any admin, withdraw, proxy, or selfdestruct path in the artifact; the only `CALL` sink is the string-return helper at `pc:0x188`, which is consistent with a precompile-assisted memory copy rather than an ETH recovery function. This is bytecode-only reasoning, so the conclusion is limited to visible runtime behavior.","locations":["pc:0x0","pc:0x45","pc:0x188"]}]}
tokens used
49,239
Metadata
{
    "codex": {
        "ran_at": "2026-04-05T02:30:45.479571+00:00",
        "returncode": 0
    },
    "project": {
        "mode": "bytecode",
        "bytecode_length": 1434,
        "bytecode_truncated": false,
        "capability_graph_present": true,
        "analysis_artifact_present": true
    },
    "summary": "Bytecode looks like a small legacy ERC20-style token with `name`, `symbol`, `decimals`, `balanceOf`, and `transfer`. I did not find evidence of proxy logic, `DELEGATECALL`, owner-only admin paths, or a meaningful reentrancy surface. The reported high-severity `CALL` at `pc:0x188` is better explained as an old Solidity string-return helper that appears to hit precompile `0x04`; I do not treat that detector hit as a standalone vulnerability. The meaningful bytecode-level issues are legacy ABI/payability behaviors: transfers are decoded without explicit calldata-length checks, and the contract appears to accept ETH with no visible recovery path.",
    "raw_final": {
        "summary": "Bytecode looks like a small legacy ERC20-style token with `name`, `symbol`, `decimals`, `balanceOf`, and `transfer`. I did not find evidence of proxy logic, `DELEGATECALL`, owner-only admin paths, or a meaningful reentrancy surface. The reported high-severity `CALL` at `pc:0x188` is better explained as an old Solidity string-return helper that appears to hit precompile `0x04`; I do not treat that detector hit as a standalone vulnerability. The meaningful bytecode-level issues are legacy ABI/payability behaviors: transfers are decoded without explicit calldata-length checks, and the contract appears to accept ETH with no visible recovery path.",
        "findings": [
            {
                "title": "`transfer` decodes calldata without an explicit length check",
                "category": "other",
                "evidence": "In the `0xa9059cbb` path, arguments are read directly with `CALLDATALOAD` at `pc:0x129` and `pc:0x12c`. I do not see a selector-specific `CALLDATASIZE` guard before those loads; the dispatcher simply routes by selector and falls through to execution. From bytecode alone I cannot prove a currently exploitable caller, so severity is kept low, but the decode pattern is the legacy one associated with short-calldata risk.",
                "severity": "low",
                "locations": [
                    "selector:0xa9059cbb",
                    "pc:0x129",
                    "pc:0x12c"
                ],
                "recommendation": "Reject undersized calldata before decoding arguments, or redeploy behind a modern compiler/ABI decoder that enforces argument length. If the contract is immutable, only expose it through wrappers/integrations that validate calldata length before forwarding.",
                "exploit_scenario": "A third-party integration that builds malformed calldata can trigger classic short-calldata/short-address style misdecoding. In that case the contract will zero-pad missing bytes instead of rejecting the call, so the decoded recipient and/or amount can differ from what the integration intended, potentially causing unintended token movements for that integration's users."
            },
            {
                "title": "Contract appears payable and can trap ETH permanently",
                "category": "other",
                "evidence": "The runtime contains no `CALLVALUE` check, and the unknown-selector / fallback path ends in `STOP` at `pc:0x45` rather than reverting. I also do not see any admin, withdraw, proxy, or selfdestruct path in the artifact; the only `CALL` sink is the string-return helper at `pc:0x188`, which is consistent with a precompile-assisted memory copy rather than an ETH recovery function. This is bytecode-only reasoning, so the conclusion is limited to visible runtime behavior.",
                "severity": "low",
                "locations": [
                    "pc:0x0",
                    "pc:0x45",
                    "pc:0x188"
                ],
                "recommendation": "Add a `msg.value == 0` check on all entrypoints or provide an authorized recovery/sweep function. If the code is immutable, document clearly that ETH must never be sent to this address.",
                "exploit_scenario": "A user or integration accidentally sends ETH either directly to the contract or alongside a token call. The call appears to succeed, increasing the contract's ETH balance, but there is no visible bytecode path to withdraw or recover that ETH, so the value becomes stuck."
