00e62a53-8575-4729-8d8e-0cc98548c4a2
Open this run to answer one question: is this real attacker-relevant behavior with real impact, or just normal contract plumbing?
| ID | Type | Status | Attempts | Heartbeat |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31248 | report.consolidate | complete | 1 / 1 | 3 months ago |
| 104747 | artifact.fetch | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 104748 | tool.cast_disasm | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 104749 | analysis.bundle | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 104750 | capability.graph | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 104751 | detector.run | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
| 104752 | validation.fork | complete | 1 / 3 | 1 week ago |
No slither job recorded yet.
[codex:558668] OpenAI Codex v0.77.0 (research preview)
[codex:558668] --------
[codex:558668] workdir: /tmp/codex-multi-bo3m2f52
[codex:558668] model: gpt-5.2-codex
[codex:558668] provider: openai
[codex:558668] approval: never
[codex:558668] sandbox: read-only
[codex:558668] reasoning effort: xhigh
[codex:558668] reasoning summaries: auto
[codex:558668] session id: 019b7d56-0699-79a1-b5b0-7abfea86a71f
[codex:558668] --------
[codex:558668] user
[codex:558668] You are a profit-focused exploit hunter analyzing EVM bytecode. Your ONLY goal is finding ways to extract value (ETH, tokens, NFTs) from this contract.
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] Read `BYTECODE_BUNDLE.txt` completely before concluding.
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] ONLY REPORT if you find a CONCRETE, EXPLOITABLE path to profit. We do NOT care about:
[codex:558668] - Gas inefficiency, code quality, or best practices
[codex:558668] - Theoretical vulnerabilities without a clear extraction path
[codex:558668] - Generic footguns (unchecked return values, etc.) unless they enable theft
[codex:558668] - Issues requiring social engineering or off-chain coordination
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] PATTERNS WORTH INVESTIGATING in bytecode:
[codex:558668] - CALL/DELEGATECALL with controllable destination or calldata
[codex:558668] - Value transfers (CALL with non-zero value) without prior CALLER/ORIGIN checks
[codex:558668] - SSTORE to low slots (0-10) that might be owner/admin storage
[codex:558668] - ecrecover (signature validation) - look for missing nonce/replay protection
[codex:558668] - External calls before state updates (reentrancy)
[codex:558668] - SELFDESTRUCT with controllable beneficiary
[codex:558668] - Proxy patterns (DELEGATECALL to storage slot) with unprotected upgrade paths
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] For each finding, you MUST explain:
[codex:558668] 1. The specific bytecode pattern/offsets that indicate the vulnerability
[codex:558668] 2. The concrete sequence of transactions to extract value
[codex:558668] 3. Why you believe this is exploitable (not just suspicious)
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] If you cannot identify a concrete profit path from bytecode alone: set no_findings=true.
[codex:558668] Do NOT hallucinate. Bytecode-only analysis is limited - be honest about uncertainty.
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] Output MUST be valid JSON matching the provided schema.
[codex:558668] - severity: info, low, medium, high, critical (use high/critical ONLY for clear extraction paths)
[codex:558668] - category: access_control, reentrancy, math, oracle, upgradeability, auth, other
[codex:558668] mcp startup: no servers
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] thinking
[codex:558668] **Choosing method to read file**
[codex:558668] exec
[codex:558668] /bin/bash -lc ls in /tmp/codex-multi-bo3m2f52 succeeded in 5ms:
[codex:558668] BYTECODE_BUNDLE.txt
[codex:558668] codex-output-schema.json
[codex:558668] exec
[codex:558668] /bin/bash -lc 'cat BYTECODE_BUNDLE.txt' in /tmp/codex-multi-bo3m2f52 succeeded in 5ms:
[codex:558668] Runtime bytecode bundle for best-effort auditing.
[codex:558668] Note: without verified source, conclusions are low-confidence unless a concrete pattern is visible.
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] FILE: runtime_bytecode.hex
[codex:558668] 0x600436116046575b5f60605f8051602060898339815191525436603e575b8136915af43d90816035575b156031576060f35b6060fd5b815f60603e6029565b36838337601d565b5f3560e01c63adadadad0360075733733376ebc8dce3453a045a145ab7b1e728b2ed581e146072575f80fd5b60043560601c5f8051602060898339815191525500feabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcd
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] thinking
[codex:558668] **Decoding and analyzing Ethereum bytecode**
[codex:558668] thinking
[codex:558668] **Evaluating exploit possibilities in proxy logic**
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] I’m carefully examining whether the admin upgrade function can be bypassed or if delegatecall use might allow control over the implementation slot, but it seems well protected by a strict caller check and calldata size dispatch. I’m also checking the address extraction logic to ensure the admin parameter is correctly parsed and looking for any function selector collisions or fallback edge cases that might enable unintended access.