            }
        ],
        "no_findings": false
    },
    "no_findings": false,
    "schema_version": 1
}

Opcode Heuristics

tool.cast_disasm
Delegatecall
0
Selfdestruct
0
CREATE2
0
CALL-family (heavy)
1
EXT*/BALANCE
0
Total opcodes
511
Flags
No heuristic flags raised.
View cast disassembly output
00000000: PUSH1 0x60
00000002: PUSH1 0x40
00000004: MSTORE
00000005: PUSH1 0xe0
00000007: PUSH1 0x02
00000009: EXP
0000000a: PUSH1 0x00
0000000c: CALLDATALOAD
0000000d: DIV
0000000e: PUSH4 0x06fdde03
00000013: DUP2
00000014: EQ
00000015: PUSH2 0x0047
00000018: JUMPI
00000019: DUP1
0000001a: PUSH4 0x313ce567
0000001f: EQ
00000020: PUSH2 0x00a4
00000023: JUMPI
00000024: DUP1
00000025: PUSH4 0x70a08231
0000002a: EQ
0000002b: PUSH2 0x00b0
0000002e: JUMPI
0000002f: DUP1
00000030: PUSH4 0x95d89b41
00000035: EQ
00000036: PUSH2 0x00c8
00000039: JUMPI
0000003a: DUP1
0000003b: PUSH4 0xa9059cbb
00000040: EQ
00000041: PUSH2 0x0123
00000044: JUMPI
00000045: JUMPDEST
00000046: STOP
00000047: JUMPDEST
00000048: PUSH2 0x0152
0000004b: PUSH1 0x00
0000004d: DUP1
0000004e: SLOAD
0000004f: PUSH1 0x20
00000051: PUSH1 0x02
00000053: PUSH1 0x01
00000055: DUP4
00000056: AND
00000057: ISZERO
00000058: PUSH2 0x0100
0000005b: MUL
0000005c: PUSH1 0x00
0000005e: NOT
0000005f: ADD
00000060: SWAP1
00000061: SWAP3
00000062: AND
00000063: SWAP2
00000064: SWAP1
00000065: SWAP2
00000066: DIV
00000067: PUSH1 0x1f
00000069: DUP2
0000006a: ADD
0000006b: DUP3
0000006c: SWAP1
0000006d: DIV
0000006e: SWAP1
0000006f: SWAP2
00000070: MUL
00000071: PUSH1 0x80
00000073: SWAP1
00000074: DUP2
00000075: ADD
00000076: PUSH1 0x40
00000078: MSTORE
00000079: PUSH1 0x60
0000007b: DUP3
0000007c: DUP2
0000007d: MSTORE
0000007e: SWAP3
0000007f: SWAP2
00000080: SWAP1
00000081: DUP3
00000082: DUP3
00000083: DUP1
00000084: ISZERO
00000085: PUSH2 0x02c4
00000088: JUMPI
00000089: DUP1
0000008a: PUSH1 0x1f
0000008c: LT
0000008d: PUSH2 0x0299
00000090: JUMPI
00000091: PUSH2 0x0100
00000094: DUP1
00000095: DUP4
00000096: SLOAD
00000097: DIV
00000098: MUL
00000099: DUP4
0000009a: MSTORE
0000009b: SWAP2
0000009c: PUSH1 0x20
0000009e: ADD
0000009f: SWAP2
000000a0: PUSH2 0x02c4
000000a3: JUMP
000000a4: JUMPDEST
000000a5: PUSH2 0x01c0
000000a8: PUSH1 0x02
000000aa: SLOAD
000000ab: PUSH1 0xff
000000ad: AND
000000ae: DUP2
000000af: JUMP
000000b0: JUMPDEST
000000b1: PUSH2 0x01c0
000000b4: PUSH1 0x04
000000b6: CALLDATALOAD
000000b7: PUSH1 0x03
000000b9: PUSH1 0x20
000000bb: MSTORE
000000bc: PUSH1 0x00
000000be: SWAP1
000000bf: DUP2
000000c0: MSTORE
000000c1: PUSH1 0x40
000000c3: SWAP1
000000c4: KECCAK256
000000c5: SLOAD
000000c6: DUP2
000000c7: JUMP
000000c8: JUMPDEST
000000c9: PUSH2 0x0152
000000cc: PUSH1 0x01
000000ce: DUP1
000000cf: SLOAD
000000d0: PUSH1 0x20
000000d2: PUSH1 0x1f
000000d4: PUSH1 0x02
000000d6: PUSH1 0x00
000000d8: NOT
000000d9: PUSH2 0x0100
000000dc: DUP6
000000dd: DUP8
000000de: AND
000000df: ISZERO
000000e0: MUL
000000e1: ADD
000000e2: SWAP1
000000e3: SWAP4
000000e4: AND
000000e5: SWAP3
000000e6: SWAP1
000000e7: SWAP3
000000e8: DIV
000000e9: SWAP2
000000ea: DUP3
000000eb: ADD
000000ec: DUP2
000000ed: SWAP1
000000ee: DIV
000000ef: MUL
000000f0: PUSH1 0x80
000000f2: SWAP1
000000f3: DUP2
000000f4: ADD
000000f5: PUSH1 0x40
000000f7: MSTORE
000000f8: PUSH1 0x60
000000fa: DUP3
000000fb: DUP2
000000fc: MSTORE
000000fd: SWAP3
000000fe: SWAP2
000000ff: SWAP1
00000100: DUP3
00000101: DUP3
00000102: DUP1
00000103: ISZERO
00000104: PUSH2 0x02c4
00000107: JUMPI
00000108: DUP1
00000109: PUSH1 0x1f
0000010b: LT
0000010c: PUSH2 0x0299
0000010f: JUMPI
00000110: PUSH2 0x0100
00000113: DUP1
00000114: DUP4
00000115: SLOAD
00000116: DIV
00000117: MUL
00000118: DUP4
00000119: MSTORE
0000011a: SWAP2
0000011b: PUSH1 0x20
0000011d: ADD
0000011e: SWAP2
0000011f: PUSH2 0x02c4
00000122: JUMP
00000123: JUMPDEST
00000124: PUSH2 0x0045
00000127: PUSH1 0x04
00000129: CALLDATALOAD
0000012a: PUSH1 0x24
0000012c: CALLDATALOAD
0000012d: PUSH1 0x01
0000012f: PUSH1 0xa0
00000131: PUSH1 0x02
00000133: EXP
00000134: SUB
00000135: CALLER
00000136: AND
00000137: PUSH1 0x00
00000139: SWAP1
0000013a: DUP2
0000013b: MSTORE
0000013c: PUSH1 0x03
0000013e: PUSH1 0x20
00000140: MSTORE
00000141: PUSH1 0x40
00000143: SWAP1
00000144: KECCAK256
00000145: SLOAD
00000146: DUP2
00000147: SWAP1
00000148: LT
00000149: ISZERO
0000014a: PUSH2 0x01ca
0000014d: JUMPI
0000014e: PUSH2 0x0002
00000151: JUMP
00000152: JUMPDEST
00000153: PUSH1 0x40
00000155: MLOAD
00000156: DUP1
00000157: DUP1
00000158: PUSH1 0x20
0000015a: ADD
0000015b: DUP3
0000015c: DUP2
0000015d: SUB
0000015e: DUP3
0000015f: MSTORE
00000160: DUP4
00000161: DUP2
00000162: DUP2
00000163: MLOAD
00000164: DUP2
00000165: MSTORE
00000166: PUSH1 0x20
00000168: ADD
00000169: SWAP2
0000016a: POP
0000016b: DUP1
0000016c: MLOAD
0000016d: SWAP1
0000016e: PUSH1 0x20
00000170: ADD
00000171: SWAP1
00000172: DUP1
00000173: DUP4
00000174: DUP4
00000175: DUP3
00000176: SWAP1
00000177: PUSH1 0x00
00000179: PUSH1 0x04
0000017b: PUSH1 0x20
0000017d: DUP5
0000017e: PUSH1 0x1f
00000180: ADD
00000181: DIV
00000182: PUSH1 0x0f
00000184: MUL
00000185: PUSH1 0x03
00000187: ADD
00000188: CALL
00000189: POP
0000018a: SWAP1
0000018b: POP
0000018c: SWAP1
0000018d: DUP2
0000018e: ADD
0000018f: SWAP1
00000190: PUSH1 0x1f
00000192: AND
00000193: DUP1
00000194: ISZERO
00000195: PUSH2 0x01b2
00000198: JUMPI
00000199: DUP1
0000019a: DUP3
0000019b: SUB
0000019c: DUP1
0000019d: MLOAD
0000019e: PUSH1 0x01
000001a0: DUP4
000001a1: PUSH1 0x20
000001a3: SUB
000001a4: PUSH2 0x0100
000001a7: EXP
000001a8: SUB
000001a9: NOT
000001aa: AND
000001ab: DUP2
000001ac: MSTORE
000001ad: PUSH1 0x20
000001af: ADD
000001b0: SWAP2
000001b1: POP
000001b2: JUMPDEST
000001b3: POP
000001b4: SWAP3
000001b5: POP
000001b6: POP
000001b7: POP
000001b8: PUSH1 0x40
000001ba: MLOAD
000001bb: DUP1
000001bc: SWAP2
000001bd: SUB
000001be: SWAP1
000001bf: RETURN
000001c0: JUMPDEST
000001c1: PUSH1 0x60
000001c3: SWAP1
000001c4: DUP2
000001c5: MSTORE
000001c6: PUSH1 0x20
000001c8: SWAP1
000001c9: RETURN
000001ca: JUMPDEST
000001cb: PUSH1 0x01
000001cd: PUSH1 0xa0
000001cf: PUSH1 0x02
000001d1: EXP
000001d2: SUB
000001d3: DUP3
000001d4: AND
000001d5: PUSH1 0x00
000001d7: SWAP1
000001d8: DUP2
000001d9: MSTORE
000001da: PUSH1 0x40
000001dc: SWAP1
000001dd: KECCAK256
000001de: SLOAD
000001df: DUP1
000001e0: DUP3
000001e1: ADD
000001e2: LT
000001e3: ISZERO
000001e4: PUSH2 0x01ec
000001e7: JUMPI
000001e8: PUSH2 0x0002
000001eb: JUMP
000001ec: JUMPDEST
000001ed: DUP1
000001ee: PUSH1 0x03
000001f0: PUSH1 0x00
000001f2: POP
000001f3: PUSH1 0x00
000001f5: CALLER
000001f6: PUSH1 0x01
000001f8: PUSH1 0xa0
000001fa: PUSH1 0x02