[codex:558668] exec
[codex:558668] /bin/bash -lc "python3 - <<'PY'
[codex:558668] import binascii
[codex:558668] hexstr=open('BYTECODE_BUNDLE.txt').read().split('0x',1)[1].split('\\n',1)[0].strip()
[codex:558668] # Actually file has 'FILE: runtime_bytecode.hex' line then hex line. Let's parse last line
[codex:558668] lines=open('BYTECODE_BUNDLE.txt').read().splitlines()
[codex:558668] for line in lines:
[codex:558668] if line.startswith('0x'):
[codex:558668] hexstr=line[2:]
[codex:558668] break
[codex:558668] bs=binascii.unhexlify(hexstr)
[codex:558668] print('len',len(bs))
[codex:558668] # show bytes around 0x80-0xa0
[codex:558668] for i in range(0x80,0xa0):
[codex:558668] if i>=len(bs):
[codex:558668] break
[codex:558668] print(hex(i),hex(bs[i]))
[codex:558668] # show 32 bytes from 0x89
[codex:558668] start=0x89
[codex:558668] print('slot bytes',bs[start:start+32].hex())
[codex:558668] PY" in /tmp/codex-multi-bo3m2f52 succeeded in 20ms:
[codex:558668] len 169
[codex:558668] 0x80 0x83
[codex:558668] 0x81 0x39
[codex:558668] 0x82 0x81
[codex:558668] 0x83 0x51
[codex:558668] 0x84 0x91
[codex:558668] 0x85 0x52
[codex:558668] 0x86 0x55
[codex:558668] 0x87 0x0
[codex:558668] 0x88 0xfe
[codex:558668] 0x89 0xab
[codex:558668] 0x8a 0xcd
[codex:558668] 0x8b 0xab
[codex:558668] 0x8c 0xcd
[codex:558668] 0x8d 0xab
[codex:558668] 0x8e 0xcd
[codex:558668] 0x8f 0xab
[codex:558668] 0x90 0xcd
[codex:558668] 0x91 0xab
[codex:558668] 0x92 0xcd
[codex:558668]
[codex:558668] thinking
[codex:558668] **Analyzing proxy bytecode and potential exploits**
[codex:558668] codex
[codex:558668] {"no_findings":true,"summary":"Analyzed runtime bytecode; it is a minimal proxy with DELEGATECALL to an implementation stored at constant slot 0xabcd…, and a single upgrade function guarded by hardcoded caller 0x3376…; no unprotected value transfer, selfdestruct, or writable upgrade path is visible, so no concrete profit path from bytecode alone.","findings":[]}
[codex:558668] tokens used
[codex:558668] 16,474
[codex:558668] {"no_findings":true,"summary":"Analyzed runtime bytecode; it is a minimal proxy with DELEGATECALL to an implementation stored at constant slot 0xabcd…, and a single upgrade function guarded by hardcoded caller 0x3376…; no unprotected value transfer, selfdestruct, or writable upgrade path is visible, so no concrete profit path from bytecode alone.","findings":[]}
{
"codex": {
"ran_at": "2026-01-02T06:15:22.941666+00:00",
"returncode": 0
},
"summary": "Analyzed runtime bytecode; it is a minimal proxy with DELEGATECALL to an implementation stored at constant slot 0xabcd\u2026, and a single upgrade function guarded by hardcoded caller 0x3376\u2026; no unprotected value transfer, selfdestruct, or writable upgrade path is visible, so no concrete profit path from bytecode alone.",
"raw_final": {
"summary": "Analyzed runtime bytecode; it is a minimal proxy with DELEGATECALL to an implementation stored at constant slot 0xabcd\u2026, and a single upgrade function guarded by hardcoded caller 0x3376\u2026; no unprotected value transfer, selfdestruct, or writable upgrade path is visible, so no concrete profit path from bytecode alone.",
"findings": [],
"no_findings": true
},
"no_findings": true,
"schema_version": 1
}
00000000: PUSH1 0x04 00000002: CALLDATASIZE 00000003: GT 00000004: PUSH1 0x46 00000006: JUMPI 00000007: JUMPDEST 00000008: PUSH0 00000009: PUSH1 0x60 0000000b: PUSH0 0000000c: DUP1 0000000d: MLOAD 0000000e: PUSH1 0x20 00000010: PUSH1 0x89 00000012: DUP4 00000013: CODECOPY 00000014: DUP2 00000015: MLOAD 00000016: SWAP2 00000017: MSTORE 00000018: SLOAD 00000019: CALLDATASIZE 0000001a: PUSH1 0x3e 0000001c: JUMPI 0000001d: JUMPDEST 0000001e: DUP2 0000001f: CALLDATASIZE 00000020: SWAP2 00000021: GAS 00000022: DELEGATECALL 00000023: RETURNDATASIZE 00000024: SWAP1 00000025: DUP2 00000026: PUSH1 0x35 00000028: JUMPI 00000029: JUMPDEST 0000002a: ISZERO 0000002b: PUSH1 0x31 0000002d: JUMPI 0000002e: PUSH1 0x60 00000030: RETURN 00000031: JUMPDEST 00000032: PUSH1 0x60 00000034: REVERT 00000035: JUMPDEST 00000036: DUP2 00000037: PUSH0 00000038: PUSH1 0x60 0000003a: RETURNDATACOPY 0000003b: PUSH1 0x29 0000003d: JUMP 0000003e: JUMPDEST 0000003f: CALLDATASIZE 00000040: DUP4 00000041: DUP4 00000042: CALLDATACOPY 00000043: PUSH1 0x1d 00000045: JUMP 00000046: JUMPDEST 00000047: PUSH0 00000048: CALLDATALOAD 00000049: PUSH1 0xe0 0000004b: SHR 0000004c: PUSH4 0xadadadad 00000051: SUB 00000052: PUSH1 0x07 00000054: JUMPI 00000055: CALLER 00000056: PUSH20 0x3376ebc8dce3453a045a145ab7b1e728b2ed581e 0000006b: EQ 0000006c: PUSH1 0x72 0000006e: JUMPI 0000006f: PUSH0 00000070: DUP1 00000071: REVERT 00000072: JUMPDEST 00000073: PUSH1 0x04 00000075: CALLDATALOAD 00000076: PUSH1 0x60 00000078: SHR 00000079: PUSH0 0000007a: DUP1 0000007b: MLOAD 0000007c: PUSH1 0x20 0000007e: PUSH1 0x89 00000080: DUP4 00000081: CODECOPY 00000082: DUP2 00000083: MLOAD 00000084: SWAP2 00000085: MSTORE 00000086: SSTORE 00000087: STOP 00000088: INVALID 00000089: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 0000008a: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 0000008b: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 0000008c: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 0000008d: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 0000008e: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 0000008f: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 00000090: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 00000091: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 00000092: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 00000093: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 00000094: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 00000095: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 00000096: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 00000097: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 00000098: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 00000099: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 0000009a: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 0000009b: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 0000009c: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 0000009d: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 0000009e: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 0000009f: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 000000a0: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 000000a1: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 000000a2: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 000000a3: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 000000a4: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 000000a5: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 000000a6: UNKNOWN(0xCD) 000000a7: UNKNOWN(0xAB) 000000a8: UNKNOWN(0xCD)
| Severity | Category | Tool | Title | Confidence | Validated | Confirmed | Details |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| high | upgradeability | detector | Untrusted DELEGATECALL target reachable | 55 | yes | yes |
viewtrace_id: 0xdca700c472ab196931fc8a07f512eaf32a6e557e9969b5bdb5ae27e3ed2cdaea
call_targets:
0x0000000011239a45196deff0fbd62245a77b363f, 0x522ccc5ff0935d2d8189fc59754ccb8b66a109a0
target_varies:
yes
classification:
target_varies
validation_json{
"sink": "DELEGATECALL",
"errors": 0,
"status": "confirmed",
"attempts": 1,
"trace_id": "0xdca700c472ab196931fc8a07f512eaf32a6e557e9969b5bdb5ae27e3ed2cdaea",
"confirmed": true,
"trace_mode": "callTracer",
"call_targets": [
"0x0000000011239a45196deff0fbd62245a77b363f",
"0x522ccc5ff0935d2d8189fc59754ccb8b66a109a0"
],
"matched_probe": null,
"target_varies": true,
"classification": "target_varies"
}
witness_json{
"notes": "heuristic witness; entrypoints are best-effort selectors with zeroed calldata",
"constraints": [],
"entrypoints": [
{
"calldata": "0xadadadad",
"selector": "0xadadadad",
"calldata_variants": [
"0xadadadad",
"0xadadadad0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
]
}
]
}
evidence_json{
"examples": [
{
"pc": 34,
"opcode": "DELEGATECALL",
"returndata_checked": null,
"value_expression_category": "n/a",
"target_expression_category": "computed"
}
],
"guards_detected": [
{
"pc": 107,
"type": "msg_sender_eq_const",
"value": 2.9381055698272e+47
},
{
"pc": 85,
"type": "msg_sender_eq_const",
"value": "0x3376ebc8dce3453a045a145ab7b1e728b2ed581e"
}
],
"delegatecall_count": 1,
"untrusted_delegatecall_count": 1
}
|
| medium | upgradeability | cast | DELEGATECALL present | 80 | no | — |
viewevidence_json{
"notes": "delegatecall enables execution in caller context; common in proxies/upgradeable patterns",
"delegatecall_count": 1
}
|