000001fc: EXP
000001fd: SUB
000001fe: AND
000001ff: DUP2
00000200: MSTORE
00000201: PUSH1 0x20
00000203: ADD
00000204: SWAP1
00000205: DUP2
00000206: MSTORE
00000207: PUSH1 0x20
00000209: ADD
0000020a: PUSH1 0x00
0000020c: KECCAK256
0000020d: PUSH1 0x00
0000020f: DUP3
00000210: DUP3
00000211: DUP3
00000212: POP
00000213: SLOAD
00000214: SUB
00000215: SWAP3
00000216: POP
00000217: POP
00000218: DUP2
00000219: SWAP1
0000021a: SSTORE
0000021b: POP
0000021c: DUP1
0000021d: PUSH1 0x03
0000021f: PUSH1 0x00
00000221: POP
00000222: PUSH1 0x00
00000224: DUP5
00000225: PUSH1 0x01
00000227: PUSH1 0xa0
00000229: PUSH1 0x02
0000022b: EXP
0000022c: SUB
0000022d: AND
0000022e: DUP2
0000022f: MSTORE
00000230: PUSH1 0x20
00000232: ADD
00000233: SWAP1
00000234: DUP2
00000235: MSTORE
00000236: PUSH1 0x20
00000238: ADD
00000239: PUSH1 0x00
0000023b: KECCAK256
0000023c: PUSH1 0x00
0000023e: DUP3
0000023f: DUP3
00000240: DUP3
00000241: POP
00000242: SLOAD
00000243: ADD
00000244: SWAP3
00000245: POP
00000246: POP
00000247: DUP2
00000248: SWAP1
00000249: SSTORE
0000024a: POP
0000024b: DUP2
0000024c: PUSH1 0x01
0000024e: PUSH1 0xa0
00000250: PUSH1 0x02
00000252: EXP
00000253: SUB
00000254: AND
00000255: CALLER
00000256: PUSH1 0x01
00000258: PUSH1 0xa0
0000025a: PUSH1 0x02
0000025c: EXP
0000025d: SUB
0000025e: AND
0000025f: PUSH32 0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef
00000280: DUP4
00000281: PUSH1 0x40
00000283: MLOAD
00000284: DUP1
00000285: DUP3
00000286: DUP2
00000287: MSTORE
00000288: PUSH1 0x20
0000028a: ADD
0000028b: SWAP2
0000028c: POP
0000028d: POP
0000028e: PUSH1 0x40
00000290: MLOAD
00000291: DUP1
00000292: SWAP2
00000293: SUB
00000294: SWAP1
00000295: LOG3
00000296: POP
00000297: POP
00000298: JUMP
00000299: JUMPDEST
0000029a: DUP3
0000029b: ADD
0000029c: SWAP2
0000029d: SWAP1
0000029e: PUSH1 0x00
000002a0: MSTORE
000002a1: PUSH1 0x20
000002a3: PUSH1 0x00
000002a5: KECCAK256
000002a6: SWAP1
000002a7: JUMPDEST
000002a8: DUP2
000002a9: SLOAD
000002aa: DUP2
000002ab: MSTORE
000002ac: SWAP1
000002ad: PUSH1 0x01
000002af: ADD
000002b0: SWAP1
000002b1: PUSH1 0x20
000002b3: ADD
000002b4: DUP1
000002b5: DUP4
000002b6: GT
000002b7: PUSH2 0x02a7
000002ba: JUMPI
000002bb: DUP3
000002bc: SWAP1
000002bd: SUB
000002be: PUSH1 0x1f
000002c0: AND
000002c1: DUP3
000002c2: ADD
000002c3: SWAP2
000002c4: JUMPDEST
000002c5: POP
000002c6: POP
000002c7: POP
000002c8: POP
000002c9: POP
000002ca: DUP2
000002cb: JUMP
View stderr
Warning: This is a nightly build of Foundry. It is recommended to use the latest stable version. To mute this warning set `FOUNDRY_DISABLE_NIGHTLY_WARNING` in your environment.

Findings

validated = confirmed for call sinks; sink observed for others
Severity Category Tool Title Confidence Validated Confirmed Details
high other detector Untrusted CALL target/value reachable 60 yes yes
view
trace_id: 0x9d132b36b9df7d489b16da31efba4682bd87d8729dd2caa4a8e3db2e69132a95
call_targets: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004, 0xbd247894dc95d7022363ac7c12a507a5db2e689c
target_varies: yes
classification: target_varies
validation_json
{
    "sink": "CALL",
    "errors": 0,
    "status": "confirmed",
    "attempts": 1,
    "trace_id": "0x9d132b36b9df7d489b16da31efba4682bd87d8729dd2caa4a8e3db2e69132a95",
    "confirmed": true,
    "trace_mode": "callTracer",
    "call_targets": [
        "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004",
        "0xbd247894dc95d7022363ac7c12a507a5db2e689c"
    ],
    "matched_probe": null,
    "target_varies": true,
    "classification": "target_varies"
}
witness_json
{
    "notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata",
    "constraints": [],
    "entrypoints": [
        {
            "calldata": "0x06fdde03",
            "selector": "0x06fdde03",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x06fdde03",
                "0x06fdde030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x313ce567",
            "selector": "0x313ce567",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x313ce567",
                "0x313ce5670000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x70a08231",
            "selector": "0x70a08231",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x70a08231",
                "0x70a082310000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x95d89b41",
            "selector": "0x95d89b41",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x95d89b41",
                "0x95d89b410000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0xa9059cbb",
            "selector": "0xa9059cbb",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0xa9059cbb",
                "0xa9059cbb0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        }
    ]
}
evidence_json
{
    "examples": [
        {
            "pc": 392,
            "opcode": "CALL",
            "returndata_checked": null,
            "value_expression_category": "computed",
            "target_expression_category": "computed"
        }
    ],
    "call_count": 1,
    "guards_detected": [],
    "untrusted_call_count": 1
}
high other detector ETH value transfer possible 55 yes yes
view
trace_id: 0x9d132b36b9df7d489b16da31efba4682bd87d8729dd2caa4a8e3db2e69132a95
call_targets: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004, 0xbd247894dc95d7022363ac7c12a507a5db2e689c
target_varies: yes
classification: target_varies
validation_json
{
    "sink": "CALL",
    "errors": 0,
    "status": "confirmed",
    "attempts": 1,
    "trace_id": "0x9d132b36b9df7d489b16da31efba4682bd87d8729dd2caa4a8e3db2e69132a95",
    "confirmed": true,
    "trace_mode": "callTracer",
    "call_targets": [
        "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004",
        "0xbd247894dc95d7022363ac7c12a507a5db2e689c"
    ],
    "matched_probe": null,
    "target_varies": true,
    "classification": "target_varies"
}
witness_json
{
    "notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata",
    "constraints": [],
    "entrypoints": [
        {
            "calldata": "0x06fdde03",
            "selector": "0x06fdde03",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x06fdde03",
                "0x06fdde030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x313ce567",
            "selector": "0x313ce567",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x313ce567",
                "0x313ce5670000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x70a08231",
            "selector": "0x70a08231",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x70a08231",
                "0x70a082310000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0x95d89b41",
            "selector": "0x95d89b41",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0x95d89b41",
                "0x95d89b410000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        },
        {
            "calldata": "0xa9059cbb",
            "selector": "0xa9059cbb",
            "calldata_variants": [
                "0xa9059cbb",
                "0xa9059cbb0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
            ]
        }
    ]
}
evidence_json
{
    "examples": [
        {
            "pc": 392,
            "opcode": "CALL",
            "returndata_checked": null,
            "value_expression_category": "computed",
            "target_expression_category": "computed"
        }
    ],
    "eth_value_calls": 1,
    "guards_detected": []
}
low other codex `transfer` decodes calldata without an explicit length check 65 no
view
evidence_json
{
    "evidence": "In the `0xa9059cbb` path, arguments are read directly with `CALLDATALOAD` at `pc:0x129` and `pc:0x12c`. I do not see a selector-specific `CALLDATASIZE` guard before those loads; the dispatcher simply routes by selector and falls through to execution. From bytecode alone I cannot prove a currently exploitable caller, so severity is kept low, but the decode pattern is the legacy one associated with short-calldata risk.",
    "locations": [
        "selector:0xa9059cbb",
        "pc:0x129",
        "pc:0x12c"
    ],
    "recommendation": "Reject undersized calldata before decoding arguments, or redeploy behind a modern compiler/ABI decoder that enforces argument length. If the contract is immutable, only expose it through wrappers/integrations that validate calldata length before forwarding.",
    "exploit_scenario": "A third-party integration that builds malformed calldata can trigger classic short-calldata/short-address style misdecoding. In that case the contract will zero-pad missing bytes instead of rejecting the call, so the decoded recipient and/or amount can differ from what the integration intended, potentially causing unintended token movements for that integration's users."
}
low other codex Contract appears payable and can trap ETH permanently 65 no
view
evidence_json
{
    "evidence": "The runtime contains no `CALLVALUE` check, and the unknown-selector / fallback path ends in `STOP` at `pc:0x45` rather than reverting. I also do not see any admin, withdraw, proxy, or selfdestruct path in the artifact; the only `CALL` sink is the string-return helper at `pc:0x188`, which is consistent with a precompile-assisted memory copy rather than an ETH recovery function. This is bytecode-only reasoning, so the conclusion is limited to visible runtime behavior.",
    "locations": [
        "pc:0x0",
        "pc:0x45",
        "pc:0x188"
    ],
    "recommendation": "Add a `msg.value == 0` check on all entrypoints or provide an authorized recovery/sweep function. If the code is immutable, document clearly that ETH must never be sent to this address.",
    "exploit_scenario": "A user or integration accidentally sends ETH either directly to the contract or alongside a token call. The call appears to succeed, increasing the contract's ETH balance, but there is no visible bytecode path to withdraw or recover that ETH, so the value becomes stuck."
}